Global and local governance of shrimp farming in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam by Tran Thi Thu, H.
  
 
 
Global and local governance of shrimp 
farming in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tran Thi Thu Ha 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis committee 
 
Promoters 
Prof. dr.ir. Arthur P.J. Mol 
Professor of Environmental Policy  
Wageningen University 
 
Prof. dr.ir. J.W.M. van Dijk 
Professor of Law and Governance in Africa 
Wageningen University 
 
Co-promoter 
Dr. Simon R. Bush 
Assistant professor, Environmental Policy Group 
Wageningen University 
 
Other members  
Prof. dr. B.J.M. Arts, Wageningen University 
Dr. P. Vandergeest, York University, Canada 
Dr. S.R. Vellema, Wageningen University 
Prof. dr. J.A.J. Verreth, Wageningen University 
 
 
 
This research was conducted under the auspices of the Wageningen School of Social 
Sciences (WASS) 
    
 
 
Global and local governance of shrimp 
farming in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam 
 
 
 
 
Tran Thi Thu Ha 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis 
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor 
at Wageningen University 
by the Rector Magnificus 
Prof. Dr. M.J. Kropff, 
in the presence of the 
Thesis Committee appointed by the Academic Board 
to be defended in public 
on Friday 26 October 2012 
at 11:00 a.m. in the Aula 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tran Thi Thu Ha 
Global and local governance of shrimp farming in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam 
 
PhD thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL (2012) 
With references, with abstracts in English, with summaries in English and Dutch. 
 
ISBN: 978-94-6173-376-4 
 i 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This dissertation is the result of research conducted under the RESCOPAR project 
with funding from the Wageningen University Interdisciplinary Research Fund (INREF). 
I would like to express my gratitude to Wageningen University for enabling my studies 
and the Vietnam Forestry University for granting me study leave.  
During the past five years, many people and organisations have contributed in 
different ways to my research.  Without their assistance, advice, constructive criticism, 
collaborations and supports this thesis would not have been possible.  
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my promoters Prof. Arthur P.J. Mol, 
Chair of the Environmental Policy Group and Prof. Han van Dijk of the Rural 
Development Sociology Group at Wageningen University for their invaluable advice, 
guidance and encouragement from the start to the accomplishment of this thesis. 
Although they have many students to be supervised their time and effort are fairly 
distributed. I really appreciate their work and value their assistance beyond expression.  
My special thank goes to my co-promoter Dr. Simon R. Bush. His extensive 
knowledge and experience of Vietnam and Southeast Asia in the field of aquaculture 
governance was reflected by his critical comments during the process from preparing 
the research proposal to editing the thesis. Without his critical and detail comments on 
design, analysis and writing, the articles contained in the thesis would not have been 
what it has now become. 
This thesis is developed from invaluable information, experiences and support 
from many shrimp farmers, collectors, traders, and processing companies, as well as 
staff from the government  in Dam Doi, Nam Can and Ngoc Hien districts, Ca Mau 
province. My thank also goes to staff from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development as well as staff of NGOs in Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh city and Ca Mau city. I am 
greatly indebted to all of them. Special thank goes to Mr. Lam Thanh Dung, the head of 
Tan Long hamlet, Mr. Ho Day, head of Ben Dua hamlet, and Mr. Nguyen Thanh Tin, head 
of Rach Goc B hamlet, for their kind support and encouragement during my fieldwork. 
They made Ca Mau my second homeland and more than any others they have aspired to 
see the day my thesis is published.  
Many thanks are due to my colleagues from the Department of Economics, 
Faculty of Economics and Business Management, Vietnam Forestry University for their 
continuous encouragement and support during the time of this PhD study. Without you I 
 ii 
could not have spent such a long time in the Mekong Delta for my fieldwork as well as 
the time in Wageningen.  
I have also received a lot of support from College of Aquaculture and Fishery, Can 
Tho University, the partner of RESCOPAR project in Vietnam. I would like to express my 
thanks to Assoc. Prof. Nguyen Anh Tuan, Assoc. Prof. Nguyen Thanh Phuong, Prof. Le 
Quang Tri, Assoc. Prof. Nguyen Huu Chiem. Special thanks also goes to Ms. Doan Trang, 
Ms. Kim Lien and Ms. Ngoc Lien for their help with logistic arrangements during my 
fieldwork in Ca Mau.  
My gratitude goes to other staff of the Environmental Policy Group (ENP) for 
their assistance and guidance at various levels. Corry Rothuizen for her administrative 
and logistic support during the time I was at Wageningen. Gábor Szántó and  Dorien 
Korbee for their kind support with the ENP bike system. Other staff and PhD students 
for their enthusiasm in organising the leaning and social environment in our group.  Not 
forgetting my friends at ENP: Leah, Elizabeth, Hilde, Judith van Leeuwen, Judith Floor, 
Laurent, Harry, Eira, Carolina, Kanang, Marjanneke, Ching, Jennifer, Alice, Radhika, Li, 
Natapol, Joeri, Dan, Nhat, Anh, Dung, Hoi and the rest of the group. I will always carry the 
nice memories for our time together during lunches, dinners, discussions and 
excursions.  
I am very grateful to have been part of the RESCOPAR team which focuses on and 
contributes to the improvement of coastal areas both in Vietnam and Indonesia. I would 
like to acknowledge the role of the scientific leader Prof. Johan Verreth and scientific 
coordinator Assoc. Prof. Paul van Zwieten, as well as  other members of the RESCOPAR 
project for their contribution during the RESCOPAR meetings, workshops and all other 
related activities. My special thank goes to Dr. Roel Bosma for all the arrangements, 
support and encouragement he has given to RESCOPAR students. I thank my RESCOPAR 
friends: Gigi, Rina, Rini, Bambang, Audrie, Phung Ha, Nghia, Tuyen, Tuyet Hoa, Minh 
Dieu, and My Duyen for providing me friendship through the activities we shared 
together.  
I also extend my thanks to my Vietnamese friends in Wageningen: Thanh Phong, 
Kieu Nhan, Chanh Tin, Thuy Ai, Minh Hoa, Thai Anh, Kha Tu, Nhu Cuong, Viet Long, 
Hoang Vu, Phuong Loan, Tran Nhan, Giang Tuy, Tan Yen, Kim Anh, Thanh Binh, Quang 
Tu, the and the families Ke Quyen, Hoa Thierry, Thu Hau, as well as the rest of 
Vietnamese community in Wageningen. My life in Wageningen has been unforgettable 
due to your kind friendships. I will forever hold special memories of the staying and life 
with Phung Ha, Lan Huong, Tuyet Hoa, My Duyen, Minh Dieu, Kim Dung and Thien Tam. 
Thank you all for sharing with me the happy but also the sad moments.  
 iii 
I am indebted my host family Will and Pieter Matters in Twello, their children 
and their grandchildren for their warm loves and hospitalities since I first time came to 
the Netherlands in 1999. They are my family away from home.  
I dedicate this work to my parents Mr. Tran Van Y and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Minh Du 
who have always encouraged their children to become well educated. They have also 
taken care of my children when I left for my PhD. This thesis is also for my father-in-law 
and to the memory of my mother-in-law for their love and encouragement. I thanks all 
my brothers and sisters, brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law and their children for their 
supporting and continuously encouraging me during the past five years. I had a difficult 
time in Wageningen when could not share a final moment with my mother-in-law and 
my brother-in-law before they passed away in 2009 and 2011. This work is dedicated to 
you all. 
My deepest gratitude goes to my beloved husband, Nguyen Minh Thanh for his 
persistent love, care and support through my life. This work would simply be impossible 
without him. To my daughter, Nguyen Ha Anh and my son, Nguyen Tran Tuan Minh, I 
would like to say that you are the source of my motivation and energy to complete this 
difficult study.  I am sorry for the time that I was not able to be with you to take you to 
school, to cook for you,  to share everything with you. You all deserve this thesis.  
 
Wageningen, October 2012 
Tran Thi Thu Ha 
 iv 
  
 v 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................................. i 
List of tables ...................................................................................................................................................... ix 
List of figures ...................................................................................................................................................... x 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................... xi 
1   GENERAL INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 3 
1.1   Vietnamese shrimp aquaculture as a governance issue ..................................................... 3 
1.2   Governing shrimp aquaculture – a theoretical framing ...................................................... 6 
1.2.1   The social-ecological resilience of coastal areas ................................................................... 6 
1.2.2   From government to environmental governance ................................................................. 8 
1.2.3   Situating the state in environmental governance ................................................................ 9 
1.2.4   Positioning producers in their (global) market context ................................................. 11 
1.3   Research problem and objectives .............................................................................................. 13 
1.4   Study sites and research setting................................................................................................. 16 
1.4.1   Shrimp farming in Ca Mau province- at a glance .............................................................. 16 
1.4.2    Research approach and setting ................................................................................................ 21 
1.5   Outline of the thesis ........................................................................................................................ 25 
2   TRANSFORMATIONS OF VIETNAMESE SHRIMP AQUACULTURE POLICY ...................... 33 
2.1   Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 33 
2.2   Quality, transnational regulatory networks and the role of the state ......................... 35 
2.3 The transformation of state policy: From quantitative to qualitative production 
goals ................................................................................................................................................................ 38 
2.3.1    Land use policy ................................................................................................................................. 38 
2.3.2   Species diversification policy ...................................................................................................... 39 
2.3.3   GAqP and BMP mandatory implementation policy ........................................................... 41 
2.4    Private governance arrangements ........................................................................................... 42 
2.4.1   Naturland organic shrimp certification ................................................................................. 42 
2.4.2   Cooperative development policy and farmer cluster management practices ....... 45 
2.5   Discussion ........................................................................................................................................... 47 
2.6    Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 51 
 vi 
 3   REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF CERTIFYING ORGANIC SHRIMP PRODUCTION ........59 
3.1   Introduction .......................................................................................................................................59 
3.2   Certification as Environmental Regulatory Network (ERN) ...........................................61 
3.3   The evolution of integrated shrimp-mangrove farming systems ..................................64 
3.4   Regulating organic shrimp production and trade through certification ....................67 
3.4.1   Organic Environmental Regulatory Network ...................................................................... 67 
3.4.2   Farmer practices and compliance to the standards .......................................................... 69 
3.4.3   Value chain practices - premium payment and benefit sharing ................................... 71 
3.4.4   Auditing practices - Internal Control System (ICS) ............................................................ 72 
3.5   Regulatory challenges of ‘organic coasts’: A discussion ....................................................73 
3.6   Conclusions .........................................................................................................................................76 
4   QUESTIONING THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE  SHRIMP AQUACULTURE ..........................83 
4.1   Introduction .......................................................................................................................................83 
4.2   Upgrading and collective production for small-holders. ..................................................84 
4.2.1  Collective action and farmer cooperatives ............................................................................. 84 
4.2.2  Upgrading small-holders in global value chains .................................................................. 85 
4.3   Methodology .......................................................................................................................................88 
4.4   Shrimp farmer cooperatives and clusters in the Mekong Delta .....................................89 
4.5   The cases of shrimp farmer clusters in Ca Mau ....................................................................92 
4.5.1   Nhi Nguyet intensive shrimp farmer cluster ......................................................................... 92 
4.5.2   Tan Long extensive shrimp farmer clusters .......................................................................... 95 
4.6   A cluster panacea? A discussion .................................................................................................98 
4.6.1   Upgrading intensive vs. extensive production systems ..................................................... 98 
4.6.2   Improving quality management.............................................................................................. 101 
4.6.3   External support – the role of government, NGOs and the private sector ............. 102 
4.7   Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 103 
5   FOREST MANAGEMENT IN INTEGRATED SHRIMP- MANGROVE AREAS ..................... 111 
5.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 111 
5.2   Devolution of forest management and benefit sharing - implications for 
mangroves ................................................................................................................................................. 112 
5.3   Study sites and methods ............................................................................................................. 115 
5.4   National forest allocation and benefit sharing policy in Vietnam .............................. 117 
5.5   Results ............................................................................................................................................... 119 
 vii 
5.5.1   Forest management and allocation status in Ca Mau province ................................ 119 
5.5.2   Benefit sharing mechanism and income from mangroves ........................................... 121 
5.5.3   Farmer’s decision-making and perspectives on mangroves in two study sites ... 124 
5.6   Discussion and conclusion ......................................................................................................... 125 
6   GENERAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................... 133 
6.1   Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 133 
6.2.   The shift from government to governance and the changing roles of the state .. 135 
6.3   Value-chain governance and upgrading small producers ............................................. 141 
6.4   Shrimp farming governance and social-ecological resilience of coastal areas ..... 146 
6.4.1   Farming systems and their effects on the resilience of coastal areas...................... 146 
6.4.2   Linking scaling to shrimp farming governance and resilience of coastal areas. 149 
6.4.3   Global-local links, economic risks and their effects on the resilience of coastal 
areas ................................................................................................................................................................. 151 
6.4.4   Governance in the context of social relations and its implications for resilience
 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 152 
6.5   Final comment ................................................................................................................................ 153 
Annexes ......................................................................................................................................................... 157 
Summary ........................................................................................................................................................ 167 
Samenvatting ............................................................................................................................................... 173 
About the author ......................................................................................................................................... 179 
Completed Training and Supervision Plan ......................................................................................... 181 
 
  
 viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
List of tables 
 
 
Table 1.1. Communal sites, shrimp farming systems and governance arrangement selected 
Table 2.1. Shrimp farming in Vietnam and Ca Mau province  from 1999 to 2007  
Table 3.1.  Economic analysis of different systems of shrimp farming in Ca Mau province 
Table 3.2.  Naturland organic shrimp production in Tam Giang from 2002 to 2009 
Table 4.1. Number of aquaculture cooperatives and clusters , 2001-2008 in Ca Mau  
Table 4.2. Comparison of costs in intensive shrimp farms in and outside clusters 
Table 4.3. Summarising characteristics of two farmer cluster cases in Ca Mau 
Table 5.1. Description of sampled households according to percentage forest cover 
Table 5.2. Income comparisons between shrimp and mangrove harvests in sample 
households 
Table 5.3. Productivity, income and price of mangroves according to the year of cutting  
Table 5.4. Farmer’s perception and decisions making in mangroves  
Table 6.1. Challenges of governance arrangements and (potential) roles of the state 
Table 6.2. Level of social-ecological resilience indicators observed among farming systems 
Table 6.3. (Potential) impacts of governance arrangements on coastal resilience  
 x 
List of figures 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Aquaculture and shrimp farming area (ha) in Vietnam, 2000 -2009 
Figure 1.2: Shrimp production (tonnes) in Vietnam and the Mekong Delta,  2000 - 2009 
Figure 1.3: Vietnamese shrimp export values (US$ million), 2005 - 2011 
Figure 1.4: Shrimp production (tonnes) of the country, the Mekong Delta and Ca Mau 
Province, 1995 - 2009 
Figure 1.5. The shrimp supply chain in Ca Mau: actors, lines and relationships 
Figure 3.1. The map indicate Tam Giang and Tan An communes 
Figure 3.2. The proportion of different shrimp farming systems in terms of area in Ca Mau 
Figure 3.3. Proportion of income from aquaculture of different farming systems 
Figure 3.4. Ratio of forest to pond area as set out by the provincial government 
Figure 4.1. The map indicates Tran Phan and Tan Duyet communes 
Figure 4.2. Schematic comparison of the structure and trade relations of intensive and 
improved extensive production systems 
Figure 4.3. Farmer’s compliance the disease control regulations in 2008-2009 
Figure 5.1. Percentages of forest allocated to stakeholders in Ca Mau province 
Figure 6.1: Transformations of Vietnamese shrimp aquaculture policy- Case of shrimp 
farming in Ca Mau province, the Mekong Delta 
  
 xi 
Abbreviations 
ASC 
BCR 
BMP(s) 
CAMIMEX 
CDARD 
ERN(s) 
EU 
FAO 
FC 
FGD(s) 
FMB 
GAqP(s) 
GSO 
GVC(s) 
ICS 
IMO 
IFOAM 
MARD 
Minh Hai Jostoco    
NACA 
NAFIQAD 
NSMD 
NGO(s) 
PRA 
RESCOPAR 
RIA2 
SEANAMICO 
SFEs 
ShAD 
SIPPO 
SPS 
SPSS 
VASEP 
VND 
WSSV 
WWF 
Aquaculture Stewardship Council  
Benefit Cost Ratio 
Better Management Practice(s) 
Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corporation 
Ca Mau Department of Agriculture and Rural Development 
Environmental Regulatory Network(s) 
European Union 
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
Forestry Company 
Focus Group Discussion(s) 
Forest Management Board 
Good Aquaculture Practice(s) 
General Statistical Office  
Global Value Chain(s) 
Internal Control System 
Institute for Marketecology  
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
Minh Hai Export Frozen Seafood Processing Joint-stock Company  
Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific 
National Agro-Forestry-Fisheries Quality Assurance Department  
Non-State Market-Driven 
Non-governmental Organisation(s) 
Participatory Rural Appraise 
Rebuilding Resilience in Coastal Populations and Aquatic Resources 
Research Institute for Aquaculture No.2 
Nam Can Sea-products Import Export Join Stock Company  
State-owned Forest Enterprises 
Shrimp Aquaculture Dialogue 
Swiss Import Promotion Program  
Sanitary and Phytosanitary  
Statistical Packages for Social Science 
Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers 
Vietnam Dong 
White spot syndrome virus 
World Wild Fund for Nature  
 xii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shrimp farming village in Tam Giang commune, Nam Can district, Ca Mau province 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Chapter 1    
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   Vietnamese shrimp aquaculture as a governance issue 
Shrimp aquaculture emerged as extensive production systems in Vietnam in the 
1970s. In 1974, the UNDP reported that the area dedicated to shrimp culture in the 
Mekong River Delta was 70,000 ha, while the area of production in North Vietnam in 
1975 was estimated at approximately 15,000 ha (Nhuong et al., 2006). It was not until 
the 1990s, however, that shrimp aquaculture began to increase at a dramatic rate in 
response to efforts by the Vietnamese government to reinvigorate shrimp production 
(see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The programmes implemented shifted producers away from 
extensive traditional systems to improved extensive, semi-intensive and intensive 
production models (Anh et al., 2010) classified according to pond size, method of water 
exchange, feed and chemical use and stocking density. This gradual upscaling of 
production resulted in the harvesting of 93,503 tonnes of cultured shrimp from 324,100 
ha in 2000. Illustrating this continuing trend of intensification, by the end of the decade 
the area of production had nearly doubled to 623,300 ha, while production had 
increased by 342% to 413,132 tonnes (GSO Vietnam, 2011).  
A major driver of the aquaculture sector in Vietnam for the last 20 years has been 
the implementation of domestic structural economic reforms (referred to in Vietnamese 
as ‘renovation’, đổi mới) and the reorientation of the economy toward international 
trade in the 2000s. This resulted in the rapid rise of Vietnam to the ninth position in the 
world’s top ten aquaculture producers in 2000 (FAO, 2004). By 2006, Vietnam had 
reached third place in terms of quantity and second in terms of growth, with an annual 
average increase of 16.4% from 1998 to 2008 (FAO, 2006; FAO, 2010). While most 
neighbouring countries in Asia primarily produce white leg shrimp (Penaeus vannamei), 
80 to 90% of the production in Vietnam is based on the black tiger shrimp (Penaeus 
monodon) (MARD, 2009). The growth of the industry has been continuous with the 
exception of the impact of the US anti-dumping case in 2006, and the total value of the 
industry reached $US2.4 billion in 2011 (see Figure 1.3). The importance of this growth 
will continue as the government continues to promote shrimp production as a high 
value agrifood commodity that is exported to 91 countries; the industry is still 
dominated, however, by Japan, the US, the EU, Canada, South Korea and China, which 
together account for 66% of the total shrimp export value (VASEP, 2011).  
  These figures demonstrate that the Vietnamese shrimp industry is closely linked 
to global markets and that shrimp farmers are therefore embedded in the global value 
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chain. At the same time, shrimp farming in Vietnam remains relatively “under-
modernised” compared to other countries in Asia, with the total cultivated area 
dominated by improved extensive systems. The exposure to international markets 
coupled with a relatively low capacity to upgrade production has left the industry 
dependent on small holders who are vulnerable to global market perturbations and 
changing trade policy. This in turn has led to the reduced resilience of shrimp-based 
livelihoods in regions such as the Mekong Delta (see Tran, 2012).  
  
Figure 1.1: Aquaculture and shrimp farming area (ha) in Vietnam, 2000 -2009 
 
  
Figure 1.2: Shrimp production (tonnes) in Vietnam and the Mekong Delta,  2000 - 2009 
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Figure 1.3: Vietnamese shrimp export values (US$ million), 2005 - 2011 
While having had an impact on economic growth and poverty reduction, 
especially in coastal areas, the development of shrimp aquaculture in Vietnam has also 
contributed to the deterioration of coastal habitats, for example, the loss of mangroves. 
The natural resource base in many of the coastal areas of Southeast Asia has also been 
severely overexploited, particularly inshore fisheries. Many high value fish resources 
have declined, while catches of lower value species have increased; fish volume is also 
being depleted. Thus, despite the success of the Vietnamese government’s policy of 
promoting aquaculture to expand the supply to domestic and export markets, there has 
been no concurrent effort to ensure governance capacity to guarantee sustainable 
aquaculture production in fresh, brackish and marine environments (Vietnam Ministry 
of Fisheries and the World Bank, 2005). 
The Mekong Delta is one of seven ecological regions in Vietnam and is an 
essential habitat within the Mekong River Basin. The region consists of 13 provinces 
from Long An to Ca Mau and along the west coast to Kien Giang and contributes the 
largest volume and value of Vietnam’s aquaculture production (Vietnam Ministry of 
Fisheries and the World Bank, 2005). The region is also the biggest shrimp producer, 
accounting for from 73% to more than 81% of the shrimp production in the country. The 
annual growth rate for aquaculture in the region has been estimated at more than 10% 
compare to about 6% for the entire country (Loc, 2006). The development of shrimp 
farming in the Mekong Delta has created an important source of regional and national 
income that has given the region the highest economic growth rate in the country at 
14%, compared to an average national economic growth of 9% (Loc et al., 2007).  
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 6 
Undoubtedly, aquaculture and shrimp products from the Mekong Delta have 
become internationally traded, and farmers are therefore increasingly embedded in a 
global system of production and marketing. While aquaculture farmers and fishers in the 
Mekong Delta have greater market access and diversification compared to others, they 
also have a limited capacity to enter and effectively compete in international markets 
(Bush, 2005). The shrimp industry, with its many stakeholders and fragmented market 
chains, constrains the implementation of traceability systems and other increasingly 
stringent requirements for entering international markets (Vietnam Ministry of 
Fisheries and World Bank, 2005). Coastal resources in the Mekong Delta are increasingly 
vulnerable to rapid changes in land and resource use as a result of population growth 
and higher levels of investment following the inception of the government’s market 
liberalisation policies (Adger, 1999). Shrimp farmers in the region also face negative 
environmental impacts such as water pollution and the outbreak of shrimp disease. 
In January 2006, the Prime Minister signed the fisheries sector master plan, 
effective until 2010, and the development orientation, effective until 2020. These 
policies have the central goal of reorienting the sector to supply ‘large’ export markets 
(the EU, the US, China and Australia) with an improved capacity for high quality 
products produced in large quantities at competitive prices. Moreover, the policies aim 
to ensure the social, economic and environmental sustainability of the sector in which 
the main concerns are the quality and sufficiency of the seed and feed supply, disease 
control, and the management of environmental impacts. Following the broader rhetoric 
of the export-led economy, the government also wished to address poverty reduction 
through the improvement of quality for export markets. However, by positioning the 
shrimp industry in such a way to increase income, the government has also exposed 
producers to global market requirements in terms of quantity as well as the quality of 
shrimp products and the production process. Reducing the risk of negative 
environmental and social impacts is therefore dependent on improved government 
planning and management in the context of global markets and trade. Successful 
governance of the sector is consequently reliant on a complex balance of multiple goals 
associated with shrimp farming where different state and non-state actors show their 
interests and play their roles. 
1.2   Governing shrimp aquaculture – a theoretical framing  
1.2.1   The social-ecological resilience of coastal areas  
The wide variety of goods and services provided by the coastal zone account for 
its many uses, but the opportunities for employment, income and foreign exchange from 
coastal aquaculture have been overshadowed by negative environmental and social 
effects. The many uses of the coastal zone include fisheries, aquaculture, agriculture, 
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human settlement, harbours and navigation, recreation and tourism, and mining and 
industry. These multiple uses have given rise to conflicts over resource use. Recently, 
however, some of the most controversial conflicts have been related to the apparent and 
potential negative impacts of aquaculture (Primavera, 2006). Aquaculture, the farming 
of aquatic plants and animals in fresh, brackish and marine waters, is very diverse. 
Aquaculture systems can be classified as (1) extensive aquaculture, involving no 
intentional fertilisation or feeding; (2) semi-intensive aquaculture, using supplementary 
fertilisation and/or feeding; and (3) intensive aquaculture, which relies on added feeds. 
Aquaculture is also very diverse in terms of scale, ranging from poor smallholders in 
developing and transitional economies to large multi-national corporations. Aquaculture 
is also a highly complex sector comprised of sub-sectors (breeding, hatchery, nursery, 
grow-out, marketing and so forth) and interdependent on a wide range of associated 
industries (feeds, fertilisers, mediation and equipment).  
Shrimp aquaculture is considered a development opportunity in many 
developing countries where it has generated enormous revenues and is promoted by 
both national governments and international development agencies alike (FAO, 2010). 
Shrimp continues to be the largest single commodity in value terms, accounting for 15% 
of the total value of internationally traded fishery products (FAO, 2008). As shrimp 
farmers are increasingly embedded in global production systems, the control and 
management of their resources, collectively termed ‘governance’, has also expanded to 
include networks of state and non-state actors at multiple spatial and political scales, 
from local to global (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007). In response to concerns over 
environmental and social sustainability, the shrimp aquaculture industry, with the 
support of international NGOs, has responded to public perceptions and market 
requirements to develop more effective governance mechanisms (FAO et al., 2006). In 
the past two decades, considerable progress has been made in addressing aquaculture 
governance issues through both national and international corporate efforts with the 
common goal of ensuring the sustainability of the sector (FAO, 2010). However, as noted 
by Boyd (2006), reaching this goal requires a mix of forceful institutions, which involve 
interactions among institutions both horizontally and vertically to coordinate and 
cooperate at different global and local scales.  
Adger (2000) argues that by creating incentives for sustainable or unsustainable 
use, institutional arrangements are a central component linking social and ecological 
resilience. Part of the potential convergence and learning between vulnerability and 
resilience comes from a consistent focus on social-ecological systems. The concept of a 
social-ecological system reflects the idea that human action and social structure are 
integrated with nature and that any distinction between social and natural systems is 
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arbitrary (Adger, 2006). In the context of these social-ecological systems, resilience 
refers to the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a system changes to 
a radically different state as well as to the capacity to self-organise and to adapt to 
emerging circumstances (Folke, 2006). Vulnerability, in contrast, is usually portrayed in 
negative terms as the susceptibility of being harmed. It is the degree to which a system is 
susceptible to and unable to cope with adverse effects (McCarthy et al., 2001). 
Vulnerability and resilience research therefore have common elements of interest: the 
shocks and stresses experienced by the social-ecological system, the response of the 
system and the capacity for adaptive action. As Adger (2006) notes, social and ecological 
systems are themselves linked, thus the resilience of social systems is related in some 
way to the resilience of the ecological systems on which the social systems depend.  
Social resilience, including institutions for collective action, robust governance 
systems, and a diversity of livelihood choices, are important assets for overcoming the 
effects of ecological change and promoting social reorganisation. Effective multi-level 
governance arrangements are critical for building the capacity to cope with changes 
such as climate change, disease outbreaks, global market demands, subsidies, 
governmental policies, and other large-scale changes. The sharing of management 
authority requires cross-level interactions and cooperation, not merely centralisation or 
decentralisation (Adger at el., 2005). Therefore, policy interventions to reduce 
vulnerability must be able to identify vulnerabilities within social-ecological systems, to 
recognise the mechanisms which cause vulnerability in the first place and to redress 
marginalisation as a cause of social vulnerability. Further, as Ostrom (2001) and Brown 
(2003) indicate, policy interventions must recognise the plurality of knowledge types 
and governance systems that are used throughout the world to manage risks and 
promote resilience. 
1.2.2   From government to environmental governance 
Governance, a central term in this thesis, is traditionally understood to be 
synonymous with government. However, recently the term has acquired a new meaning, 
referring now to new processes, methods and techniques of steering the political, 
economic and social dynamics of societal decision making in which government is only 
one of the actors along with civil society and the private sector (Jabeen, 2007). 
Governance stresses the importance of these ‘other’ non-state actors and their collective 
interaction at local, national and global levels (Spaargaren et al., 2006). The terminology 
“new governance”, as referred to by Gunningham (2009), recognises that a shift is taking 
place in the role of the nation-state from hierarchical top-down, command-and-control 
regulation to a more decentralised, consensual and network approach, which provides 
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an opportunity for non-state actors to assume regulatory, managerial and mediating 
functions.  
To take into account the broad shifts in governance, but also explore the potential 
for innovation in decision making in shrimp aquaculture, this thesis uses the definition 
of governance from Kooiman and Bavinck (2005). Their work defines governance as the 
whole of public as well as private interaction taken to solve societal problems and create 
societal opportunities. They include the formulation and application of principles 
guiding those interactions and care for the institutions that enable them. The most 
important element of this governance definition is the term interactions, which indicates 
a specific form of action undertaken by actors to remove obstacles and tread new paths. 
The definition of governance also refers to the importance of institutions, which offer 
structure, order and predictability to human relationships such that social actors know 
how to interact, what is expected of them and what they can expect from others. 
Institutions are social constructs that guide human behaviour. They range from laws, 
which are formal and to which compliance is obligatory, to informal conventions, where 
conformance is expected. Therefore, the concept of governance should be examined as a 
social construct rather than a concrete mechanism in which the actors and their aims 
and implementations can be identified.  
Shrimp farming governance, as one of the sectors that uses natural resources for 
producing exported products, is often complex, taking into account the interactions 
between ‘vertically’ linked actors in the ‘shrimp chain’ involved in providing inputs (e.g., 
feed, seed and chemicals) and distributing outputs (e.g., shrimp and organic wastes) 
from production systems operating at different local and global scales (Thorpe et al., 
2005; Bush and Oosterveer, 2007; Islam, 2008). At the same time, shrimp farming is 
located in complex coastal environments, enmeshed in these landscapes through 
‘horizontal’ flows of water, disease, nutrients, salt and aquatic organisms. It is clear that 
the management of the sector requires powerful institutions and must involve both 
horizontal and vertical interactions to coordinate and cooperate at different scales 
(Boyd, 2006). Thus, a governance approach to the sector cannot focus on the state, the 
market or civil society alone, but should instead take into account how these three 
interact. How the shrimp sector, one of the most important sectors driving social, 
economic and environmental change along the Vietnamese coast, can move toward a 
more diverse, and therefore potentially more effective governance framework, remains 
a centrally important question. 
1.2.3   Situating the state in environmental governance 
There is growing debate, in both theory and practice, about the role of public-
private governance arrangements dealing with the perceived ‘inefficiencies’ and 
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‘failures’ of national and international environmental conventions, agreements and 
regulations. Attention has been given to the potential that has been invested in market-
based mechanisms, particularly environmental certification schemes (Palmujoki, 2006). 
Transnational and domestic non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been key 
actors in the creation of what Cashore (2002) refers to as non-state market-driven 
(NSMD) governance systems to develop and implement environmentally and socially 
responsible management practices (see also Cashore et al., 2004). Cashore argues that 
NSMD governance is distinct from other forms of public and private authority due to two 
important features. First, under NSMD conditions, governments do not create or require 
adherence to the rules, but act as one of the interest groups. Second, the authority of 
NSMD arrangements is granted through the market, where price premiums and 
increased market access play an important role in influencing production practices. 
The shift of control away from the state under NSMD governance shows that 
governments are expressly forbidden from being members or voting in decision-making 
processes. Instead, governments act as another “external audience” in accordance with 
NSMD dynamics. According to Cashore (2002), there are a number of governmental 
activities that are consistent with NSMD: (1) the existing rules and policy established by 
governments beyond the NSMD program itself play an important role, such as contract 
law, property rights etc.; (2) governments can act as a traditional interest group 
attempting to influence NSMD policy-making processes by offering advice or asking to 
help write specific rules; (3) governments can act as a large organisation by initiating 
procurement policies and other economic actions that may influence market-driven 
dynamics; and (4) governments can act as landowners in which public land ownership is 
a key part of natural resource policy and a common feature in developing countries. 
Furthermore, the state is one of the four broad sets of organisational stakeholders 
together with supply-side economic interests (producers that have to implement the 
rules), demand-side economic interests (customers, suppliers and other organisations in 
the supply chain who put pressure on producers to accept the rules) and social interests 
such as environmental groups, the media and labour organisations.  
One of the key criticisms of the NSMD perspective has come from Vandergeest’s 
(2007) work on shrimp aquaculture in Thailand. He criticises the notion that regulation 
is private and that the close interaction of state and market actors makes it difficult to 
sustain the ‘non-state’-‘market-driven’ divide when examining governance 
arrangements such as environmental certification. Instead, Vandergeest offers a 
perspective similar to the interactive governance frameworks outlined above, arguing 
that transnational certification arrangements are better understood as Environmental 
Regulatory Networks (ERNs). Through this networked approach, he argues, a more open 
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and accurate understanding of the authority, motives and practices of state and non-
state institutions in reducing environmental degradation, promoting economic growth, 
facilitating trade and ensuring food safety and quality for export can be created. This 
perspective is also supported by various other schools of thought, including the agrifood 
and ecological modernisation literature that is focused on environmental governance 
(Oosterveer, 2006; Spaargaren et al., 2006); in all accounts, scholars stress the ongoing 
blurring of boundaries among actors in the private and public sectors. 
The government’s role in shrimp aquaculture governance remains centrally 
important for establishing legislation to promote socio-economic development and to 
prevent (or reduce) potential environmental harm. Moreover, as Islam (2008) 
concludes, “though shrimp farming is a profitable industry … it does not reward 
everyone involved in it” (p. 216); therefore, the role of the government is to balance this 
gap, and when a country produces a high-valued transnational commodity for wealthy 
buyers like shrimp, “the more a government work[s] with the market, the more it will 
gain power” (p.220). The role of the government in governing shrimp aquaculture, 
however, has changed in the context of rising global private regulatory networks in 
which the government is a central interested party. In this changing situation, the issue 
of determining the type and degree of state involvement in establishing or supporting 
private forms of environmental governance is central to global commodities such as 
shrimp. Thus, how the government addresses balancing externally led global market 
demands and consumer concerns for the improved environmental and social 
performance of tropical shrimp production while maintaining sovereign control over the 
shrimp industry remains an essential question.  
1.2.4   Positioning producers in their (global) market context  
The second feature of NSMD, as outlined by Cashore (2002), focuses on 
“incentives” and their importance in affecting the decision making of farmers. As 
Reardon et al. (2009) indicate, farmers’ choices are based to a large extent on various 
market and non-market benefits (or incentives) that they can accrue through the 
production process. Market incentives for changing production practices to meet 
environmental goals exist when the relative net price reflects a premium for a given 
quality of product and the relative operational costs to meet these new requirements are 
comparable to the traditional channel (Reardon et al., 2009). The implementation of 
certification, a market-based governance scheme, was originally expected to provide 
incentives in which consumers were willing to reward producers’ practices with price 
premiums, access to new markets and improved market stability (Hock, 2001). The 
spread of environmental certification as an NSMD scheme, however, is mainly based on 
the role and interest of more powerful agents, such as retailers. This situation thus holds 
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the potential to create unfair situations where costs are imposed on producers without 
providing compensation through market premiums (Klooster, 2005). In the forestry 
sector, instead of opening new markets, certification has increasingly become a part of 
the buyer’s minimum expectations of ‘quality’ and a condition for market entry 
(Rametsteiner and Simula, 2002). From a managerial perspective, as mentioned by Béné 
(2005), standards are also thought to provide inadequate incentives for farmers to 
change their production practices and thus create an imbalance between environmental 
sustainability and the farmer’s economic welfare. 
Economic sociological perspectives provide a basis to explore what enables or 
hinders the realisation of ‘incentives’ embedded in local markets. How behaviour and 
institutions are affected by social relationships is one of the main concerns of social 
theory. Granovetter (1985) stressed the importance of personal interactions among 
individuals in structures or networks of relationships in generating trust and 
discouraging malfeasance. Thus, economic activities are embedded in these social 
relationships (Grabowski, 1998), and markets do not operate in social or political 
isolation but are instead instituted processes (Granovetter, 1985). Markets, either 
conventional or alternative, are structured by forms of governance regulating market 
entry, linking actors as well as the distribution of benefits (Taylor, 2005). Incentives can 
only be achieved by producers through a fair benefit sharing mechanism, which cannot 
be decided by the farmer individually, but must look to some type of collective action 
and external support for empowerment. The effectiveness of governance arrangements 
in developing a new mechanism for governing environmentally sustainable as well as 
social equitable production therefore depends on the ability of local producers to 
participate in the governance arrangements and access the added value from the new 
governance schemes.  
The global value chain (GVC) approach is a powerful instrument for exploring the 
organisational imperatives giving rise to international industries’ diverse network forms 
(Taylor, 2005). The GVC framework puts these social relationships in the value chain 
into a wider global perspective, therefore positioning producers in governance 
networks. This approach adds to ERNs because it recognises the role of the market and 
it’s embedded social relationships. According to Gibbon et al. (2008), “GVC refers to the 
set of intra-sectoral linkages between firms and other actors through which this 
geographical and organisational reconfiguration of global production is taking place” 
(p.318). GVC analysis underscores the role of powerful companies, the so called ‘lead 
firms’ in global economic governance that serve as the core actors in a segmented 
system to organise international production networks. GVC analysis also pays attention 
to the ‘value’ question, which has two components: first, how and by what processes 
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value is created, and second, how and by what processes the resulting value is 
distributed.  
Gereffi (1994) clarifies producer-driven and buyer-driven chains that are 
constituted by different governance arrangements. Producer-driven chains are high-
intensive capital and technology industries in which transnational corporations and 
large enterprises play a central role in controlling production systems. In consumer-
driven chains, large retailers and merchandisers build up decentralised production 
networks that export to Southern countries. Shrimp, as with many agrarian 
commodities, represent buyer-driven value chains where the governance structures 
locate the lions’ share of power over chain organisation, including the distribution of 
benefits, in the hand of actors from consuming Northern countries (Taylor, 2005). The 
success of governing shrimp farming is very much dependent on social relationships and 
their context, where small-holders such as shrimp farmers and other actors play their 
roles and show their interest and concerns. Alternative market-based instruments are 
socially embedded, and their operations are structured by particular governance forms. 
Successful operation, therefore, requires attention to both the formal and informal ways 
in which governance is organised (Taylor, 2005). The GVC approach allows us to 
understand and position small-holders such as shrimp farmers in the global market 
context.  
1.3   Research problem and objectives 
This thesis follows in the wake of shrimp farming in the Mekong Delta becoming 
a ‘boom crop’ (Hall, 2004), which means that the promise of high returns on investment 
has gradually been tempered by riskier returns in the global market and increasing 
levels of social and ecological uncertainty and vulnerability. The shrimp trade is faced 
with uncertainties and vulnerabilities that are emerging at the complex intersection of 
changing market conditions, such as food safety and quality standards, and ecological 
feed-back mechanisms, such as disease incidence and epidemics (Barbier and Cox, 2004; 
Oosterveer, 2007). The resilience of shrimp aquaculture, defined as the capacity to 
maintain integrity when faced with external changes and feedback from coastal socio-
ecological systems (Holling, 2001), is required to determine the best method for 
managing shrimp production to ensure ecological and social resilience in coastal areas.  
Shrimp farming in the Mekong Delta, as in other areas, is widely recognised as an 
example of a sector that makes unsustainable use of natural resources for export 
markets, undermines food security at the local level, reduces prospects for future 
development and poverty alleviation (Bailey, 1988; Folke and Kautsky, 1992; Stonich, 
1995; Primavera, 1997; Vandergeest et al., 1999; Stonich and Vandergeest, 2001; 
Primavera, 2006; Rivera-Ferre, 2009) and leads to environmental degradation. The 
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regulatory approach to governing shrimp farming, however, is limited in its ability to 
enforce the legislation of the government agencies, and economic 
incentives/disincentives in the form of market-based governance may be more effective 
in inducing behavioural changes toward the environment. In this situation, there is 
increasing reference to international policy which led to complex relationships between 
the state, international development agencies, private firms and local actors managing 
and exploiting coastal resources. Therefore, the need for a better understanding of the 
institutional network governing coastal resources has emerged. This will alleviate 
problems associated with the lack of information and communication among resource 
users, managers and scientists, which is often mentioned as the reason for difficulties in 
implementing ecosystem-based knowledge in coastal zone management.  
Shrimp farming governance, understood as a set of state and non-state 
institutions, is important for the use and management of coastal resources. The 
questions of what is complementary and what is a trade-off between state and non-state 
governance arrangements governing coastal resources needs to be answered as a 
contribution to theoretical development and for discerning ways to solve the problems 
facing the Mekong Delta. As such, a set of governance arrangements that combines 
government legislation, market-based governance arrangements at higher levels and 
local governance arrangements consisting of both formal and informal institutions 
should be established to better respond to resilient social and ecological systems in 
coastal Mekong Delta areas.  
The general objective of this thesis is to investigate different environmental 
governance arrangements concerning shrimp farming and the interactions between 
existing state and non-state actors and institutions. Specifically, the research will 
develop a more informed understanding of how state, market and community-based 
governance arrangements at different levels influence decision making regarding 
shrimp farming in the Mekong Delta. The general research question is: How do different 
material conditions and social relationships affect the effectiveness and responsiveness 
of different governance arrangements in achieving the multiple goals of maintaining 
rural livelihoods, environmental sustainability and food quality?  
This question is addressed through the following four sub-questions: 
 First, to what extent has the shift to private transnational regulatory networks 
changed the role of the government from a regulator to a facilitator of global 
private governance interests and arrangements?  
The shift from state to private/market-based governance of shrimp production 
and the changing roles of the state over shrimp governance raises a number of questions 
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for the Vietnamese government, which will have to reassess its involvement in the 
(partial) deferral of environmental governance to these transnational networks. This 
question addresses the on-going shift in the environmental governance in Vietnamese 
shrimp production by simultaneously focusing on the perceived limitations and failures 
of the state-centred approach to shrimp aquaculture and the on-going challenges of 
private governance arrangements in effectively steering producers to comply with 
quality standards.  
 Second, if the government continues to use certification to strategically govern 
shrimp farming, what will be the effect on industry actors trying to balance 
economic and social goals with ecological goals? 
The research explores the regulatory challenges of using Naturland organic 
certification as a means of linking farm-level management to the sustainability of coastal 
(mangrove) landscapes. In doing so, it is driven by two areas of inquiry. First, what are 
the regulatory challenges of upscaling organic certification to coastal landscapes? 
Second, what are the (potential) roles and levels of involvement of different government 
institutions in such certification-based forms of environmental governance? Based on 
the organisational logic of ERNs, the analysis identifies and explores multiple linkages 
among actors to understand how these relationships influence practices in areas such as 
primary production and trade.  
 Third, what are the abilities and challenges of the shrimp farmer cluster and 
cooperative models to promoting small-holder upgrading in the context of 
increasing quality demands in international markets? 
To answer this question, we critique the normative position of upgrading by 
questioning the extent to which shrimp farmer cooperatives and clusters in Vietnam 
provide a vehicle for changing production practices to comply with sustainability 
standards and, in doing so, improving their competitiveness in the value chain. In 
particular, this question explores whether cooperative forms of production enable 
producers to improve environmental and quality management and, in turn, facilitate 
improved bargaining power with processing companies. Farmer cooperatives and 
clusters are one of the shrimp farming governance arrangements that can be viewed as a 
community-based mechanism, although because of the history of Vietnamese 
collectivisation, it remains closely linked to the state. As such, the scepticism of 
producers in response to different types of state involvement is also addressed.  
 Fourth, what are the possibilities for creating more incentives for shrimp farmers to 
plant and protect mangroves in integrated shrimp-mangrove areas to ensure the 
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ecological functions of the forests, while also increasing income for the shrimp 
farmers? 
The research provides an understanding of the issues surrounding mangrove 
management and policy implementation where forest production is integrated with 
shrimp farming to show how changes in the legal rights associated with devolution of 
forest management are related to actual rights and the distribution of benefits of forest 
management practices. We then challenge the assumption that mangrove forests cannot 
compete with more competitive land uses such as shrimp farming. This understanding is 
valuable for policy makers and managers in reconsidering the effect of shrimp farming 
and the roles of shrimp farmers in planting and protecting mangroves in coastal areas. 
Mangrove forest policy and management is one of the state regulations in integrated 
shrimp-mangrove areas that also directly affects the ecological function of the forests 
and income generation by shrimp farmers. 
Based on these four research questions, this thesis contributes to understanding 
the role and influence of local and global governance processes in shrimp farming with a 
specific focus on the sustainable use of resources contributing to long term economic 
and environmental viability of shrimp production and globally traded shrimp products. 
The research draws out issues of control and access to local resources and resource 
users in coastal habitats within the wider context of increasingly globalised markets and 
policy intervention. The research will provide contextualised information for 
governance reform consisting of state legislation, certification schemes and community 
management that takes into consideration local and global processes. 
1.4   Study sites and research setting  
1.4.1   Shrimp farming in Ca Mau province- at a glance 
Ca Mau province is located in the southernmost part of Vietnam in the Mekong 
Delta region. It is bordered on the north by Bac Lieu and Kien Giang provinces, in the 
west by the Gulf of Thailand and in the south and east by the East Sea. The total inland 
area of the province is 5,331.6 square kilometres, and with a population of 1,207,000 
people, it has a population density of 226 persons per square kilometre (GSO Vietnam, 
2010). The population density of the province is lower than the average for the Mekong 
Delta of 425 persons per square kilometre as well as the national average of 260 persons 
per square kilometre. Ca Mau is the leading province in terms of both area and output of 
shrimp cultivation in Vietnam. In 2009, the surface area of shrimp farming in Ca Mau 
reached 265,153 ha, the equivalent of 43% of the total shrimp farming area in Vietnam 
(623,300 ha), and produced 99,600 tonnes or 25% of the country’s total production 
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(MARD, 2009). The natural conditions of the province are very much favourable for 
shrimp farming and especially for diverse shrimp farming systems.  
 Shrimp farming systems in Ca Mau  
There are four shrimp farming systems currently practiced by farmers in Ca Mau: 
improved extensive, intensive, integrated shrimp-rice and integrated shrimp-
mangroves. The integrated shrimp-rice system, however, is not the object of this 
research because it is not present in the three districts selected as study sites. Shrimp 
farming began in the province in the early 1980s using the extensive farming system, a 
natural seed supply and no supplementary feeding; the average annual production 
reached approximately 250 kg ha-1yr-1 (de Graaf and Xuan, 1998). However, this system 
is no longer practiced by farmers because of declining natural larvae sources. With 
support from the government, a series of shrimp hatcheries were started between 1990 
and 1992. Since that time, the farmers have stocked artificially propagated shrimp. In 
1995, after the introduction of artificial stocking, the extensive system was classified as 
‘improved extensive’, and shrimp productivity increased to 450 kg ha-1yr-1 (de Graaf and 
Xuan, 1998).  
In the improved extensive shrimp farming system, artificial stock is used, but the 
shrimp feed on naturally occurring plankton. The farmers start their crop in September-
October after pond preparation and improvement once a year. At that time, farmers 
stock shrimp with a density of 2-3 fingerlings per square meter (this is called the main 
stocking). Every month following, the farmers stock supplementary fingerlings 
amounting to 10% of the initial stocking. For example, in one hectare of improved 
extensive pond, a farmer stocks 20,000 fingerlings in September. In October and all 
subsequent months, the farmer stocks a supplementary 2,000 fingerlings. Four months 
after the main stocking, shrimp are harvested. Farmers harvest twice each month, with 
each harvest lasting seven days based on the natural water exchange system. This 
means that farmers can harvest shrimp roughly 14 days per month. As a result, shrimp 
production is very fragmented, and the role of collectors becomes important within the 
shrimp supply chain for the location. The improved extensive shrimp ponds cover a 
large space, normally two to three hectares, often the majority of the area owned by a 
household. This system is now the main model practiced by farmers in the province and 
has the largest area compared to other shrimp farming systems.  
In 1995, a large disease outbreak in Ca Mau led to a decrease in the supply of 
natural shrimp fingerlings, and farmers started stocking reared shrimp seed in 
integrated shrimp-mangrove farms. The effects of land use after forest land allocation 
implementation in Ca Mau not only caused the massive destruction of mangroves that 
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serve as nursing grounds for natural shrimp but also resulted in negative changes in 
water quality due to the construction of shrimp ponds and poor pond management 
practices. The shrimp production in improved extensive coastal areas of Ca Mau 
Province, such as Nam Can and Ngoc Hien, as assessed by farmers is lower than before 
and remains in a continuous state of decline. Farmers mentioned that shrimp production 
is mainly based on the water conditions and shrimp seed quality. Before 1995, shrimp 
seed was not well managed and had lower quality, but shrimp production was still 
higher than it is currently; thus, poor water conditions due to the pollution caused by 
shrimp farming was blamed as the main source for this decline.  
By the early 2000s, a more intensive system with high density stocking and a 
high level of industrial feeding was introduced and practiced by farmers in Ca Mau. The 
intensive ponds are smaller than the improved extensive ponds with an average of 2,000 
square meters. In this system, farmers stock with a density of 20-30 fingerlings per 
square meter only one time for one crop. Water exchange between the pond and the 
channel is very limited. After five to six months, the shrimp can be harvested all at once, 
reaching a productivity of 4,000-5,000 kg ha-1yr-1 (CDARD, 2010). A number of farmers 
sometimes stock only 8-12 fingerlings per square meter to achieve larger shrimp sizes. 
In this system, aerators are placed in the ponds to provide more oxygen in the pools (the 
propellers of the aerators extend roughly one meter deep into the pond). Intensive 
farmers have to feed the shrimp industrial feed and antibiotics because disease can 
spread easily in the cramped ponds. Intensive farms are therefore much more expensive 
to run because they require so much energy, material, and labour. Shrimp farmers who 
do intensive farming must have a sound financial basis and experience to invest in this 
system. The introduction of improved extensive and intensive farming systems 
promoted a dramatic increase in shrimp production in the province, the region and the 
country after 2000 (see Figure 1.4).   
These two farming systems (improved extensive and intensive) are currently 
practiced in the form of monoculture, but farmers in Ca Mau also practice shrimp 
farming in the form of integration with mangroves. Being one of the few provinces in the 
Mekong Delta and Vietnam that has large areas of mangroves, the integrated shrimp-
mangrove farming system is a special characteristic of Ca Mau. In this system, pond and 
mangroves are integrated with a mangrove ratio ranging from 30% to 70% depending 
on the total size of the cultivated land. Except for having mangroves inside of the pond, 
this farming technique is almost the same as the improved extensive shrimp farming 
system practiced in the non-mangrove areas. This type of integrated shrimp-mangrove 
farming model only occurs in the Nam Can and Ngoc Hien districts where mangroves 
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still exist and grow well. In Ngoc Hien district, this is the only farming system that is 
practiced by farmers.  
 
Figure 1.4: Shrimp production (tonnes) of the country, the Mekong Delta and Ca Mau 
province, 1995 - 2009 
In 2009, from a total of 265,233 ha of shrimp farming, the improved extensive 
monoculture system accounted for 65%, the integrated shrimp-rice system for 19.16% 
and the integrated shrimp-mangrove system for 15% of the total shrimp cultivated 
areas, while the intensive system only accounted for 0.5% of the total area. Overall, the 
average provincial shrimp productivity is 356 kg ha-1yr-1, which is much lower than that 
in the other provinces in the Mekong Delta (CDARD, 2010) because of the fact that 
farming systems here are much more extensive compared to other provinces in the 
region such as Bac Lieu and Soc Trang. The data also shows that shrimp productivity is 
declining compared to what it was when the improved extensive farming system was 
first introduced in the province in 1995. To increase shrimp production in Ca Mau, the 
provincial government planned to expand intensive farming areas from 984 ha in 2005 
to 10,000 ha by the year 2010. The plan was too ambitious and did not take into account 
either the natural conditions or the farmers’ ability to upgrade to the intensive system. 
From 2008 to 2010, the area used for intensive shrimp farming remained stable at 1,300 
ha, which was much lower than the objective.  
 The shrimp supply chain in Ca Mau  
Shrimp supply chains present different actors and their relationships along the 
chain starting from shrimp farmers as producers and ending at processing companies as 
the processor. In Ca Mau, the shrimp supply chains can be divided into four types (see 
Figure 1.5). Line 1 shows that the shrimp must go through at least three intermediate 
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actors to reach the processing company. Farmers first sell the shrimp to small collectors 
who normally collect shrimp from 25 to 30 farmers. Small collectors then sell the shrimp 
to a larger collector who may collect shrimp from 10 small collectors. The shrimp from 
the large collector is then sold to a trader located in the town/city or to the nearby 
processing company and then from the trader to the processing company. This line of 
the shrimp supply chain is the longest and occurs in monoculture improved extensive 
and integrated shrimp-mangrove farming areas where production and products are 
fragmented and far from the market place. Most of the shrimp farms in the Tam Giang 
commune (Nam Can district) and the Tan An commune (Ngoc Hien district) belong to 
this type of supply chain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5. The shrimp supply chain in Ca Mau: actors, lines and relationships 
In line 2, shrimp farmers sell their products to a large collector who will then sell 
the shrimp to a trader and then to the processing company. This line of the value chain 
occurs mainly in monoculture improved extensive farms located near a town or market 
place. Most of the monoculture improved extensive shrimp farmers in the Tan Duyet 
commune (Dam Doi district) join this line of the supply chain. In line 3, shrimp farmers 
can sell their products to a trader, the only middle step on the way to the processing 
company. Most intensive shrimp farms belong to this type of supply chain if they do not 
have a direct selling contract with the processing company, but rather with a trader. In 
line 4, the shortest line, intensive shrimp farmers can directly sell products to the 
processing company without any intermediate steps. These farmers have a selling 
contract with the processing company either individually or in groups in the form of a 
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cooperative or cluster. The last two lines can be found mainly in the Dam Doi district 
where intensive shrimp farming is popular and the processing company is located 
nearby.  
1.4.2    Research approach and setting 
The aim of this research was to investigate governance arrangements at different 
levels that influence the use, management and conservation of coastal resources at 
specific localities. Because governance arrangements at different levels function 
differently (Young, 1997), the research uses a multi-level, multi-actor approach that 
incorporates both qualitative and quantitative methods to identify and analyse relevant 
state and non-state institutions governing the use, management and conservation of 
coastal resources and their interactions in specific study sites. The selection of the case 
is guided by its possible contribution to certain conceptual problems and to the 
improved understanding of the research problem that it promises to deliver.  
As the research is problem-oriented and aims at a deeper understanding of 
existing problems, analysis under the theoretical framework can help us to realise 
possible solutions for solving problems. To successfully conduct this type of research, 
qualitative and empirical approaches are useful for understanding and explaining social 
life (Neuman, 1997). A case study approach is an empirical inquiry that investigates 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin, 2003), is the main strategy 
for this research in which a large amount of information on one or a few cases is 
gathered, going into greater depth and obtaining more details for examination (Neuman, 
1997). The major disadvantage of a research design by case studies is that the principles 
of statistical generalisation do not apply, and thus the results can only be “qualitative”. 
The current research, however, used some quantitative methods such as a questionnaire 
and monthly household recordings to overcome this limitation.  
 Communal sites and selection of case studies 
The study sites were assessed through a three-week field survey in November 
2007. Three eastern coastal districts, Dam Doi, Nam Can and Ngoc Hien, were selected as 
the study sites for the research. The selection of these districts was based on the 
research objectives requiring that the study sites present all types of shrimp farming 
systems and governance arrangements. To have a very specific study, four communes 
were selected from these districts: Tan Duyet and Tran Phan communes from Dam Doi 
district, Tam Giang commune from the Nam Can district, and the Tan An commune from 
the Ngoc Hien district.  
The research is based on a combination of several specific cases: (1) Naturland 
organic certification in the Tam Giang commune; (2) Naturland organic certification in 
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Tan An commune; (3) intensive shrimp farmer cluster in Tran Phan commune; (4) 
improved extensive shrimp farmer clusters in Tan Duyet commune; (5) forest 
management in Tam Giang commune; and (6) forest management in Tan An commune. 
These case studies cover a variety of governance arrangements for shrimp farming and 
will enable us to draw some general conclusions on the relationships between 
governance, resilience and the sustainability of shrimp farming (see Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1. Communal sites, shrimp farming systems and governance arrangement selected 
Communes Shrimp farming systems  
 
Governance arrangements selected  
 
Tan Duyet  - Improved extensive and 
intensive shrimp farming 
systems 
- No mangroves in the area 
- Improved extensive shrimp farmer 
clusters externally led by the 
government, NGO and research 
institute 
 
Tran Phan  - Improved extensive and 
intensive shrimp farming 
systems 
- No mangroves in the area 
 
- Intensive shrimp farmer cluster 
externally led by the government 
Tam Giang  - Integrated shrimp-mangrove 
farming system 
- Mangroves under the 
production forest system 
- Naturland organic shrimp 
certification 
- Forest management under the 
control of the Forestry Company 
 
Tan An  - Integrated shrimp-mangrove 
farming system 
- Mangroves under the 
protection forest system 
- Naturland organic shrimp 
certification 
- Forest management under the 
control of the Forest Management 
Board 
 
 
In using a case study approach, validity, which refers to the quality of the data 
and the data collecting procedures and the correctness of an explanation, interpretation 
or conclusion, has to be guaranteed. This research attempts to maximise the validity of 
the case studies as specified by Maxwell (1996) by (1) properly selecting the concepts 
used in analysis; (2) carefully selecting the cases to be examined; and (3) carefully 
collecting and analysing the data. The data were collected using primarily qualitative 
methods such as semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and informal talks. 
Moreover, the research also used monthly household recordings and household 
questionnaires to gather quantitative data on some aspects. More details on primary 
data collection are presented in the next sub-section.  
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 Primary data collection 
Primary data and information gathering began in November 2007 and continued 
until February 2011 and consisted of 11 fieldtrips by the researcher. A number of data 
collection methods were used as described below. 
 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were used to gain an in-depth understanding of 
different aspects of the field surveys. This method was largely used for gathering 
information from informants from the time the project started until the end of the 
research. The interviewees were farmers, local officers from the commune and 
provincial levels, traders, collectors, processing companies, and NGO staff. The 
researcher attempted to conduct as many interviews as possible with different 
stakeholders related to shrimp farming. Interviews were also conducted with a number 
of government officers at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) 
and Aquaculture Department in Ha Noi. Moreover, some meetings were conducted with 
the certification bodies and external auditors in Ca Mau province and in Germany. Semi-
structured interviews use open-ended questions to provide space for informants to tell 
their story on related issues. However, a checklist for different interviewees with 
respect to relevant topics was prepared to be able to have full and concentrated 
information.  
 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
FGDs among key informants and representatives of local institutions facilitated 
discussion by using open-ended questions. The technique allows the group the 
opportunity to explain issues in more detail and to clarify common understandings 
among different stakeholders. It also assists in crosschecking information from other 
techniques. During the discussion, various PRA tools were used to investigate the actors 
involved and their interactions when governing coastal resources and to assess the 
benefits and trade-offs between state and non-state governance arrangements. FGDs 
were used to focus on the issues of shrimp farmer clusters, Naturland organic shrimp 
certification and forest management in integrated shrimp-mangrove areas. Six group 
discussions were conducted with both farmers who joined and did not join the cluster 
and farmers who were certified or not certified by the organic shrimp certification. 
Farmers in the integrated shrimp-mangrove areas were also asked to discuss mangrove 
policy and management issues with the group.  
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 Monthly household recording  
To collect quantitative information about shrimp production in the different 
farming systems, monthly household records were used for one year from October 2008 
to October 2009. Twenty households were selected for a longitudinal study of shrimp 
production in which farmers completed monthly records; ten households practiced 
integrated shrimp-mangrove farming, seven practiced improved extensive farming, and 
three practiced shrimp intensive farming. The monthly record of households provided 
useful information to compare the economic aspects of different shrimp farming 
systems such as productivity, total income, total costs and benefits. Furthermore, the 
information on farm management practices such as input and output marketing, group 
activities, compliance with state regulations on pond preparation and disease control 
are also presented in this record. 
 Household questionnaires  
A household questionnaire was used to collect data at the household level in the 
integrated shrimp-mangrove areas. Using this questionnaire, we asked about forest 
income after harvesting and benefit sharing policy, income from shrimp and forest, 
decision making on mangroves and the reasons for their choices or preferences, and the 
perception of farmers on carbon payments. Thirty-two households involved in 
mangrove harvesting activities from 2006 to 2010 in the Tam Giang and Tan An 
communes were selected for the questionnaire.  
 Informal talks 
Informal talks were also used to confirm and complement information collected 
by other methods. The method was useful in terms of establishing trust between 
farmers and the researcher, which can provide valuable information and data as well as 
determine the true feelings and attitudes of the farmers. The researcher spoke 
extensively and informally with local people when staying with them in the villages. 
Some sensitive issues such as shrimp quality management through the chain, especially 
when it involves middlemen and traders, the mangrove’s benefit sharing mechanism 
and the conflict between farmers and forest protection management boards and forestry 
companies that illegally cut the mangroves were investigated through these informal 
talks with local people.  
 Secondary data collection 
Secondary data and information on the issues related to shrimp farming and 
production and forest management in integrated shrimp-mangrove areas were collected 
from government offices at the district and provincial levels. Data and information were 
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also collected from national organisations such as the MARD, the Aquaculture 
Department and the General Statistical Office (GSO) in the form of printed documents, 
websites and other sources. 
 Data analysis 
Two main methods were used to analyse the data for qualitative and quantitative 
information. First, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for 
analysing the data from monthly household recordings and questionnaires to obtain 
descriptive statistics and test for significant differences. The results of these analyses 
provide quantitative data to support the arguments. Second, content analytical methods 
were used to analyse qualitative information from the semi-structured interviews, focus 
group discussions, informal talks and the internet. This information was categorised into 
themes tailored to the research questions, and consequently, as papers for publication 
within the thesis.  
1.5   Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is presented in a publication-based format in which the four empirical 
chapters are the articles. Overall, the thesis is presented in six chapters. Following this 
introduction, chapter two highlights two key transformations in the governance of 
Vietnamese shrimp aquaculture in the context of emergent concerns about 
environmental and social impacts. In the chapter, we investigate how the shift to private 
transnational regulatory networks has changed the role of the government from a 
regulator to a facilitator of global private governance interests and arrangements. 
International environmental and social concerns about tropical shrimp production have 
led to the emergence of private transnational governance and regulation. The rise of 
these various schemes has also been part of a shift from quantitative to qualitative 
policy goals within the Vietnamese aquaculture sector. In turn, this has led to new 
internal relationships, most notably the re-positioning of private interests and 
community-based management within the Vietnamese state framework. We conclude 
that the ongoing transformation of the government’s role in environmental shrimp 
governance requires mechanisms that foster improved participation and compliance 
between the state and private actors. To achieve this, better efforts are needed to 
include local government at both the communal and village levels and to strategically 
use existing global market incentives. 
Chapter three attempts to answer the question of how certification can promote 
ecologically, socially and economically sound shrimp production systems. We analyse 
the regulatory challenges of using organic certification as a means of linking farm-level 
management to the sustainability of coastal (mangrove) landscapes. The results show 
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the importance of farmer perceptions of sustainable farm and landscape management, 
fair benefit sharing mechanisms in the certified value chain, and legitimate private 
sector-led auditing. We conclude that the social and economic conditions of production 
in shrimp-mangrove systems require intervention from provincial and local level 
governments in private (certification) forms of environmental governance to overcome 
conflicts of interest and legitimate representation. To achieve benefits beyond the scale 
of the farm, the role of shrimp producers should be redefined as partners in, rather than 
targets of, regulation. 
Chapter four investigates how farmer cooperatives and clusters can promote 
sustainable shrimp farming in the context of increasing quality in a competitive 
international market. The chapter analyses the role of cooperative production models to 
improve the environmental performance of shrimp farmers and therefore help them to 
upgrade their position in the global value chain. The results support claims that the 
cluster model can improve the management capacity of producers for meeting 
international production standards. However, the success of more flexible cooperative 
production models, such as producer ‘clusters’, depends on the type and strength of 
vertical coordination with other actors along the value chain for both the provision of 
inputs and market products. We argue that for extensive shrimp farmer clusters to take 
further advantage of production-oriented quality standards, the Vietnamese 
government needs to play a greater role in the development of production infrastructure 
and create a legal framework for private sector coordination of cluster formation. 
Chapter five investigates how the devolution of rights over forestland and benefit 
sharing mechanisms are related to actual rights and the distribution of benefits of forest 
management practices. The current forest allocation and subcontracting policies of the 
Vietnamese government with respect to the devolution of forest management and 
participation of local people in sustainable forest management reflect both 
environmental and economic concerns. The findings show that farmers’ decision making 
over mangroves is very much influenced by shrimp farming because the income from 
mangroves is very low compared to that from shrimp. Farmers’ decision making relative 
to the forest is very much influenced by the way in which the benefit-sharing policy is 
implemented by the state-owned forestry companies and management boards. 
However, their attitudes toward mangrove plantations and protection are far from 
negative. The study supports the claim that shrimp farmers may well be able to plant, 
protect and manage mangroves if they have more rights and responsibilities over forests 
and are able to benefit more from the production of mangroves. In this way, more 
sustainable management of mangrove forests may be promoted. 
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Chapter six presents general discussions and conclusions. The main challenge of 
governance in general, and governance over coastal resources in particular, is its 
diversity, complexity and dynamics. Governance solutions, therefore, must be numerous 
and able to work at different spatial, institutional and disciplinary scales. The research 
therefore analyses power, access and the influence over coastal resources at the 
intersection of all global, national, and local levels. Together with the four empirical 
studies conducted, three main discussions are presented in the last chapter: (1) the shift 
from government to governance and the changing roles of the state; (2) value chain 
governance and upgrading small producers; (3) shrimp farming governance and the 
social-ecological resilience of coastal areas. Taken together, the research will provide 
understanding of governance over shrimp farming in the wider context of the resilience 
of coastal areas such as the Mekong Delta. 
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Abstract  
International environmental and social concerns about tropical shrimp production have 
led to the emergence of private transnational governance and regulation. Using cases 
from Ca Mau, we investigate how the shift to private transnational regulatory networks 
has changed the role of the government from a regulator to a facilitator of global private 
governance interests and arrangements. The rise of these various schemes has also been 
part of a shift from quantitative to qualitative policy goals within the Vietnamese 
aquaculture sector. In turn, this has led to new internal relationships, most notably the 
re-positioning of private interests and community-based management within the 
Vietnamese state framework. We conclude that the ongoing transformation of the 
government’s role in environmental shrimp governance requires mechanisms that 
foster improved participation and compliance between the state and private actors. To 
achieve this, efforts are needed to better include local government at both communal 
and village levels and to more strategically use existing global market incentives. 
Keywords: Aquaculture policy, market-based governance, transnational regulatory 
networks, shrimp farming, Mekong Delta 
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Chapter 2 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF VIETNAMESE SHRIMP AQUACULTURE POLICY 
 
2.1   Introduction  
The government’s role in the global agrifood system remains central for 
establishing legislation to promote socio-economic development and to prevent or 
reduce the potential harm of production systems, such as shrimp aquaculture. Across 
Southeast Asia, however, regulatory approaches are fraught with a limited ability to 
enforce legislation because the delineation of legislative responsibilities amongst 
government agencies, especially in coastal shrimp farming areas (historically dominated 
by Penaeus monodon), remains vague (Huitric et al., 2002; Primavera, 1997; 2006; 
Vandergeest et al., 1999). In response to this (perceived) institutional failure, a series of 
private forms of governance, including branding, contracts and certification, have 
emerged within global agrifood networks (Busch and Bain, 2004; Henson and Reardon, 
2005). The shrimp aquaculture industry has been at the forefront of this move to 
privatise governance as a way to meet the growing (predominantly Northern) consumer 
concerns and interests around food safety and quality, including ‘credence’ issues such 
as the sustainable use of coastal resources (Bush et al., 2010; Lebel et al., 2008; 
Oosterveer, 2006; Vandergeest, 2007).  
In Vietnam, this ‘shift’ from state to private governance of shrimp production is 
partial and incomplete. At least seven standards or ‘best management practice’ schemes 
have been developed by government departments in partnership with non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and retail and intergovernmental organisations, 
which are still in various phases of implementation (Corsin et al., 2007). The rise of 
these various schemes has also been part of a shift from quantitative to qualitative 
policy goals within the Vietnamese aquaculture sector. Shrimp aquaculture expanded 
enormously in the 2000s, with area expanding 97% (from 324,100 ha to 638,614 ha) 
and production increasing 269% (from 93,503 tonnes to 345,336 tonnes) (GSO Vietnam, 
2008; Vietnam Aquaculture Department, 2009). However, the government has become 
gradually aware of the risks associated with maximum growth targets, as evidenced by 
the increased incidence of disease (Johnston et al., 2000), extensive mangrove 
deforestation (de Graaf and Xuan, 1998; Tong et al., 2004) and import bans due to 
banned antibiotic residues (Lebel et al., 2008). The response has been a delicate balance 
of supporting a sector that has proven to be a significant source of local employment and 
income (Nhuong et al., 2006; Thong et al., 2004) while at the same time managing 
exposure to high-risk international markets that have driven ecological degradation 
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(Lebel et al., 2002; EJF, 2003; Bush et al., 2010) and opening up to private food safety 
and quality regulatory networks. 
The shift to private transnational regulatory networks has changed the role of the 
nation state in environmental governance, forcing governments to incorporate a much 
more decentralised and consensual approach at multiple levels (Gunningham, 2009). In 
particular, it raises a series of challenges and questions for the Vietnamese government, 
who, after many years of centralised control, will have to reassess its involvement as 
part of the (partial) deferral of environmental governance to these transnational 
networks. To what extent will the Vietnamese government ‘retreat’ from its position as a 
regulator to one as a facilitator of global private governance? Further questions remain 
about whether and how shrimp producers can be meaningfully incorporated into these 
global networks. What role will the state continue to assume in designing and facilitating 
the inclusion of small-holders in the global agrifood system and managing their 
exposure and compliance with transnational regulatory networks? Alternatively, can 
small-holders negotiate access to and compliance with quality standards in the absence 
of the state, through NGOs or community supported collective action? 
Table 2.1. Shrimp farming in Vietnam and Ca Mau province  from 1999 to 2007  
Indicators 
Year 
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
Whole country:      
Area (ha)  454,900 574,900 528,300 625,600 
Production (tonnes) 57,457 154,911 237,880 327,194 384,500 
Ca Mau province:      
Area (ha) 90,511 217,898 248,028 248,406 264,522 
Growth rate (%)  42.1 3.6 0.1 5.0 
Production (tonnes) 19,720 55,330 62,443 81,100 94,876 
Growth rate (%)  56.4 3.0 19.4 7.3 
           Source:  Vietnam General Statistical Office (2008)  
We examine the ongoing shift in the environmental governance of Vietnamese 
shrimp production by simultaneously focusing on the perceived limitations and failures 
of the state-centred approach over shrimp aquaculture and the on-going challenges of 
private governance arrangements in effectively steering producers to comply with 
quality standards. We illustrate this shift through cases from Ca Mau, the leading 
province in the country in terms of both area and output (see Table 2.1). Our analysis 
first examines the wider shifts within government policy from quantitative to qualitative 
production goals and the recent investment in compulsory ‘best management practices’ 
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for improving the environmental and social performance of shrimp production. We then 
turn to two cases that illustrate the shifting role and function of the state and private 
regulatory networks. The first case examines the challenges faced by Naturland organic 
certification in enrolling small, individual farmers with extensive shrimp-mangrove 
systems. The second case explores the challenges of enrolling state and NGO supported 
farmer ‘clusters’ as a platform for facilitating compliance with quality standards. As 
outlined in the following section, the paper contributes to our understanding of 
transformations of government policy over the shrimp aquaculture sector in Vietnam 
and the extent to which these transformations open up alternative approaches towards 
more sustainable shrimp farming.  
In the study we draw on an extensive review of government policy, 
supplemented with the results of semi-structured interviews with key informants, from 
the municipal to the national level, conducted between November 2007 and March 
2009. Field-based research employed a series of techniques, including focus group 
discussions with farmers in the Tam Giang commune in Nam Can district, the Tan An 
commune in Ngoc Hien district, and the Tan Duyet and Tran Phan communes in Dam Doi 
district, all of which are located on the east coast of Ca Mau province. These discussions 
were essential to increasing insights into historical changes and contemporary practices. 
The farmers are also the focus of research for an on-going and more elaborate case 
study on the challenges of shrimp aquaculture governance. Finally, field research was 
complemented by literature and online sources to expand information on the status of 
the shrimp farming industry at the local, provincial and national levels. 
2.2   Quality, transnational regulatory networks and the role of the state 
Within the global agrifood system, quality has emerged as a central organising 
principle for economic competition in addition to price and quantity (Goodman, 2003; 
Henson and Reardon, 2005; Hatanaka and Busch, 2008). Whereas quality once referred 
to the characteristics of a product, it is now used to define the process of production, 
including a range of credence issues such as social and environmental sustainability 
(Reardon et al., 2001). As consumers, retailers and governments alike seek greater 
assurances over the quality of products, global systems of verification have emerged, 
including private standards, branding, contracts and certification to organise 
competition based on quality (Busch and Bain, 2004). This trend is particularly notable 
in the global agrifood system, as Northern food retailers have been joined by civil society 
actors in qualifying, standardising and certifying Southern producers through 
transnational regulatory networks (Renard, 2005; Hughes, 2000; Mutersbaugh, 2002). 
 The rise in global private regulatory networks has been accompanied by a 
concurrent transformation of the capacity of states to regulate agriculture and industrial 
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food processing. It has been stated that government regulatory bodies have not been 
able to keep pace with the globalisation of agricultural trade and the expansion of 
product qualities, in part because of reductions in state budgets and rollbacks in state 
responsibility as a result of neoliberal policies (Reardon and Farina, 2002; Hatanaka and 
Busch, 2008). Nevertheless, governments, the private sector and civil society actors alike  
recognise the need for regulatory regimes to be transnational in nature given the 
networked systems of provision that link producers and consumers in global space 
(Konefal et al., 2005; Marsden, 2004; Oosterveer,  2005; Reardon et al., 2001). The 
regulation of quality has therefore been redefined within the wider process of 
globalisation and the shift from state government to multi-actor and multi-scaled 
governance arrangements. 
The shift from ‘government to governance’ has led to what has been referred to 
as an ongoing political modernisation of the state, emphasising the redundancy of 
governmental steering and party politics and the recognition and devolution of 
responsibilities to civil society and private sector actors (Arts and Van Tatenhoven, 
2006; Jabeen, 2007). In recognition of the market as an alternative institutional setting, 
Cashore (2002) termed this governance shift ‘non-state market-driven’ (NSMD) to 
characterise the role and function of regulation led by transnational and domestic NGOs 
when developing and implementing environmentally and socially responsible 
production. Similarly, Hatanaka and Busch (2008) define governance as a joint activity 
between the state, corporations and private regulation organisations, such as 
certification and accreditation bodies and activist NGOs. However, they note that the 
devolution of state authority and responsibilities does not mean that the state has 
retreated from the realm of regulation altogether. Instead, government bodies maintain 
direct oversight and responsibility for monitoring and regulating food and agriculture. 
Determining the type and degree of state involvement in establishing or 
supporting private forms of environmental governance is central to global commodities 
such as shrimp. Following Evan’s (1995) notion of ‘embedded autonomy’, we are drawn 
to questions of what kind of involvement the state should have in supporting private 
sector participation in industrial transformation. Embedded autonomy is based on the 
idea that the ideal ‘developmental state’ (i.e., a state that plays a central role in industrial 
transformation) is made up of a corporate and coherent bureaucracy that is embedded 
within wider societal networks. How effective the state is in balancing these goals will 
determine the success of industrial development. In a similar vein, Sonnenveld and Mol 
(2002) argue that the effectiveness of environmental governance under the conditions 
of globalisation, through any number of market-based modes, still relies on an effective 
state. Their questions remain relevant for the ongoing development of private global 
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agrifood-led governance mechanisms for shrimp farming in Vietnam. What effect does 
globalisation have on the promotion and implementation of environmental regulatory 
mechanisms? What tensions or complementarities exist between command and control 
and market or civil society-based mechanisms? Or, as Islam (2008) asks about the 
Bangladeshi shrimp industry, do new governance mechanisms supplement and support 
state goals, or will new regulatory networks be perceived as undermining and 
subordinating state capacity and sovereignty? 
The emergence of NSMD-like governance arrangements to regulate the 
environmental and social performance of production is widely seen as a path to more 
democratised, fair, and even empowered producers in the South. As Hatanaka (2010) 
argues, transnational alternative agrifood networks, including organic certifications, are 
generally thought to “enhance the viability of alternative products in the marketplace, 
and thus promote socially just and sustainable agriculture and safe and healthy food” (p. 
1). Using the case of organic shrimp in Indonesia, Hatanaka provides a strong critique of 
the extent to which Southern producers can be empowered through these networks 
given (1) the discontent of producers who feel their knowledge and practices are 
ignored; (2) the unequal division of labour and responsibility leading to producer 
distrust of northern consumers; and (3) the third-party relations that mediate 
consumers and producers often confound any mutual understanding or moral 
obligation. From a managerial perspective (Béné, 2005), this leads to inadequate 
incentives for farmers to change their production practices and creates an imbalance 
between environmental sustainability and the farmer’s economic welfare. From a more 
critical standpoint (ibid.), this can be interpreted as entrenched power asymmetries 
between Southern and Northern actors and the marginalisation of farmers in decision 
making. 
Whether and how producers are able to meaningfully engage with global 
agrifood networks is clearly an important determinant of the effectiveness of quality-
based governance arrangements. The difficulties associated with enrolling shrimp 
farmers into these regulatory networks has led to questions around effective means of 
inclusion: individually, through the government, or through alternative collective action 
strategies, such as farmer cooperatives, clusters or groups. Based on work in Thailand, 
Vandergeest (2007) argues that, contrary to the hard divide within the NSMD discourse, 
local government can and does play an important role in facilitating the participation of 
farmers in the largely market-based transnational ‘environmental regulatory networks’ 
that exist around the shrimp industry. In addition, he argues that to include farmers in 
any meaningful way into these networks, greater attention needs to be given to 
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community-based (natural resource) institutions. These institutions are often connected 
to local government.  
Recognising state-community-farmer linkages within global agrifood networks 
reflects Evans’ assertions about the importance of social ties between the state and local 
entrepreneurs to facilitate successful policy implementation. Put differently, it reflects 
the wider trend towards promoting government and community-led collective action in 
global agrifood networks to facilitate compliance with (environmental) quality 
standards, pool resources and reduce costs (e.g., Bacon, 2005), implement shared 
cleaner production technologies (e.g., Franks and Mc Gloin, 2007), or negotiate the 
terms and conditions of incorporation in global trade (e.g., Gibbon, 2008). However, 
questions remain as to whether and how new spaces of interaction (see Bush, 2010) 
might be opened up between farmers and transnational regulatory networks to better 
include local interpretations and practices of sustainability – especially in the political 
context of Vietnam. How can certification schemes meaningfully include shrimp 
farmers? What opportunities are there for different forms of collective action for 
farmers to better negotiate their position in global agrifood networks? How can 
individual and collective approaches to farmer inclusion overcome ‘misunderstandings’ 
and ‘inequalities’? 
2.3 The transformation of state policy: From quantitative to qualitative 
production goals 
2.3.1    Land use policy  
By the beginning of the 1990s, the Vietnamese government considered shrimp a 
high-value export product with the potential for increasing national export earnings. In 
response, the government set up the Shrimp Aquaculture Export Promotion Program, 
aimed at enlarging the capacity of the industry as a whole.1 The most important and 
influential policy within this programme was the support given to converting land to 
shrimp ponds. The success of the programme is clearly illustrated by the case of Minh 
Hai province (later divided into Ca Mau and Bac Lieu provinces), where land use 
conversion focused on the allocation of mangrove forests. The data shows that 66,253 ha 
of mangroves were converted to shrimp ponds in Minh Hai, expanding the area of 
shrimp production from 3,000 ha in 1980 to 76,036 ha in 1995 (Buu and Phuong, 1999).  
The effects on land use after the forest land allocation implementation in Ca Mau 
led not only to the massive destruction of mangroves, which serve as a nursing ground 
for natural shrimp, but also to negative changes in  water quality due to the construction 
of shrimp ponds and poor pond management practices. Shrimp farming in Ca Mau 
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 Decision 347-CT, signed on 14 December 1987, about solutions to speed up shrimp aquaculture production for 
export. 
 39 
province first started with the use of extensive farming systems, with natural seed 
supply, no supplementary feeding, and an average annual production of about 250 kg ha-
1yr-1 (de Graaf and Xuan, 1998). With the introduction of artificial stocking, the 
government classified a new ‘improved extensive’ production system with production of 
450 kg ha-1yr-1 (de Graaf and Xuan, 1998). The shrimp production in improved extensive 
coastal areas of Ca Mau province (such as Nam Can and Ngoc Hien) in 2008 was 
approximately 250- 350 kg ha-1yr-1, much lower than before and continuously declining.  
The aquaculture development programme, approved by the government in 1999, 
was one of the documents that strongly influenced the development of shrimp farming 
in Vietnam, especially in Ca Mau province.2 The overall goal of the plan was to increase 
the country’s aquaculture production to two million tons and the export value to US$2.5 
billion in 2010. The plan aimed to increase the area of black tiger shrimp farming to 
260,000 ha, producing a total of 360,000 tonnes of shrimp with an export value of 
US$1.4 billion. To reach this goal, the government launched two important policies. The 
first allowed farmers to convert low-producing rice fields, uncultivated areas and 
saltpans into ponds for aquaculture. The second policy focused on financial support to 
poor farmers without collateral. 
According to government statistics, the increase in the area of shrimp 
aquaculture in Ca Mau province after this policy came mainly from the conversion of rice 
and arable farmland to ponds between 1999 and 2000. However, before this time many 
farmers had already converted their rice fields to shrimp production. The main drive for 
this first wave of growth was demand from the international market. There was a boom 
in shrimp farming, with profits from shrimp production surging to 10 and 15 times 
higher than that of rice cultivation. The development plan largely sought to co-opt the 
existing growth within government policy, thereby justifying the growth. The 
implementation of the policy compounded the expansion of ponds by supporting 
farmers in converting agricultural land. By 2008, the total black tiger shrimp farming 
area in Ca Mau province was 264,500 ha, 4,500 ha higher than the 2010 national target 
for the entire country. In hindsight, instead of promoting sustainable growth, the policy 
led to a rapid, spontaneous increase in shrimp production outside of the control of the 
government.  
2.3.2   Species diversification policy 
The fisheries sector in Vietnam had one of its most challenging years in 2008, due 
to the combined forces of globalisation and the world’s economic downturn (EU, 2009). 
The export market for shrimp started to decline in 2008, and demand for black tiger 
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 Decision 224/1999/QD-TTg to approve Period 1999-2010 Aquaculture Development Program. 
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shrimp is expected to further decline (VASEP, 2009). To make up for this decline, the 
Vietnamese government reversed an earlier decision to ban the production of Pacific 
white leg shrimp (Litopenaeus vannamei), thereby continuing a trend across Southeast 
Asia (e.g., Lebel et al., 2010). This change was in direct response to changing market 
demands as well as a lower risk profile for white leg shrimp, which can be grown at 
higher densities and, until the recent reports of an outbreak of Taura syndrome virus in 
Vietnam (Vietnam Aquaculture Department, 2009), had not demonstrated the same 
susceptibility to disease as black tiger shrimp. The government formalised this shift in 
species through a new government decree allowing the cultivation of Pacific white leg 
shrimp in the Mekong Delta, where only former black tiger-intensive farms are allowed 
to grow Pacific white leg shrimp. In Ca Mau, a plan was made and approved by the 
Chairman of the People’s Committee in September 2008 with the goal of setting up an 
area of 10,800 ha for Pacific white leg shrimp in 2010. This could be considered an 
ambitious plan. Presently, Ca Mau has 1,115 ha of intensive shrimp farming, which can 
be easily changed from black tiger to white leg production. However, for the remaining 
9,685 ha currently under various forms of extensive production, the transition poses 
serious challenges in terms of cost and management.  
Moreover, the environmental and natural conditions seem to have been 
overlooked by the government when setting up the plan. In Ca Mau, especially in the 
Nam Can, Ngoc Hien and Dam Doi districts, the natural conditions are suitable for black 
tiger shrimp production in improved extensive systems. Farmers in these districts have 
considerable experience in black tiger shrimp farming and have accumulated 
considerable wealth. They are also quick to note that that it is more profitable and safer 
to practice improved extensive shrimp farming than to ‘upgrade’ to intensive farming 
systems. Another source of anxiety for farmers in the move from black tiger to Pacific 
white leg shrimp is the inability of the government to monitor shrimp seed and feed 
quality – an essential regulatory role in intensive farming. In addition, small-scale 
shrimp farmers in Vietnam will find it hard to compete with Thai Pacific white leg 
shrimp, which accounts for 90% of the total world production (EU, 2009). Yet despite 
these concerns, the shift in policy has had limited impact until now, with the area and 
production of Pacific white leg shrimp remaining relatively small compared to that of 
black tiger shrimp. According to the Aquaculture Department in 2008, the cultured area 
and production of black tiger shrimp for the whole country was 557,836 ha and 288,834 
tonnes, while only 1,399 ha of ponds produced 8,155 tonnes of Pacific white leg shrimp. 
Government policy has been consistent in promoting shrimp aquaculture as the 
main source of export income and poverty alleviation in coastal areas. With the 
introduction of improved extensive systems since 1995, there has been a gradual 
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transformation in shrimp aquaculture from extensive to intensive practices. In addition, 
government policy has actively sought to minimise the industry’s exposure to market 
fluctuations by diversifying to Pacific white leg shrimp, thereby responding to changing 
market demands and further intensifying production. However, despite these 
interventions by the Vietnamese government, the main force behind shrimp production 
in the Delta has clearly been the market, driving both the uncontrolled growth in the late 
1990s and species diversification when the demand fell for high-priced black tiger 
shrimp in the financial crisis of 2008 (VASEP, 2009). 
2.3.3   GAqP and BMP mandatory implementation policy  
The new frontier of market control now appears to be the governance of more 
qualitative aspects of production, as demonstrated by the rise in market-based food 
quality and safety standards in the 2000s. In recent years, the government has played an 
important role in promoting quality control in seafood products, from primary 
production to distribution, with a large number of directives and regulations related to 
fisheries’ safety and hygiene, environmental protection, antibiotics, and veterinary and 
medical use in aquaculture. As one of the first four countries to implement the FAO Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the Vietnamese government has designed a 
national set of Good Aquaculture Practices (GAqPs) as practical norms for food safety, 
disease control and the minimisation of environmental pollution for both intensive and 
improved extensive systems (NACA, 2008). However, the implementation of these 
standards comes at a cost. They impose very high technical prerequisites on farmers 
that are prohibitive for small-scale shrimp farmers. To solve this problem, Vietnam, 
Thailand and India, with technical assistance from the Network of Aquaculture Centres 
in Asia-Pacific (NACA) and financial support from the Australian government, have 
developed alternative Better Management Practices (BMPs) standards. These 
alternative standards aim to provide a set of practical norms that can be applied by 
small-scale farms as well as aquaculture clusters/zones with inadequate infrastructure 
conditions. They aim to ensure food safety, minimise the incidence of disease and reduce 
environmental pollution.  
In the Mekong Delta, GAqP started as a research programme before being 
implemented by processing companies in large-scale intensive shrimp farms. In the Ca 
Mau province, BMP was also implemented in three pilot hatchery farms and extended to 
grow-out farms through the state aquaculture extension department. Despite these 
plans, however, the new techniques have not yet been carried out by farmers in Ca Mau. 
Farmers argue that they have been unwilling to invest in the changes required by the 
BMP standards because of the high cost of implementation. According to the report from 
the National Agro-Forestry-Fisheries Quality Assurance Department (NAFIQAD, 2006), 
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to meet BMP and GAqP standards farmers have to make an additional investment in 
improved pond preparation, screen water intake and treat water to ensure it is disease-
free and check certified post larvae for white-spot syndrome virus (WSSV). This 
increased cost is about VND13,700 per kg (US$0.76) of produced shrimp, which is 
equivalent to 20% of total production costs (Tien and Griffiths, 2009). However, the 
most important reason for non-compliance mentioned by farmers interviewed in Ca 
Mau is the uncertainty as to whether they will receive any price premium for shrimp 
meeting these standards. 
To speed up the implementation of these guidelines, the government released 
legislative Decision 56/2008/QĐ-BNN,3 shifting from voluntary to mandatory 
compliance. The itinerary of this programme, applied to both black tiger and Pacific 
white leg shrimp farms, is divided into three categories, each with different imperatives. 
First, intensive and semi-intensive farms founded after the signing of this Decision must 
implement the GAqP standard immediately. Second, intensive and semi-intensive farms 
founded before the signing of the Decision must implement GAqP from the 1 January 
2009. Finally, improved extensive farms have to comply (at least) with BMP standards 
from the 1 January 2010. It appears the plan may still be too ambitious, given that 
international integration of these standards has not yet been scheduled. It is even less 
likely to occur with improved extensive shrimp farms given their large number and lack 
of government capacity to implement and enforce certification--not an easy task, 
considering the 606,612 aquaculture farms in the Mekong Delta and the 122,946 shrimp 
farms in Ca Mau province alone. In short, the difficulties faced by mandatory standards 
requiring punitive enforcement appear to indicate that farmers are unlikely to comply 
with production standards if they are not given incentives for self-regulation. 
2.4    Private governance arrangements 
2.4.1   Naturland organic shrimp certification 
Whereas the situation of implementing BMP/GAqP illustrates the government’s 
concerns about emerging international conventions for sustainable aquaculture, 
Naturland organic shrimp certification in Ca Mau province provides a good example of 
the government’s adoption and adaptation of private international standards and the 
influence of global consumerism. In 2001, the Swiss Import Promotion Program (SIPPO) 
designed a trade promotion programme to assist small and medium-sized enterprises 
from developing and transition countries in gaining access to the Swiss and European 
markets. The Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP), in 
cooperation with the Ca Mau Department of Fisheries, took advantage of this 
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 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Decision 56/200/QD-BNN about Regulations on monitoring and 
certifying sustainable farming issued on 29 April 2008 
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programme to build the country’s first organic shrimp farming model. After a long field 
survey process, they selected a group of farms in an integrated shrimp-forest area in 
Tam Giang commune, Nam Can District, controlled by the state-owned 184 Forestry 
Fisheries Enterprise, to implement Naturland organic shrimp standards. The 
programme was joined by the Institute for Marketecology (IMO), a specialist in quality 
assurance of eco-friendly products that remains the principle auditor for Naturland in 
Vietnam, and the Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corporation 
(CAMIMEX) as the retailer of this organic shrimp product.  
Tam Giang is the first and only organic shrimp certification site operating in 
Vietnam and, as such, has drawn the attention of the government as well as retailers and 
traders from Switzerland and other European countries. However, initial government 
permission and support was not unanimous. While many government staff at the 
provincial level and especially VASEP supported the idea, others opposed the 
implementation of Naturland certification because it was a private standard, which, they 
believed, would diminish the government’s sovereign control over the industry. 
According to the Vice Chairman of VASEP, its implementation so far should therefore be 
viewed as a success if we consider this contradiction. Moreover, Vietnamese black tiger 
shrimp was the first product to be recognised as organic among other shrimp producers. 
The Vice Chairman also mentioned that its implementation benefited the image of 
shrimp farming internationally because it showed that Southeast Asian shrimp 
production does not inevitably lead to the destruction of mangrove forests. 
The programme started with 14,000 kg of organic shrimp with 143 certified 
households in 2002 and gradually increased to an estimated 687,000 kg from 784 
certified households in 2009. This has led to an increase in the export value of organic 
shrimp to COOP supermarkets, from US$271,500 in 2002 to more than US$3 million by 
2006 (Singh, 2007). Although it represents only 0.3% of the province’s total shrimp 
production, organic shrimp continues to expand in Nam Can, and the government has 
drawn up plans to extend the Naturland model to neighbouring districts. A central tenet 
of this model is the design of an Internal Control System (ICS), which incorporates novel 
forms of collaboration between members of the processing company (CAMIMEX), the 
state forestry company (184 Forestry Fisheries Enterprise), the farmers and the 
collectors. 
The Naturland programme may well be judged a successful shrimp certification 
model if we consider these results. However, considerable differences in opinion exist 
regarding its success and stability. Staff from central, provincial and local government 
organisations, as well as processing companies and the IMO, are optimistic about the 
potential of this model to promote more sustainable shrimp farming by changing 
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farmers’ practices. They are also optimistic about the potential for scaling it up to 
include a larger coastal area with a wider variety of coastal mangrove habitats in Ca Mau 
province. However, a number of more proximate concerns are expressed by these actors 
about the capacity of a continually growing number of farmers to comply with the 
standards. In particular, the IMO and the CAMIMEX, who are directly accountable for 
regulating the certification process, are concerned that farmers are unable to adequately 
record their inputs and practices to meet traceability requirements. Furthermore, they 
are concerned that the market for organic shrimp products will remain small and will 
not support the demand necessary for widespread adoption of the standards. 
Many farmers are also sceptical that the Naturland model provides them enough 
incentive to invest in standard compliance. The more contentious concerns surround the 
consistency of inspection and auditing of farming practices. First and foremost, farmers 
have a different perception about what constitutes a ‘forested’ area. Based on more 
collective land management within family units, farmers calculate forest area as a 
percentage of the total family farming area. They complain that Naturland standards, 
which require at least 50% mangrove forest cover, are not realistic because they are 
assessed on an individual farm basis. This demonstrates a clear division between farmer 
practices and externally defined and regulated quality standards. Second, farmers do not 
trust that the collectors, who are selected by the processing company, control the quality 
in an open and transparent way. Although their contracts are consistently paid, extra 
fees imposed by the processing company reduced their overall premium for organic 
production from the contracted 15% to around 6% or 7%. The lack of trust that farmers 
have in this imposed trade relation means that they are less willing to sell their already 
certified product to the processing company.  
Despite the continued investment in organic certification as a means of governing 
‘value-added’ sustainable shrimp production, a series of challenges remain. The most 
critical of these challenges is the perceived lack of transparency between farmers and 
other actors in the regulatory network that supports the implementation of certification. 
Until now, the government has not intervened in the apparently deteriorating 
networked relations. As argued elsewhere (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007), in order for the 
government’s quantitative goals of extending of the area under organic certification to 
be met, qualitative aspects of trade and market relations will have to understood and 
addressed in a meaningful way. Put simply, equitable economic benefits for farmers and 
transparent information exchange between farmers and other actors are likely to 
determine the success of organic certification. Given the various conflicts of interest and 
the conflict observed in the shrimp industry of Vietnam, determining whether and how 
the government mediates is critical. 
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2.4.2   Cooperative development policy and farmer cluster management practices 
The Cooperative Law signed on 26 November 2003 by the Chairman of the 
Parliament is one of the more important policies in agriculture and aquaculture 
following the collapse of the old form of the cooperative model in Vietnam (Beresford, 
1990; Fford and Huan, 2001). With the goal of developing and improving the efficiency 
of the cooperative economy, the government launched a support programme to promote 
the development of cooperatives and other forms of cooperative economy.4 Taking into 
account the dependence of the shrimp aquaculture on hundreds of thousands of small-
scale shrimp producers in Vietnam, cooperative development has been widely 
recognised as a possible solution to increase the collective and individual 
competitiveness of the industry (WWF, 2008). There is also growing attention to the 
potential of these cooperative structures to foster collective improvements in shrimp 
farming practices, such as water use and sanitation, shrimp seed quality management, 
and feed provisioning, all of which (the government and international organisations 
hope) will improve traceability practices for entry to international markets. 
The Vietnamese Cooperative Law defines a cooperative as any private sector 
organisation, household and legal entities that have common needs and benefits and 
voluntarily provide capital to collectively support improved efficiency in production. 
Larger, state-sponsored forms of cooperatives (hợp tác xã) have not proven popular 
under the new law  given their long history of failure (e.g., Kerkvliet, 1995). In their 
place, the government’s Decree in 2007 on the organisation and operation of 
cooperative groups relaxed the state’s control over cooperatives, giving legal space for 
these smaller cooperative groups operated “by three individuals or more who jointly 
contribute assets and labour to carrying out certain works for mutual benefit and 
responsibility” (Decree No. 151-2007/ND-CP, 2007). Many aquaculture producers see 
the benefits of this formalised cooperation for building closer (contractual) ties to 
processing companies and access to credit (e.g., Khiem et al., 2010; Lem et al., 2004). 
These new-style, service oriented cooperatives (referred to variously as tổ hợp tác or tổ 
liên kết) have been taken up in the shrimp aquaculture sector as a platform to improve 
compliance with BMP, GAqP, and other international safety and quality standards. In Ca 
Mau province, both cooperatives and farmer clusters are being heavily promoted by the 
government. However, faced with the limited management capacity of farmers, state and 
non-state organisations working to support collective production have paid more 
attention to the establishment of farmer clusters.  
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 Vietnamese Government, Decree 88/2005/ND-CP, signed on 11 July 2005, about supported policies to promote 
development of cooperatives and other forms of cooperative economy. 
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 To speed up the establishment of farmer clusters, the Agriculture and Rural 
Development division at the district level supports farmers through training courses on 
financial management and shrimp farming techniques. Financial support for those who 
participate in these clusters is provided through the Agriculture and Rural Development 
Bank. In Tan Duyet commune, for example, with a total of 11 clusters consisting of 325 
household members and 83 ha of intensive and improved extensive shrimp farming, 
participating households received start-up support of nearly VND 2 billion 
(US$112,359) from the Agriculture and Rural Development Bank, with a subsidised 
interest rate of around 12% per year. They also get technical training organised by the 
agriculture extension office. Within this framework, a number of farmer clusters have 
been established to try new methods of shrimp farming, in particular a high-yield 
improved extensive system designed to increase the yield of production while meeting 
BMP water quality standards.  
Although farmer clusters were initially promoted by the government, they have 
also been identified as an approach to improved production by the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF), which is active in promoting environmental standards through their Shrimp 
Aquaculture Dialogue (ShAD) – a process to facilitate the development of performance-
based standards that will contribute to the recently proposed Aquaculture Stewardship 
Council (ASC). To date, one farmer cluster has been set up in the Tan Long hamlet that 
receives technical support through commune-level technicians funded by the WWF. The 
aim of the cluster is to improve the effectiveness of production management schemes 
among small scale farmers while also improving their vertical linkages in the value 
chain, both of which are recognised as major barriers to the improved environmental 
and social performance of production. The long-term goal of the cluster is to enable a 
collective form of production, which will enable small-holders to be certified by the new 
ASC. 
Despite the attention to these collective forms of production and their perceived 
benefits for improving the environmental and social performance of shrimp aquaculture, 
their numbers appear to be declining. According to farmers, this is because clusters do 
not really create economic benefits or the benefits farmers expect after joining the 
group. Some of the difficulties mentioned by farmers are shortages of financial resources 
to keep the cluster running and a lack of leadership by farmers. However, the most 
important reason, echoed in other aquaculture systems in the country (Khiem et al., 
2010), is the limited ability of the clusters to improve trading partnerships with traders 
and processing companies to reduce costs and ensure more profitable production. 
Despite the legislative changes and investment from both the government and the WWF, 
it appears that external financial and technical support do not provide the necessary 
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incentives to promote the development of farmer clusters. It therefore remains 
questionable whether and how cooperative forms of production can support improved 
environmental production performance for improved extensive systems. 
In contrast, intensive production appears to be more suited to cooperative forms 
of production. One clear example of such success in Ca Mau is the case of the Nhi Nguyet 
shrimp farming cluster. A group of 66 intensive farming households formed this cluster, 
70% of which have already shifted to culturing Pacific white leg shrimp. The group has 
direct contract with Minh Hai Export Frozen Seafood Processing Joint-stock Company 
(Minh Hai Jostoco), which lends farmers money with the proviso that they sell their 
shrimp exclusively to the company. Because the cluster was an early adopter of Pacific 
white leg shrimp in Ca Mau, the farmers have been able to maintain a high economic 
return compared to farmers outside the cluster. The cluster has therefore been 
successful because they have been able to gain support unavailable to improved 
extensive farmers. They have a contract with the company, access to a high quality of 
fingerlings because of an economy of scale large enough to invest in collective nursing 
management, and they have institutionalised shared learning between members. The 
high degree of organisation and their strong private sector connections allowed them to 
adequately respond to the 2008 economic crisis by shifting production from black tiger 
to Pacific white leg shrimp.  
There are clear advantages of intensive production over improved extensive 
production when it comes to cooperative production, most notably the scale and timing 
of harvest and potential economic gains in input provisioning. However, intensive 
production comes with considerably higher production risks, including disease and poor 
water quality, and remains marginal in Vietnam in terms of the number of farmers 
involved. Maintaining lower risk and more resilient shrimp production may therefore be 
more likely under extensive conditions. In turn, this gives further impetus to 
determining how cooperative forms of production might assist (improved) extensive 
farmers in complying with production-oriented quality standards. Like the Naturland 
case, determining how the government (perhaps, but not necessarily, in collaboration 
with NGOs) can facilitate improved horizontal collective action between farmers, as well 
as vertical collaboration with key actors in the shrimp value chain, remains a critical 
area of research and development. 
2.5   Discussion  
State involvement in the governance of shrimp in Vietnam continues to be subject 
to what we identify as a series of transformations. The first was an internal policy shift 
from quantitative to qualitative state-led production goals. The early quantitative goals 
of the 1990s were successful in terms of opening up once marginal and isolated coastal 
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areas, but the disease and market risks associated with intensification has meant that 
Vietnamese shrimp production remains one of the most extensive in Southeast Asia 
(Anh et al., 2010). In addition, market demand drove the majority of the expansion 
rather than any coherent centralised planning. Government departments were 
rewarded for increases beyond set baselines, but they did not have the capacity to 
monitor farmers’ practices in a coordinated fashion (cf. Hue and Scott,  2008; Luttrell, 
2001). As a result, shrimp farming in isolated regions such as Ca Mau underwent a 
period of rapid, unplanned development, leading to what are now regarded as ‘typical’ 
side effects of shrimp aquaculture across Southeast Asia, including substantial mangrove 
loss, declining water quality and outbreaks of shrimp disease. 
The transformation from quantitative to qualitative policy goals of the 
government in Vietnam appears to indicate the failures of the state-centred approach to 
shrimp farming in the context of market liberation and globalisation. The market forces 
driving the growth of shrimp production and cultivated areas appear to have proved 
stronger than the capacity of the government to implement and enforce state policy. 
Illegal mangrove clearance and rice field conversion for shrimp farming has been 
significantly increased in the Mekong Delta, but this trend was already apparent for 
several years before the policy was launched in response to market demand for shrimp 
production. The lesson of how to balance state goals with market dynamics was not 
initially transferred to the implementation of qualitative policy goals. It has taken a 
second transformation in shrimp governance to incorporate private actors and market 
dynamics into improved production practices. 
Recognising the distinct inability of the state to implement and enforce 
regulation, the second (continuing) transformation is characterised by a shift of 
responsibility to private forms of governance. This shift has seen considerable 
experimentation in state-private sector relations in Vietnam, balancing the tensions and 
complementarities that Sonnenveld and Mol (2002) argue exist between the goals and 
modes of command and control and market-based governance mechanisms. Both the 
Naturland and farmer cluster cases in Ca Mau illustrate the kind of state involvement 
that might prove successful in establishing or supporting private forms of 
environmental governance. Both cases continue from the first internal governance 
transformation. They therefore represent a maturing of policy from production growth 
to quality improvement by gradually increasing the role of non-state actors such as 
NGOs (WWF), private certifiers and auditors (Naturland and IMO), retailers (CAMIMEX), 
traders (COOP) and local middlemen. They also signal a return to voluntary 
participation and a turn to market incentives as the main driving force for compliance 
with new production standards. Responding to the concerns of Islam (2008), these new 
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mechanisms therefore appear to supplement state qualitative goals of sustainable 
production and to address wider concerns about the meaningful incorporation of 
shrimp farmers by providing incentives for self-governance. However, in practice a 
number of challenges remain. 
In the case of Naturland organic shrimp certification, it appears that the 
wholesale deferment of control of the shrimp-forestry system to the private sector has 
led to a conflict of interest between farmers and market actors. Farmers have undergone 
a complete transition from state control to their current exposure to a commodity chain 
that extends directly to international markets and involves a range of private actors. 
Reminiscent of Vandergeest’s environmental regulatory networks, the involvement of 
private actors has not yet led to farmer empowerment and effective self-governance. 
Instead, the farmers find themselves the objects of monitoring with little (if any) 
bargaining capacity. The only incentive they receive is the right to sell (or not to sell) 
their product to the processing company. They believe that the close relation between 
market actors—particularly processing companies, certifiers and middlemen—means 
there is little, if any, independent oversight of the regulatory network. In addition, 
established market relations with middlemen, who are embedded within existing social 
relations of production such as credit provision (see Bush and Oosterveer, 2007), do not 
provide them adequate incentives for self-governance.  
Following Vandergeest’s observations in the case of GAqP standards in Thailand, 
the farmers’ participation in the regulatory network remains largely performative – 
recording and reporting has had little impact on their production practices, and there is 
little if any feedback in terms of amending the practice of certification or the content of 
standards. This, in turn, has meant that farmers are largely relegated to objects of ‘social 
responsibility’ rather than being involved in standard setting and decision making in the 
certification process. Such a situation also fails to move the debate around the efficacy of 
private forms of shrimp governance beyond the ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘inequalities’ 
inherent in third-party certification outlined by Hatanaka (2010). As long as producers 
feel their knowledge and practices are ignored in the process of setting and 
implementing standards, it appears unlikely they will be able to better negotiate their 
position in global agrifood networks.  
The government’s ability to bridge what is essentially a lack of trust and 
independent oversight in the shrimp chain may therefore open the door to more 
substantive state involvement. Revising the role of the state is particularly necessary 
given the provincial government plans to extend the Naturland model to other coastal 
districts in Ca Mau. This would lead to the wider involvement of state-owned forest 
enterprises and provincial forestry boards as the central arbiters in environmental 
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regulatory networks. Based on the example of Tam Giang, it is unlikely that these 
companies can maintain any independence in the certification process, given that they 
are directly dependent on timber production and therefore do not represent farmer 
interests. To avoid a return to the compulsory implementation of what are rhetorically 
labelled ‘voluntary’ standards, as seen in the first transformation in shrimp governance 
in Vietnam, the role of local government at the communal and village levels in providing 
objective oversight needs to be strengthened.  
The development of farmer clusters in Vietnam may prove useful in providing an 
intermediary step to more inclusive participation of farmers in market-based forms of 
governance, allowing them to more meaningfully negotiate their position in the global 
agrifood network. However, this is again only likely if state involvement is more clearly 
defined. Taking the Naturland and farmer cluster cases together, we see considerable 
potential for group certification. Clusters may well provide a collective platform for 
establishing cost savings associated with standard compliance, including the 
establishment of internal monitoring systems, upgrading of communal infrastructure 
and reaching more efficient economies of scale for improved bargaining capacity (e.g., 
Umesh et al., 2010). Group certification may also provide a basis for certifying larger 
ecological units, thereby responding to the concerns of the Naturland farmers that 
mangrove forests are best considered across landscapes rather than individual farms. 
However, we argue that while the case of Naturland certification highlights the case for 
more government oversight, the cluster models promoted by the government and the 
WWF show the role of market networks in facilitating more meaningful inclusion of 
farmers in global agrifood networks. 
The attempts of both the government and the WWF to establish farmer clusters 
have succeeded in creating management structures under which producers can legally 
associate. Reminiscent of the compulsory state-led implementation of GAqP and BMP 
standards, however, they have thus far failed to address market incentives by involving 
traders and processing companies. This is one of the reasons for the decline of farmer 
clusters in Ca Mau and threatens the goals of group certification. As also noted by Khiem 
et al (2010), direct relations with traders and processing companies are increasingly 
important in Vietnam as aquaculture systems are moving towards more vertically 
integrated and concentrated value chains in response to heightened quality standards. 
The case of the Nhi Nguyet intensive shrimp farmer cluster clearly demonstrates this 
point. Whether and how clusters of ‘small scale’ extensive or improved extensive 
producers can maintain their position in these chains is likely to depend on how they 
can negotiate improved connectivity to the private sector. However, unlike the intensive 
farmers of Nhi Nguyet, improved extensive farmers remain spatially fragmented and 
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sceptical of the benefits of even the most basic of service-oriented cooperation. As such, 
NGOs and the government play important roles in promoting cluster formation and as 
intermediaries in facilitating negotiations with processing companies. 
The results also indicate that special attention must be paid to the role of market 
incentives in fostering participation and compliance in both state and private sector-led 
governance arrangements. Given that profitability is one of the most important driving 
factors of farmers’ decision making (Thong et al., 2004), it is clear that incentives for 
changing production practices are required throughout the market. Both the organic 
shrimp certification and farmer cluster cases support this point. If farmers are not able 
to improve market access or an increased price for their product, they are unlikely to 
continue on a certification path. Similarly, farmers involved in clusters cite the need for 
continuous economic benefit after joining the group; indeed, this was a key reason for 
the failure of clusters in Ca Mau and elsewhere in the Mekong Delta (Khiem et al., 2010).  
The second transformation in shrimp governance in Vietnam therefore illustrates 
an ongoing process of political modernisation, within which the role of government vis-
à-vis private actors in emerging environmental regulatory networks is being 
renegotiated. The two cases of private governance illustrate current attempts to 
innovate environmental governance in Vietnam, where state sovereignty and capacity 
are being continually renegotiated. The widely perceived limitations of state-based 
governance over shrimp farming in Vietnam therefore need to be seen in terms of 
complementarities with the private sector and communities of producers alike. This goes 
beyond Hatanaka and Busch’s argument that state authority in global agrifood networks 
should be one of oversight and responsibility for monitoring and regulating food 
production. Instead, we argue that the role of state remains central not only in 
facilitating private regulation, but also as a third-party arbiter. Given the close relation of 
the state and private sectors in Vietnam, this mode of regulation is illustrative of a wider 
process of ‘embedded autonomy’ of state-led industrial transformation, with a corporate 
and coherent bureaucratic framework embedded within wider societal networks. 
However, following Vandergeest (2007), we also argue that the incorporation of 
community-based processes, either through collective cluster models or market 
networks, should be emphasised in the process of implementing the environmental 
regulatory networks inherent in the governance of sustainable shrimp aquaculture. 
2.6    Conclusion 
In this paper we have highlighted two key transformations in the governance of 
Vietnamese shrimp aquaculture in the context of emergent concerns about 
environmental and social impacts. The first transformation, an extended period of 
growth and expansion, showed the failures of the state-based governance and top-down 
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approach to regulation of this sector. In spite of the rhetoric of centralised control, the 
aquaculture sector in Vietnam has directly responded to international markets. The 
second, ongoing transformation is also in response to market demands but is directed to 
the emergent ‘quality’ concerns about the environmental and social impacts of tropical 
shrimp farming. Our results indicate that this second governance shift has created a new 
set of challenges for the Vietnamese government, which, within the context of global 
market and (environmental) advocacy networks, is now promoting regulation of 
environmental quality through private certification and farmer cluster practices as 
community-based mechanisms. These parallel transformations therefore present a 
complex balancing act between externally-led global market demands and consumer 
concerns for the improved environmental and social performance of tropical shrimp 
production. At the same time, these transformations draw on the Vietnamese 
government’s interests in maintaining sovereign control over the shrimp industry.  
To overcome these challenges, the Vietnamese government should continue to 
position itself as a facilitator of global private governance arrangements, especially as 
farmers and global market actors are engaged in transnational regulatory networks 
operationalized at local scales. In the case of certification, the role of the state is still 
central in terms of facilitating private regulation and as a third-party arbiter. In doing so, 
the role of local government at the communal and village levels is essential and needs to 
be strengthened to bridge a widely perceived lack of trust and independent assessment 
of the shrimp chain. The role of the government then becomes that of a facilitator of 
negotiations between producers and processing companies--both of whom have, until 
now, negotiated their incorporation in global production networks in the absence of the 
state. However, the state needs to give far more attention to market incentives for 
fostering the participation and compliance of farmers in these transnational regulatory 
networks. We therefore argue that the goals of non-market arrangements, such as the 
state BMP standards, should be reconsidered. 
Finally, our results contribute to the ongoing debate surrounding the role of the 
state and the private sector in the environmental governance of shrimp in Vietnam. In 
doing so, we have problematized the widely perceived failures of state-oriented 
approaches and the rise of private sector involvement by arguing for a more 
complementary understanding of each in environmental regulation under conditions of 
globalisation. Balancing state and private interests is a highly negotiated process, as 
companies and farmers seek to gain and maintain access to global markets. As standards 
for high-value export products such as shrimp become more ubiquitous in agrifood 
networks, more attention is needed to understanding how actors within global 
environmental regulatory networks--including processing companies, middlemen, 
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standard owners and auditors--can promote farmer compliance while also meeting the 
interest of governments. Such challenges will remain central to Vietnam’s on going 
market transition, especially under the current rhetoric of export-led economic 
development. 
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Abstract 
The Vietnamese government aims to expand the scale of Naturland certified organic 
production in integrated shrimp-mangrove farming systems across the coast of Ca Mau 
province by 2015. In doing so the division between public and private regulation has 
become blurred. We analyse the government’s goal by examining the regulatory 
challenges of using organic certification as a means of linking farm-level management to 
the sustainability of coastal (mangrove) landscapes. The results show the importance of 
farmer perceptions of sustainable farm and landscape management, fair benefit sharing 
mechanisms in the certified value chain, and legitimate private sector-led auditing. We 
conclude that in order to overcome conflicts of interest and legitimate representation in 
organic certification, the social and economic conditions of production require 
regulatory intervention from provincial and local level government. To achieve benefits 
beyond the scale of the farm, the role of shrimp producers should be redefined as 
partners in rather than targets of regulation. 
Key words: Certification, organic shrimp, Naturland, shrimp farming, Vietnam 
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Chapter 3    
REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF CERTIFYING ORGANIC SHRIMP PRODUCTION 
 
3.1   Introduction   
The aquaculture of tropical shrimp in coastal areas has been an important source 
of export income to Southeast Asian countries, as well as a source of economic risk and 
environmental impact (e.g. Barbier and Cox, 2004; Huitric et al., 2002; Primavera, 2006; 
Vandergeest et al., 1999). Asian shrimp producers are now firmly embedded in a global 
agrifood system of production and consumption, within which networks of state and 
non-state actors at multiple spatial and political scales have increasing control over the 
management of local resources (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007; Islam, 2008; Vandergeest, 
2007; Vandergeest and Unno, 2012). The great diversity of production systems across 
Southeast Asia, has meant that regulating shrimp is not only dependent on prevailing 
production conditions but also on the organisation of domestic industries (Hall, 2004). 
In Vietnam, shrimp aquaculture is dominated by small-holders due to physical and 
economic constraints of intensifying production. In an attempt to improve the 
international image of Vietnamese shrimp production the government has sought to 
promote organic production in shrimp-mangrove aquaculture systems as a means of 
conserving the coastal landscape and reducing the production risk of farmers.5  
Small-holder aquaculture farmers in transitional economies such as Vietnam are 
increasingly drawn into global organic networks by virtue of their low input farming 
practices, making it (at least in principle) easy for them to meet standardized 
requirements (Nigh, 1997). Third party certification is seen as a tool for improving their 
market position while also achieving environmental and social policy objectives. But it 
has also come under increasing scrutiny, especially when applied to small holders in 
developing countries (Hatanaka, 2010b; Konefal and Hatanaka, 2011). Questions remain 
over auditing and traceability in information-poor economies (Bush and Oosterveer, 
2007; Mol, 2009), the illogic of global standards in the context of locally defined 
practices (Muttersbaugh et al., 2005), and the modes and structures of hybrid state-
market environmental regulatory networks (Vandergeest, 2007).  
After 10 years of successful implementation in Nam Can district, the Vietnamese 
government wants to upscale Naturland certified organic production to all integrated 
shrimp-mangrove farming systems along the southern coast of the Ca Mau peninsula by 
2015. Such aspirations for developing an ‘organic coast’ reflects the high production 
                                                 
5
 Organic production in Vietnam lags behind many other Southeast Asian countries, but is one of the fastest growing 
agricultural sectors in the country, driven by exports and domestic retailers marketing safe foods to a growing urban 
middle class (see Scott et al. 2009; Hoi et al. 2009). 
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risks associated with intensification (Joffre and Bosma, 2009; Kautsky et al., 1997) and 
the growing international demand for improved environmental practices in aquaculture 
production (Bush et al., 2010; Vandergeest, 2007). The realisation of an 'organic coast' 
also demonstrates a clear shift in the governance of aquaculture in Vietnam over the last 
decade, by incorporating market oriented voluntary standards as a means of 
incentivising farmers to upgrade their production practices, as well as their position in 
global value chains (Ha and Bush, 2010). As a result, the Vietnamese government has 
begun to redefine its role from a central purveyor of regulation, to a partner in what 
Vandergeest (2007) has labeled a global environmental regulatory network (ERN). 
This paper investigates how scaling up organic certification, as an new form of 
ERN, can balance the goals of ecologically, socially and economically sound shrimp 
aquaculture in Vietnam. More specifically we explore the regulatory challenges of using 
organic certification as a means of linking farm-level management to the sustainability 
of coastal (mangrove) landscapes. The research is driven by two key questions. First, 
what are the regulatory challenges of up-scaling organic certification to coastal 
landscapes? And second, what are the (potential) roles and levels of involvement of 
different government institutions in organic certification as an ostensibly privatised 
form of environmental governance? 
 
Figure 3.1. The map indicate Tam Giang and Tan An communes 
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Research was conducted from 2007 to 2011 in Tam Giang and Tan An communes 
of Ca Mau province; an area dominated by integrated shrimp–mangrove farming system 
(Figure 3.1). A total of 130 semi-structured interviews were conducted with farmers, 
collectors, traders, government officials, processing companies and an external auditor. 
Follow up interviews were conducted in Europe with the Naturland Association for 
Organic Agriculture. Most of the interviewees were visited more than once to monitor 
changes in their perception and practices between years and seasons. In addition, a 
year-long monthly survey of 20 households provided information on shrimp production. 
Focus group discussions were conducted with both certified and non-certified shrimp 
farmers to validate research findings. Supplementary data was gathered from project 
websites and reports produced by certification and auditing bodies.  
We now turn to an explanation of certification as a new form of environmental 
regulatory network and identify key ‘clusters of conflicts’ in the practice of certification 
compliance and regulation. Section three then introduces integrated shrimp-mangrove 
farming systems in Ca Mau province. Section four and five elaborate on the organic 
shrimp ERN, analyse the challenges of regulating organic production and trade in Ca 
Mau, and discuss how governmental organisations are involved in the certification 
process. Finally we reflect on the Vietnamese government’s aspirations for developing 
an ‘organic coast’ and how organic certification can contribute to obtain such a goal. 
3.2   Certification as Environmental Regulatory Network (ERN) 
The growing prominence of market-based governance, such as third-party 
certification, has redefined responsibilities for regulating a range of environmental and 
social problems in global agrifood production. How standards are defined and enforced, 
as well as what combinations of actors are involved in both steps, has led to widespread 
discussion over the roles and power of state and private sector actors. State-centric 
models argue that governments are centers of policy making authority and have a 
steering role in societal decision making. Alternatively, market models emphasize a 
sidelining of the state (Rhodes 1994), and a shift of authority to private actors and 
economic processes. Cashore (2002), siding with the latter, frame certification as a ‘Non-
State Market Driven’ (NSMD) environmental governance arrangement, emphasising the 
diminished role of governments in create or enforce adherence to ‘rules’, and their role 
as one of many participating interest groups. Moreover, NSMD arrangements gain 
authority through the market, in which price signals and access shape the behavior of 
producers. 
The rise of NSMD certification schemes in global agrifood networks is a contested 
but widely perceived positive move to overcome the limitations of state-based 
regulation of environmental and social performance of primary production (Cashore, 
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2002). Within specific niche or alternative agrifood networks, such as fair trade and 
organic, NSMD certification is criticized for fulfilling an increasingly unrealistic number 
of expectations; from safe and healthy food to the promotion of environmentally 
sustainable production practices, and the empowerment of small-holder producers (e.g. 
Hatanaka, 2010b; Konefal and Hatanaka, 2011). Supplanting state regulation with 
private certification may therefore be a too simplified view of ‘market driven’ 
governance (Auld et al., 2008; Rönnbäck, 2003). The literature on standards and 
certification clearly outlines a continued role for governments in creating basic 
guarantees in certification arrangements, especially for small-holder producers in 
transitional economies (e.g. Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005, Klooster, 2005, Auld et al., 
2008). As Eden and Bear (2010) argue, NSMD certification has as yet only been able to 
supplement rather than supplant government regulation, and  should be thus 
understood as a “precarious balancing of different interests and forms of authority” 
(Eden and Bear, 2010: 103). 
Based on research on shrimp aquaculture in Thailand, Vandergeest (2007) 
conceptualises certification as an environmental regulatory network (ERN) in which 
wider groups of actors (including state institutions, certification bodies, environmental 
groups, development agencies, international organizations, trade agreements, 
consumers, retailers, traders and farmers) participate in a relational form of governance 
that includes, but also expands on, linear notions of value chain regulation. Actors in 
these certification ERNs are driven by multiple motives and competing agendas, 
including reducing environmental harm, promoting economic growth, facilitating trade, 
and ensuring food safety and quality. 
Seeing certification as an ERN allows us to identify multiple linkages between 
actors and understand how their relations influence practices related to primary 
production and trade. Questions of state involvement in certification ERNs remain 
extremely pertinent. The formulation, implementation and regulation of (environmental 
and food quality) standards is influenced by multiple actors and networks.  In Vietnam, a 
country in an ongoing transition from a centrally planned to market economy 
(Beresford, 1990; Kerkvliet, 1995), the government is exploring ways to balance 
sovereign control over farmers with the growing influence of intergovernmental 
organizations and market actors, all of which have a different perspective of how to 
regulate sustainable shrimp production (Ha and Bush, 2010). This is clearly evident in 
the decision by the Vietnamese government to upscale organic shrimp production in Ca 
Mau by 2015, and opens up questions about the ways in which the Vietnamese state 
interacts with and is involved in global certification ERNs. 
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Based on the literature, we identify three ‘clusters of conflicts’ within certification 
ERNs that are relevant to organic shrimp production and regulation in Vietnam. 
Governing these conflicts directly influences the willingness and capacity of local 
producers to comply with organic standards. The first cluster emerges around the 
diverging epistemologies of ‘organic’ farming between actors in certification ERNs. In 
her work on organic shrimp producers in Indonesia, Hatanaka (2010a, 2010b) 
illustrates the consequences of diverging understandings of ‘sustainable’ and ‘organic’, 
either because it is lost in translation or because there is no consultation with farmers in 
standard formulation. Hatanaka (2010b) notes an uneven division of responsibility, 
where producers are expected to comply regardless of the level of technology 
availability, technical expertise or economic capacity. While organic certification 
networks are successful in forging a partnership in ‘product outcome’, Hatanaka argues 
they are not as successful in developing ‘partnerships in process’; a point that is 
reiterated in various other studies (e.g. Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005; Islam, 2008; 
Neilson and Pritchard, 2007; Vandergeest, 2007; Ponte, 2012). Such a ‘product’ focus 
also raises concerns over the scale of responsibility. The market paradigm has placed 
the burden of proof of on farmers, which limits the scale at which the impact of 
improved production practices can be seen (Muttersbaugh, 2005). Questions then 
emerge over whether such farm-level organic certification can be helpful for the 
Vietnamese government to govern coastal landscapes. 
The second cluster focuses on trading practices in what Bush and Oosterveer 
(2007) label the ‘black box’ of global value chains: the segment linking producers and 
processors. In contrast to practices at the farm level and on factory floor, this value chain 
segment is poorly understood, with poor assumptions often made about the existence of 
direct and traceable linkages between producers and exporters. In reality, Farmers are 
embedded in a complex patron-client trade networks (Ruddle, 2011; Anh et al., 2011). 
These relations facilitate services to producers that are often not otherwise available, 
including informal credit, technical expertise and social welfare. Over the long term 
these services are often more highly valued than farm-gate price maximisation. 
However, in organic certification, which depends in large part on price signals to 
incentivize changes in production practices (Johannsen et al., 2005; Muttersbaugh, 
2006; Reardon et al., 2009), such social relations can also be constraining. 
Understanding value chain relations therefore helps to determine whether and how 
price premiums are negotiated and transferred to farmers, as well as the extent to which 
equitable benefit sharing can be fostered by the private sector and/or the state. 
The third cluster focuses on third party auditing practices. Audits are responsible 
for verifying that standards are implemented, certificates are issued to products, and 
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credibility and legitimacy is assured through periodic site visits. The credibility of the 
audit system is maintained by the differentiation of regulatory and technical 
responsibilities, and by independently verifying compliance against pre-determined 
indicators (Hatanaka, 2010a). To lower costs auditing is divided into periodic external 
audits, and continual monitoring through internal control systems (ICS). In an ICS 
producers are required to document activities that are verified on a regular basis by an 
internal party. Despite being outwardly objective in their design, there is growing 
critical awareness of the subjectivity of such auditing practices. As outlined by Power 
(1997), auditing is widely perceived as a coordinated series of technical steps, but is in 
reality a socially embedded set of practices and perspectives. Understanding the role 
that social relations play in the audit process opens up questions of legitimacy and 
credibility which are so fundamental to private forms of governance. What role 
governmental organisations can play to ‘mitigate’ concerns of legitimacy and credibility 
in certification auditing is therefore a centrally important question.  
3.3   The evolution of integrated shrimp-mangrove farming systems 
Ca Mau is the leading province of Vietnam in terms of both area and output of 
shrimp cultivation. In 2009, 265,153 ha of shrimp were being cultured - equivalent to 
48% of the total shrimp farming area in Vietnam - producing 99,600 tonnes or 25% of 
the country’s total production (Vietnam Aquaculture Department, 2009; CDARD, 2010). 
At the same time Ca Mau is home to half of the remaining mangrove forest in the Mekong 
Delta and a third of what is left in Vietnam (MARD, 2008). The government is therefore 
under pressure to balance wider aspirations of an export-led economy with the 
conservation of the remaining mangrove forests. Against these competing agendas 
integrated shrimp-mangrove systems have emerged as an opportunity to maintain 
production while ensuring a minimum area of forest cover. 
Integrated shrimp-mangrove systems can be considered a traditional form of 
extensive aquaculture that has been practiced along the Ca Mau peninsula since the 
early 1980s (De Graaf and Xuan, 1998). Extensive systems are characterised by the 
natural recruitment of larvae through tidal exchange, the absence of artificial feeding 
during the entire grow-out period and low levels of production of around 250 kg ha-1yr-
1. In the 1990s the government supported the intensification of shrimp farming by 
subsidising mangrove clearance, as well as investing in state owned hatcheries and feed 
mills (Buu and Phuong, 2000). By 2000 production was only increased to 450 kg ha-1yr-1 
(De Graaf and Xuan, 1998), still well below other Southeast Asian countries, but 
mangrove cover had declined by to 48%. Today shrimp aquaculture in Ca Mau is more 
diversified than in the 1990s, but remains dominated by improved extensive systems, 
which include shrimp-mangrove integrated systems, characterised by low density 
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artificially stocking (1-3 fingerlings per square meter) and no supplementary feeding 
(see Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.2. The proportion of different shrimp farming systems in terms of area in Ca Mau 
Although making up only 15% of the total pond area in the province, integrated 
shrimp-mangrove systems have remained attractive to farmers and policy makers alike 
given their low cost, lower virulence of diseases such as white spot syndrome (Dieu, 
2010), and the need to protect mangrove forests (MARD, 2008). Shrimp mangrove 
integrated systems have therefore become one of the only clear examples of how the 
government might fulfill its wider goals of developing environmentally responsible 
shrimp production (Ha and Bush, 2010). How environmental improvements should be 
achieved remains unclear, but is closely linked to the reduction of disease incidence, 
maintaining farmers' livelihoods, and securing the ecosystem services that mangrove 
forests provide in low lying fluvial coastal areas.6  It is also exactly these production 
aspects that have made the shrimp-mangrove system amenable (in theory) to organic 
certification.  
As shown in Table 3.1, only a small difference in productivity between the 
integrated and non-forested improved extensive systems is evident, indicating relatively 
a low economic barrier to maintaining mangrove cover. But perhaps making integrated 
shrimp–mangrove systems more attractive to farmers, policy makers and organic 
                                                 
6
 Mangroves have been shown to play an important role in coastline protection, mitigation of wave and storm 
impacts, local climate stabilization and as a source for wood, fuel and feeding and nursing areas for many aquatic 
species (Primavera, 1998; Lebel et al., 2002). The Vietnamese government has recognized these as valuable 
environmental services given their importance in the fluvial environment of the Mekong Delta and the Ca Mau 
peninsula (Viet Nam Environment Protection Agency, 2005). 
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certifiers alike is also their inherent stability compared to the non-forested improved 
extensive system. Moreover, the results show that households in the integrated system 
have extra income from fish and crab (nearly 28% of total income), while farmers in the 
non-forested system only obtain 9% additional income (see Figure 3.3). From an organic 
production perspective, this is appealing as it illustrates the more bio-diverse nature of 
production of shrimp-mangrove farming. The improved extensive systems also have 
lower investment costs than the intensive systems, and a higher economic efficiency. 
Integrated shrimp-mangrove systems are therefore comparatively a lower risk form of 
farming for the majority of farmers in Ca Mau.  
Table 3.1.  Economic analysis of different systems of shrimp farming in Ca Mau province 
 
Indicators 
Integrated 
shrimp-
mangrove 
(N=10) 
Improved 
extensive 
monoculture 
shrimp (N=7) 
Intensive 
shrimp 
(N=3) 
Shrimp productivity (kg/ha) 228 218 4,366 
Income from shrimp* 
Income from fish & crab* 
Total income* 
18,280 
4,864 
23,143 
22,669 
2,001 
24,670 
498,300 
0 
498,300 
Total cost* 5,886 3,631 251,584 
Net income* 17,257 21,039 246,716 
Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR per ha) 2.92 5.79 0.96 
(Note: * unit: VND 1000 per ha. (1 US$ = 20,000 VND) 
Source: Household recording from October 2008 to October 2009, this study 
 
Figure 3.3. Proportion of income from aquaculture of different farming systems 
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The prevalence of shrimp-mangrove farming in Nam Can and Ngoc Hien, two of 
the most forested coastal areas in the country, have made them the focal point of the 
organic coast policy. As Naturland organic certification has been drawn into the 
aspirations of the Vietnamese state, it has become an important arbiter of coastal 
landscape management by regulating small-holder producers inhabiting these forested 
areas to maintain mangrove cover. The remainder of the paper examines how and to 
what extent the organic certification ERN combines private and public actors in to 
achieve an upscaling of organic production along the coast of Ca Mau.  
3.4   Regulating organic shrimp production and trade through certification 
3.4.1   Organic Environmental Regulatory Network  
The development of an export-led economy has played a major role in the 
environmental governance of agrifood production, including shrimp aquaculture. The 
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy has not only opened up 
Vietnamese producers to international trade, but resulted in the introduction of third 
party certifications such as Naturland, in which diverse actors with a range of interests, 
norms, knowledge and values move governance beyond the monopoly of government 
institutions. 
The organic certification of integrated mangrove-shrimp production systems 
draws together different state regulation to protect mangrove forests and promote 
responsible aquaculture production, with private Naturland organic standards. The 
initial impetus for organic certification was given by the Vietnam Association of Seafood 
Exporters and Producers (VASEP), which, according to its director, was looking to 
demonstrate that shrimp farming was not necessarily damaging to the environment. 
VASEP then brought together the Ca Mau Department of Fisheries, and sought funding 
from the Swiss Import Promotion Program (SIPPO). Tam Giang was selected as a project 
site because it had integrated farming in a production forest area managed by the State-
owned 184 Forestry Fisheries Enterprise (which later became 184 Forestry Company). 
Once implemented the organic certification network expanded to include an external 
auditor, the Institute for Market Ecology (IMO), and the Ca Mau Frozen Seafood 
Processing Import Export Corporation (CAMIMEX) to export the shrimp to Co-op 
supermarkets in Switzerland.7  
The initial proposal for upscaling came from the 184 Forestry Company in 
response to the challenge of  administering a rapidly growing number of farms. As the  
number of farms grew to about 1,200 the company suggested certifying the entire area 
                                                 
7
 Located in Ca Mau city, CAMIMEX was initially a state-owned company that was transformed into a joint-stock 
corporation in 2008 
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under their management. The basis for this suggestion was to reduce the burden of 
farmers in meeting auditing requirements for certification and the observation that as 
long as the overall pond mangrove ratio was 50:50, the area could still be considered 
‘organic’. However, the proposal was rejected by IMO because they were concerned 
about free-riding by individual farmers if auditing was at the group level. The result is 
that although the government’s goal, as expressed through the forestry company is to 
maintain landscape coverage of mangrove, the responsibility for management remains 
at the individual household level.  
Table 3.2.  Naturland organic shrimp production in Tam Giang, 2002 to 2009 
 
Year 
Number of 
households 
certified 
Volume of organic product by 
certified households (tonnes) 
% of certified 
households sold 
shrimp to the 
project 
Black tiger 
shrimp 
Other 
shrimp 
2002 143 10 4 40-50 
2003 336 47 12 50-60 
2004 694 365 125 50-60 
2005 850 450 170 50-60 
2006 854 467 190 60-70 
2007 850 480 225 60-70 
2008 817 490 214 70-80 
2009 784 485 202 70-80 
Source: Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corporation, 2010 
The consistent growth of certified farms in Tam Giang since 2002 (Table 3.2) led 
the government to expand organic certification to Tan An commune in Ngoc Hien 
district in 2009. There 335 farms, on 2,100 ha, were enrolled in the program in 
partnership with the Nam Can Sea-products Import Export Join Stock Company 
(SEANAMICO), funded by SIPPO and certified by IMO. The site represented a new model 
for the government because instead of a State-owned forestry company, the production 
forest as part of a wider area of mangrove was managed by the Kien Vang Protection 
Forest Management Board. The role of the management board is similar to that of 184 
Forestry Company in Tam Giang commune: it is responsible with the processing 
company to organize and implement certification schemes in the field. Buoyed by the 
success to date, the Ngoc Hien district People’s Committee plans to enlarge the organic 
certification site to all 19,500 ha of integrated shrimp–mangrove systems by 2015. Like 
in Tam Giang, landscape management will remain at the farm level. 
The organic ERN is considered a success by the government, primarily because of 
the steady increase of the number of certified farms and production since 2002. Some 
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government officials also see the success of organic certification as strengthening both 
landscape and farm level sustainability goals. Despite questions over the level of 
responsibility for management, the state-owned Forestry Company enterprises and 
Forest Management Board are deemed to be effectively maintaining 50% forest cover, 
meeting the requirements of landscape level forestry management. Farmers, at least on 
paper, are seen as being rewarded for following farm level production practices through 
a price premium. Furthermore, the wider government goal of ensuring socio-economic 
development of forest users has been promoted through the market orientation 
inherent to organic certification. As a combination of state, private and farm level 
interests, the organic ERN has therefore received widespread support by the provincial 
and district government, as it appears to meet environmental, social and economic 
development aspirations. 
3.4.2   Farmer practices and compliance to the standards 
The success to date of promoting organic certification in Tam Giang and Ngoc 
Hien can be largely linked to the lack of epistemological conflicts between farming 
practices and the organic standards. Because of their pre-existing compliance shrimp-
mangrove integrated farmers have been coopted into the organic production system by 
virtue of their low input farming techniques (cf. Nigh, 1997). Their production system is 
also compliant to the regulations of the government; they use a low density of artificial 
fingerlings and there is no supplemental feed or chemical use. As outlined above, 
farmers have maintained these extensive systems not only because of a desire to comply 
to government regulation, but also because they recognize the unstable productivity of 
improved extensive production in the absence of mangroves.8 As one farmer expressed, 
“all shrimp farming practices and shrimp products in integrated shrimp–forest areas 
here are organic, so why do we need certification for it?”. This raises the question about 
the legitimacy of the existing system by the Naturland standards because the integrated 
mangrove–shrimp production systems here could be considered ‘organic’, or at least 
having organic farming characteristics, before Naturland certification arrived. 
The level of mangrove forest cover, however, does reveal an epistemological 
conflict. According to the Naturland standards, the “former mangrove area in property of 
the farm shall be reforested to at least 50% during a period of maximum 5 years” 
(Naturland, 2010: 23). The standard is generally in line with the regulation set out in 
Decision 24/2002/QĐ-UB on the forest – shrimp pond ratio with the exception of farms 
with a total area less than three ha (Figure 3.4). As forest cover has become the most 
                                                 
8
 The only way in which farmers currently fall short of full compliance to the Naturland standards is their failure 
to stock organic certified seed because there is no certified organic hatchery in the region, despite plans by the 
government and CAMIMEX. 
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important (and most visual) indicator for certification it has become a point of 
controversy. According to a report from IMO’s staff, 19 households were not certified 
after auditing in 2009 because they did not comply with the Naturland standards 
despite meeting the government’s requirement for 40% forest coverage. Interviews 
revealed that farmers with plots less than 1-2 ha were less likely to comply because they 
have chosen to maximize their pond area as income from shrimp is larger and more 
consistent than income from forestry (Ha et al., 2012). The 10% ‘deficit’ between the 
Naturland standards and the government regulations therefore appears to disadvantage 
small-holders in the Naturland program. 
 
  Figure 3.4. Ratio of forest to pond area as set out by the provincial government 
Data from CAMIMEX shows that most of the certified farms meet Naturland’s 
requirement for 50% forest coverage and that a number of farms have up to 70% 
coverage. The apparent success of maintaining forest by these farmers can be explained 
by the implementation of government policy and management activities of the forest 
company, as well as the farmer’s attitude towards protecting forests (Ha et al., 2012). 
Farmers, however, argued that the assessment of certification should not be based on 
individual farms, but rather,  in line with the claims of the forestry company, collectively. 
If a number of farms in the village have less than 50% forest coverage they should be 
'compensated' by those farms with 60% and even 70% forests coverage, so that both 
can be certified. Non-compliance of small-holders to the Naturland standard on forest 
cover therefore appears to be both a question of different perceptions about what 
constitutes a ‘forested’ area as well as (in)flexibility of standards that have predefined 
units and scales of measurement. Farmers complain that Naturland standards are not 
realistic because they assess individual farms, while the real ‘organic’ effect of forest 
cover is realised at a larger scale.  
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3.4.3   Value chain practices - premium payment and benefit sharing 
A key conflict that appears to undermine the certification ERN is the difference in 
the farm gate price and premium payments applied in Tam Giang and Tan An 
communes. In Tam Giang, the farm gate price of certified shrimp is VND 8,000 per kg 
(US$ 0.4) lower than the market price for non-certified shrimp. This is an explicit policy 
applied to organic shrimp by CAMIMEX in order to discourage mixing non-certified with 
certified product. The standard price of shrimp is based on 20 pieces per kg. If there are 
fewer pieces per kilogram, meaning a larger size of shrimp, the price increases by VND 
10,000 (US$ 0.50) per kg. After export a guaranteed 20% of the value of the shrimp 
flows back to the production site and is distributed into four parts: (1) 5% for CAMIMEX; 
(2) 6% for the farmer; (3) 2% for to collector; and (4) 7% to a fund to insure against 
downward fluctuations in market price. However, the payment to the farmers normally 
takes at least two to three months depending on the time of export, and the 6% farmer 
share has been reduced over time from 15% at the start of the project. In addition, 
farmers complain that the 7% insurance is never used in periods of downward prices 
and instead is accrued to CAMIMEX, making their share double of what farmers receive. 
In Tan An, the farm gate price of organic shrimp is VND 10,000 per kg (≈US$ 0.5) 
lower than the price for non-certified shrimp, but this is compensated by a flat price 
given to shrimp ranging from 20 to 40 pieces per kg. Theoretically, this benefits farmers, 
but in practice the size of shrimp in Tan An ranges from 10 to 20 pieces per kg. If 
farmers sell their shrimp to collectors working outside the organic value chain they can 
get up to VND 10,000 per kg more for the product. Certified farmers are also promised a 
20% premium above the market price. But unlike Tam Giang, the premium is divided 
into 5% for the development fund managed by SEANAMICO and 15% for the farmers. 
The main concern of the farmers is that they must wait for up to three to four months 
before being paid the premium because of the long delays in exporting shrimp to Europe 
and the slow payment schedule of downstream actors in the chain.  
As these two cases illustrate, the payment of equitable (and contracted) price 
premiums is the biggest concern of certified farmers. In both communes, farmers receive 
the same (or a little more) from certified organic shrimp compared to non-certified 
products. Reflecting experiences in other aquaculture systems in Vietnam (Khiem et al., 
2010), farmers are disadvantaged by payment delays – a stark contrast with payment 
terms for non-certified shrimp. As a result many certified farmers are increasingly 
reluctant to sell their product to organic shrimp collectors. The risk for Naturland and 
the government is that farmers are withdrawing their enrollment in the program. In 
2009, 145 new farms were certified, but in 2010 155 certified farms were not audited 
because they had not sold shrimp as organic to the processing company. The farmers are 
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increasingly questioning the economic benefit of being certified, but many remain 
associated with the system in the hope of improvements in the system. 
3.4.4   Auditing practices - Internal Control System (ICS)  
The selection of organic shrimp collectors by CAMIMEX plays a key role in the 
functioning of the certification scheme. Thirty collectors were enrolled in Tam Giang 
commune, with an average of three collectors per hamlet, each servicing 25 to 30 
organic farms. These collectors were already active before the organic project started in 
2001 and, while maintaining the same clients, are now regulated within the ICS of the 
CAMIMEX. During harvest periods (about 14 days per month) collectors are personally 
responsible for collecting shrimp and handling payments. They first categorise shrimp 
into different sizes, then weigh and fill in the forms provided by CAMIMEX. Collectors 
directly pay farmers based on the grade and size of shrimp, which is also set by the 
processing company. The shrimp are then re-checked at the CAMIMEX collection station 
by a company officer. Within 24 hours after harvesting the shrimp must enter the 
processing company according to food safety standards. 
An Internal Control System (ICS) was set up in 2008 by CAMIMEX, the 184 
Forestry Company, farmer representatives and collectors. The organisation is under the 
direct control and management of CAMIMEX and operates following the regulations 
detailed by the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). 
The main function of the ICS is to monitor farming and traceability through the trade 
chain in accordance with the Naturland standards. Because the ICS is recognized as an 
internal mode of auditing, IMO (as an external auditor) uses the data generated as the 
basis of their annual auditing. To improve their own efficiency they only randomly visit 
audited farms to check whether ICS information and documents are correct. 
Although the ICS operates smoothly and contributes to the auditing process, 
there are doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, especially with 
respect to the collector’s activities. The problem is that collectors not only collect 
organic shrimp from certified farms but also buy other aquatic products (black tiger 
shrimp, other shrimp and fish) from both certified and non-certified farms in order to 
increase their income. Farmers are also in favor of this practice as it provides a ready 
market for their other aquatic products and it is an important way for collectors to 
maintain relations with farmers in their social network. The farmers, however, reported 
that some collectors, if not many, mix non-certified with certified products in order to 
maximise their 2% bonus based on the value of the farm gate price and the volume of 
certified shrimp transported to the collecting station. 
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Managing collectors is seen as the most difficult task for ICS. Those directly 
involved in the ICS recognise that they should not only rely on farmers for auditing 
information, but are restricted by the costs that further monitoring would entail. By the 
same token these ‘middlemen’ play an important role in the supply chain due to the 
fragmented character of shrimp production. The local government is noticeably absent 
in making any attempt to improve the quality of the ICS. As government staff pointed 
out, the government has made a decision not to intervene in deteriorating network 
relations. The net results is that although auditing and supply chain management are 
important functions of the Naturland system, the current make-up of the ICS appears to 
be hindering the sustainability of the certification scheme. The results also indicate that 
the ICS system risks not being objective because all the actors have an interest in 
increasing the volume of organic shrimp. 
3.5   Regulatory challenges of ‘organic coasts’: A discussion 
Our analysis demonstrates that Vandergeest’s understanding of organic 
certification as an environmental regulation network opens up a more nuanced view on 
the role of state and private actors with their different norms, values and practices. 
Governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and industry play different roles 
in the certification ERN. Although Naturland has come a long way in facilitating 
interaction between these diverse actors, concerns remain about the ongoing incentives 
for farmers to be involved in the system should it continue to be scaled up through 
government policy. We now return to the three 'clusters of conflicts' to explore the 
regulatory challenges faced by the government’s goal of certifying an organic coastal 
landscape by 2015. 
The shrimp-mangrove integrated system benefits from existing ‘organic’ 
practices of producers in Nam Can and Ngoc Hien. The only point of contention is the 
protection and re-forestation of mangroves. The 10% ‘deficit’ between the Naturland 
standards and the government regulations on the allowable proportion of farm area 
under mangrove forest for farms less than three hectares disqualifies many small-
holders from Naturland certification. The proposal made by farmers to also consider 
forest cover over ‘clusters’ of farms demonstrates an alternative understanding of the 
relationship between farm and landscape management that would allow their 
participation in the program. The different definitions of forest cover are therefore not 
only administrative but also represent an epistemological divide over what constitutes 
landscape connectivity that holds direct implications for the participation of small-
holders. This is in line with Hatanaka's (2010b) observations on the tensions between 
farmer practices and externally defined and regulated standards. 
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The farmer’s proposal for group certification as a means of certifying larger 
ecological units holds some credence, and would respond to the concerns that mangrove 
forests are best managed at the landscape rather than farm level. There is growing 
evidence that a cluster based approach can save on certification costs, as well as enable 
improved internal monitoring systems, upgrading of communal infrastructure, 
improved economies of scale in production and improved bargaining capacity in the 
value chain (Kassam et al., 2011; Umesh, 2010). Such an approach would also respond in 
some degree to Vandergeest’s (2007) call for more cohesion of certification processes 
with community-based natural resource management institutions. However, as found in 
other studies on Vietnamese aquaculture (Khiem et al., 2010; Anh et al., 2011; Ha et al., 
Forthcoming), successful cooperation requires closer support from government 
agencies in providing technical input and closer regulatory oversight. 
With respect to conflicts around trade practices in the organic ERN, our analysis 
shows that the role of market incentives is vital in fostering farmer participation and 
compliance with any private sector-led governance arrangement. If farmers do not get 
better market access or a premium for their products, they are unlikely to change their 
practices to pursue certification (e.g. Hatanaka, 2010b; Muttersbaugh et al., 2005; 
Raynolds, 2009; Reardon et al., 2009). The certified farmers in Ca Mau are not satisfied 
with the benefit sharing mechanism applied in the Naturland program as there is no 
significant difference in farm gate price between certified and non-certified shrimp. The 
government’s orientation towards organic shrimp farming in Ca Mau is therefore 
oriented towards environmentally sustainability, but unless greater regulation ensues, 
will continue to neglect social and economic dimensions of production.  
Small-holder shrimp farmers in Vietnam, by virtue of their remote location, low 
production levels and weak organization, have extremely low bargaining power relative 
to other actors along the chain (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007). In the Naturland organic 
chain this low bargaining power might be enhanced by the involvement of the local 
government via the 184 Forestry Company and the forest management board. In 
practice, however, forestry companies and management boards are primarily interested 
in guaranteeing timber production rather than shrimp production. This reflects an 
institutional decoupling of shrimp and forest production although they are directly 
dependent on each other (Ha et al., 2012). The result is that the interests and concerns 
of the shrimp producers have been marginalized. As outlined by Belton et al. (2009), this 
reflects a wider bias in aquaculture certification towards environmental sustainability, 
neglecting equitable access of participants to a sustainable livelihood. The future success 
of the existing Naturland system and the aspirations of the government to upgrade the 
 75 
system to a wider area therefore appear to be strongly dependent on the ability of 
farmers to capture the full share of their contracted 20% premium.  
The third and final set of conflicts in the ERN relate to reporting and enforcement. 
The current make-up of the Naturland ICS in Ca Mau also appears to hinder the 
sustainability of the certification scheme. Reflecting the observations of Vandergeest 
(2007) in Thailand and Hatanaka (2010b) in Indonesia, farmers find themselves the 
objects of, rather than partners in, monitoring with little (if any) input to the form and 
function of reporting. The only means of objection and resistance they have is to not sell 
their shrimp to the processing company – by far the most influential and powerful actor 
in the system. The ICS system also risks not being objective because all the actors have 
an interest in increasing the volume of organic shrimp. This opens up a central 
contradiction of private-sector-led third party certification such as Naturland. Although 
characterized by its claims of objectivity (Hatanaka and Busch, 2008), a distinction has 
to be made between organizational and operational independence. As actors in the 
Naturland chain pursue their own benefits, operational independence is being slowly 
eroded. Supporting Rönnbäck’s (2003) review of Naturland shrimp in Indonesia, the risk 
of misinformation and cheating is considerable when external auditing is based on 
information provided by stakeholders whose benefits depend on the exploitation of 
small-holders. 
Faced with these regulatory challenges of organic certification the question of 
where, when and how the state can be brought back into networked forms of 
environmental governance remains highly relevant. The government, however, is not an 
homogenous entity. Different government departments at multiple levels have different 
goals, abilities and interests in supporting organic certification. Determining which 
institution can best intervene depends on addressing conflicts of interest and questions 
of legitimate representation within the ERN and their influence over steering towards an 
‘organic coast’.  
Following Anh et al. (2011), Muttersbaugh (2005) and Vandergeest (2007), we 
suggest that local government at communal and village level is best positioned to 
support farmers in the translation of standards and price bargaining. As we argue 
elsewhere (Ha et al. Forthcoming), improved farmer organisation through clusters can 
also be supported by local government or existing state sponsored farmer associations, 
but success is more likely if they are led and ‘owned’ by producers. If these clusters are 
supported by technical government services they can be more effective in steering and 
monitoring the shrimp supply chain (Khiem et al. 2010), which in turn can balance the 
existing regulatory difficulties experienced by the Naturland ICS. We also see a clear role 
for the provincial government to not only scale up the number of farmers enrolled in the 
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system, but also to promote organic products both internationally and domestically, and 
to provide stronger enforcement over existing benefit sharing contracts between 
producers and processing companies. However, government involvement is not an 
absolute solution for ensuring conflicts of interest are avoided and legitimate 
representation put in place. Instead multiple actors in the ERN need to develop their 
capacity for negotiating their terms of incorporation and the final outcomes of organic 
certification.  
3.6   Conclusions 
The decision of the government to upscale organic certification in Ca Mau 
province by 2015 raises a series of challenges about the role of the state in NSMD forms 
of environmental governance. Organic certification in Vietnam is not a fully privatised 
form of governance, as the state remains a key actor. Our analysis has shown how the 
government has blurred the lines of the state/private divide by using organic 
certification to govern the sustainability of coastal landscapes, where shrimp 
aquaculture and mangrove forests have historically conflicted. However, we conclude 
that although private governance holds the potential to supplement state-led regulation, 
it does not supplant the role of government. In that sense, we concur that Vandergeest’s 
concept of environmental regulatory networks better reflects the dynamics of 
implementing organic certification than the concept of Non-State Market Driven 
governance. But in order for organic certification to achieve sustainable and equitable 
shrimp aquaculture in mangrove forests a series of regulatory challenges need to be 
addressed.  
Organic certification in shrimp-forest integrated farming systems in Ca Mau holds 
the potential to link farm-level management to landscapes sustainability, especially 
because these systems already hold organic qualities. However, ensuring that farm level 
regulation can have an impact on the landscape level goes beyond questions of 
ecological scalability. Expansion of organic certification is also dependent on the 
improvement of social and economic conditions of production. Realizing ‘organic coasts’ 
therefore begins with the involvement of farmers as partners rather than targets of 
regulation when determining (1) how to best scale up forest protection; (2) the extent to 
which economic benefits are shared between actors in the certified value chain; and (3) 
the level of legitimacy given to private sector-led auditing systems. These conflicts 
within and beyond the farm level need to be resolved before producers will equitably, 
and therefore willingly, invest in the government’s goal of organically certified coasts. 
These regulatory challenges faced by implementing Naturland certification might 
be overcome through a more precisely defined involvement of the state. Based on our 
analysis of local scale value chain, auditing and farmer practices we conclude that more 
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direct involvement of provincial and district government would improve the 
representation of producers in organic ERNs. More specifically, state interventions 
should include greater legislative enforcement over contract arrangements along the 
value chain and support for improved farmer organization that can support a scaling up 
of environmental regulation and certification from the farm to the landscape level. 
Following the suggestion of both the local government and farmers this might be 
achieved through producer-led clusters across ecologically linked landscape units. Doing 
so would partly redefine the role of producers as partners rather than targets of 
regulation, assist in achieving benefits beyond the farm, and move the government 
further towards their aspirations of an organic coast. 
 
References 
Anh, P.T., Bush, S.R., Mol, A.P.J. and Kroeze, C., 2011. The multi-level environmental governance 
of Vietnamese aquaculture: global certification, national standards, local cooperatives. 
Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 13(4):373-397. 
Auld, G., Gulbrandsen, L.H., McDermott, C.L., 2008. Certification Schemes and the Impacts on 
Forests and Forestry.  Annual Review of Environment and Resources 33(1): 187-211. 
Barbier, E.B., Cox, M., 2004. An Economic Analysis of Shrimp Farm Expansion and Mangrove 
Conversion in Thailand. Land Economics 80(3): 389-407. 
Belton, B., Little, D.C., Grady, K., 2009. Is Responsible Aquaculture Sustainable Aquaculture? 
WWF and the Eco-Certification of Tilapia. Society and Natural Resources 22: 840-855. 
Beresford, M., 1990. Vietnam: Socialist agriculture in transition. Journal of Contemporary Asia 
20(40): 466 – 486. 
Bush, S.R., Oosterveer, P., 2007. The Missing Link: Intersecting Governance and Trade in the 
Space of Place and the Space of Flows. Sociologia Ruralis 47(4): 384-399. 
Bush, S.R., Van Zwieten, P.A.M., Visser, L., Van Dijk, H., Bosma, R., De Boer, W.F., Verdegem, M., 
2010. Scenarios for resilient shrimp aquaculture in tropical coastal areas. Ecology and 
Society 15(2): 15.  
Buu, D.C., Phuong, D.X., 1999. Selection of suitable mangrove species to rehabilitate the forests 
on high beds and embankments of shrimps ponds in Ca Mau. In Proceeding of the Scientific 
Workshop on Management and Sustainable Use of Natural Resources and Environment in 
Coastal Wetlands, Hanoi, 1-3 November 1999. MERD/CRES and ACTMANG, Hanoi. 
CDARD, 2010. Aquaculture development in Ca Mau province in 2010. Ca Mau Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Ca Mau Province, Vietnam. [In Vietnamese] 
Cashore, B, 2002. Legitimacy and the privatization of environmental governance: how non-state 
market-driven (NSMD) governance systems gain rule-making authority. Governance 15: 
503-529. 
De Graaf, G.J., Xuan T.T., 1998. Extensive shrimp farming, mangrove clearance and marine 
fisheries in the southern provinces of Vietnam. Mangroves and Salt Marshes 2: 159-166. 
Dieu, B.T.M., 2010. On the Epidemiology and Evolution of White Spot Syndrome Virus of Shrimp. 
PhD thesis, Laboratory of Virology, Wageningen University. 
Eden, S. , Bear C., 2010. Third-sector Global Environmental Governance, Space and Science: 
Comparing Fishery and Forestry Certification. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 
12(1): 83-106. 
Giovannucci, D., Ponte, S., 2005. Standards as a new form of social contract? Sustainability 
initiatives in the coffee industry. Food Policy 30(3):284-301. 
 78 
Ha, T.T.T., Bush S.R., 2010. The transformations of Vietnamese Shrimp Aquaculture Policy: 
Empirical Evidence from the Mekong Delta. Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy 28 (6): 1101-1119. 
Ha, T.T.T., van Dijk, H., Bush, S.R., 2012. Mangrove conservation or shrimp farmer’s livelihood? 
The devolution of forest management and benefit sharing in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam.  
Ocean and Coastal Management DOI 10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2012.07.034. 
Ha, T.T.T., Bush, S.R. van Dijk, H., Forthcoming. The cluster panacea?: Questioning the role of 
cooperative shrimp aquaculture in Vietnam. Aquaculture  
Hall, D., 2004. Explaining the diversity of Southeast Asian shrimp aquaculture. Journal of 
Agrarian Change 4(33): 315-335. 
Hatanaka, M., 2010a. Governing sustainability: examining audits and compliance in a third-
party-certified organic shrimp farming project in rural Indonesia. Local Environment 15 
(3): 233-244. 
Hatanaka, M., 2010b. Certification, Partnership, and Morality in an Organic Shrimp Network: 
Rethinking Transnational Alternative Agrifood Networks. World Development 38 (5): 
706-716. 
Hatanaka, M., Busch, L., 2008. TPC in the global agrifood system: An objective or socially 
mediated governance mechanism? Sociologia Ruralis 48 (1): 73-91. 
Hoi, P.V., Mol, A.P.J., Oosterveer, P., 2009. Market governance for safe food in developing 
countries: The case of low-pesticide vegetables in Vietnam. Journal of Environmental 
Management 91(2): 380-388. 
Huitric, M., Folke, C., Kautsky, N., 2002. Development and government policies of the shrimp 
farming industry in Thailand in relation to mangrove ecosystems. Ecological Economics 
40(3): 441-455. 
Islam, Md.S., 2008. From pond to plate: Towards a twin-driven commodity chain in Bangladesh 
shrimp aquaculture. Food Policy 33 (3): 209-223. 
Joffre, O.M., Bosma, R.H., 2009. Typology of shrimp farming in Bac Lieu Province, Mekong Delta, 
using multivariate statistics. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 132(1-2):  153-159. 
Johannsen, J., Mertineit, A., Wilhelm, B., Buntzel-Cano, R., Schöne, F., Fleckenstein, M., 2005. 
Organic farming: A contribution to sustainable poverty alleviation in developing 
countries?  Born: German NGOForum Environment & Development. [online] 
http://www.naturland.de/fileadmin/MDB/documents/Publication/English/Organic_Far
ming_Contribution_to_Sustainable_Poverty-Alleviation.pdf  
Kassam, L., Subasinghe, R., Phillips M., 2011. Aquaculture farmer organizations and cluster 
management- Concepts and experiences. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper. 
No. 563. Rome, FAO. 
Kautsky, N., Berg, H., Folke, C., Larsson, J., Troell, M., 1997. Ecological footprint for assessment of 
resource use and development limitations in shrimp and tilapia aquaculture. Aquaculture 
Research 28(10): 753-766. 
Kerkvliet, B.J.T., 1995. Village-State Relations in Vietnam: The Effect of Everyday Politics on 
Decollectivization. The Journal of Asian Studies 54(2): 396-418. 
Khiem, N.T., Bush, S.R., Chau, H.H., Loc, V.T.T., 2010. Upgrading small-holders in the Vietnamese 
Pangasius value chain. IDRC, ODI Grant Number RO334, An Giang University, Long Xuyen. 
Klooster, D., 2005. Environmental certification of forests: The evolution of environmental 
governance in a commodity network. Journal of Rural Studies 21: 403-417. 
Konefal, J., Hatanaka, M., 2011. Enacting third-party certification: A case study of science and 
politics in organic shrimp certification. Journal of Rural Studies 27(2): 125-133. 
Lebel, L., Tri, N.H., Saengnoree, A., Pasong, S., Buatama, U., Thoa, L.K., 2002. Industrial 
transformation and shrimp aquaculture in Thailand and Vietnam: pathways to ecological, 
social, and economic sustainability. AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment 
31(4):311-323. 
MARD, 2008. Proposal on restoring and development coastal mangroves for the period 2008-2015. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Hanoi. 
 79 
Mol, A.P.J., 2009. Environmental Governance through Information: China and Vietnam, Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography 30: 114-129. 
Muttersbaugh, T., 2005. Just-in-space: certified rural products, labor of quality, and regulatory 
spaces. Journal of Rural Studies 21: 389-402. 
Muttersbaugh, T., 2006. Certifying Biodiversity: Conservation Networks, Landscape 
Connectivity, and Certified Agriculture in Southern Mexico. In: Zimmerer K.S. (Ed.), 
Globalization & New Geographies of Conservation. Chicago and London. The University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 50-70. 
Muttersbaugh, T., Klooster, D., Renard, M., Taylo, P., 2005. Editorial- certifying rural spaces: 
quality-certified products and rural governance. Journal of Rural Studies 21: 381-388. 
Naturland, 2010. Naturland Standards for Organic Aquaculture. [online] 
http://www.naturland.de/fileadmin/MDB/documents/Richtlinien_englisch/Naturland-
Standards_Aquaculture.pdf  
Neilson, J., Pritchard, B., 2007. Green Coffee? The Contradictions of Global Sustainability 
Initiatives from an Indian Perspective. Development Policy Review 25(3): 311-331. 
Nigh R., 1997. Organic Agriculture and Globalization: A Maya Associative Corporation in Chiapas, 
Mexico. Human Organization 56 (4): 427-436. 
Ponte, S., 2012. The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and the Making of a Market for 
‘Sustainable Fish’. Journal of Agrarian Change 12(2-3): 300-315. 
Power, M., 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Primavera, J.H., 1998. Mangroves as nurseries: shrimp populations in mangrove and non-
mangrove habitats. Estuarine and Coastal Shelf Science 46: 457–464. 
Primavera, J.H., 2006. Overcoming the impacts of aquaculture on the coastal zone. Ocean and 
Coastal Management 49: 531-545. 
Raynolds, L., 2009. Mainstreaming Fair Trade Coffee: From Partnership to Traceability. World 
Development 37(6): 1083-1093. 
Reardon, T., Berdegue, C., Swinnen, J., 2009. Agrifood Industry Transformation and Small 
Farmers in Developing Countries. World Development 37 (11): 1717-1727. 
Rhodes, R. A. W. 1994. The hollowing out of the state: The changing nature of the public service 
in Britain.The Political Quarterly 65(2): 138-151. 
Rönnbäck, P., 2003. Critical analysis of certified organic shrimp aquaculture in Sioarjo, Indonesia. 
Report prepared for Swedish Society for Nature Conservation. 
Ruddle, K., 2011. Informal" Credit Systems in Fishing Communities: Issues and Examples from 
Vietnam.Human Organization 70(3): 224 - 232. 
Scott, S., Vandergeest, P., Young, M. 2009. Certification Standards and the Governance of Green 
Food in Southeast Asia. In Clapp, J., Fuchs, D.(Eds.) Corporate Power in Global Agrifood 
Governance, MIT Press. pp. 61-92. 
Umesh, N.R., Chandra Mohan, A.B., Ravibabu, G., Padiyar, P.A., Phillips, M.J., Mohan, C.V.,  Vishnu 
Bhat, B., 2010. Shrimp Farmers in India: Empowering Small-Scale Farmers through a 
Cluster-Based Approach In Success Stories in Asian Aquaculture 
Vandergeest, P., 2007. Certification and Communities: Alternatives for Regulating the 
Environmental and Social Impacts of Shrimp Farming. World Development 35 (7): 1152-
1171. 
Vandergeest, P., Flaherty, M., Miller, P., 1999. A political ecology of shrimp aquaculture in 
Thailand. Rural Sociology 64(4): 573-596. 
Vandergeest, P., Unno, A.,  2012. A new extraterritoriality? Aquaculture certification, sovereignty, 
and empire. Political Geography dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.05.005. 
Vietnam Aquaculture Department, 2009. Report on status and solutions for Pangasius and 
Brackish shrimp production in the Mekong Delta in 2009. The Mekong Delta provinces 
conference, Can Tho. 
Viet Nam Environment Protection Agency, 2005. Overview of Wetlands Status in Viet Nam 
Following 15 Years of Ramsar Convention Implementation 
  
 80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Questioning the role of cooperative 
shrimp aquaculture  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been accepted for publication as: Tran Thi Thu Ha, Simon R. Bush and 
Han van Dijk (Forthcoming) The cluster panacea?: Questioning the role of cooperative 
shrimp aquaculture in Vietnam, Aquaculture  
 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the role of ‘clustering’, as a form of cooperative production, to 
improve the environmental performance of shrimp farmers and facilitating them to 
upgrade their position in the global value chain. Through a comparison of intensive and 
extensive shrimp farmer clusters in Ca Mau province, Vietnam, we explore how this 
form of cooperative production can enable small-holders to upgrade both functional and 
relational dimensions of production to meet new requirements of participation in the 
global shrimp value chain. The results show that by facilitating horizontal coordination 
between producers clusters can improve the management capacity of both intensive and 
extensive producers for meeting international production standards. However, the 
success of clusters also depends on the type and strength of vertical coordination with 
other actors along the value chain for both the provision of inputs and marketing of 
outputs. The paper concludes that for improved extensive shrimp farmer clusters to take 
further advantage of production-oriented quality standards the Vietnamese government 
needs to play a greater role in the development of production infrastructure and create a 
legal framework for private sector coordination of cluster formation.  
Keywords: cooperatives, clusters, shrimp, aquaculture, value chain, upgrading, Mekong 
Delta. 
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Chapter 4    
QUESTIONING THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE  SHRIMP AQUACULTURE 
 
4.1   Introduction 
Shrimp farmers are increasingly being challenged to ‘upgrade’ their production 
by meeting a range of (environmental) production standards required for entry to 
international markets, while at the same time managing their vulnerability to economic, 
regulatory and environmentally related production risks (Vandergeest, 2007; Islam, 
2008; Hatanaka, 2010; Bush et al., 2010). Despite more than 30 different sets of 
standards available to shrimp producers, including government-led Better Management 
Practices (BMPs) (Corsin et al., 2007), adoption by small-holders remains limited 
because individual practices are often not (if ever) reflected in collective practices such 
as common water usage (Mohan and De Silva, 2010). As outlined by Kassam et al. 
(2011), organising small-holder aquaculture farmers into some form of cooperative 
production is therefore seen as an effective means of fostering a requisite level of 
financial and technical capacity needed to cope with ever more stringent 
(environmental) production requirements (see also Umesh, 2007; Mohan and De Silva, 
2010), as well as the new demands of record keeping and product traceability (e.g. 
Zhang et al., 2010). 
Cooperative production is generally seen as a means of improving the poor 
economies of scale that limit small-holders capacity for improved product quality, 
bargaining power, capital investment and management skills (Coles and Mitchell, 2011). 
Recognising these benefits, the Vietnamese government has promoted cooperative 
production through the 2003 and 2006 amendments to the Cooperative Law; both of 
which promote the organisation and operation of so called ‘new-style cooperatives’. In 
doing so the government explicitly aims to transcend the connoted failures of 
collectivisation (hợp tác xã, see Fford and Huan, 2001; Nghiem, 2008) by tailoring new 
style cooperatives to improve the economic and managerial performance of producers 
through ‘service oriented’ small-holder ‘clusters’ (tổ hợp tác). However, the promotion 
of shrimp farming clusters does not reflect the failed experience of similar forms of 
cooperative production in other sectors and countries (see Chirwa et al., 2005; 
Stringfellow et al., 1999; Valkila and Nygren, 2010). How Vietnamese style clusters can 
promote economic and environmental performance of aquaculture producers therefore 
begs further analysis. 
Through a comparison of intensive and extensive clusters in Ca Mau province this 
paper analyses how ‘new style’ shrimp farmer clusters in Vietnam provide a vehicle for 
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‘upgrading’ production practices to comply with emerging demands set out by private 
and state production standards, and in doing so improve their performance in global 
value chains (GVCs). By doing so we respond to Kassam et al. (2011) who call for input 
to the nascent global debate over the value of group formation for commercially 
oriented small-holder aquaculture.  
Our analysis takes its lead from Ponte and Ewert (2009) who argue that 
upgrading should not only refer only to a normative notion of ‘moving up’ the chain, but 
should also include a wider set of strategies and enabling conditions for firms to 
enhance rewards and/or reduce risk in global markets. Analytically, the process of 
upgrading then includes a range of relational strategies, including vertical and 
horizontal forms of coordination that influence the performance of production (Bolwig 
et al., 2010; Gibbon, 2001), and functional strategies, including the integration or 
specialisation of production functions (Bolwig et al., 2010; Giuliani et al., 2005; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Vietnamese new style cooperatives, and in particular 
farmer clusters, are therefore expected to combine both relational and functional 
dimensions of upgrading small-holder aquaculture farmers: by stimulating a form of 
horizontal coordination they are expected to improve the capacity for complying to 
private and state production standards, which in turn improves vertical access. Using 
the concept of upgrading we explore how small-holders are able to meet these combined 
goals through the kinds of clustering currently being promoted by the government and 
international organisations alike. 
The following section provides further detail on global value chain literature and 
upgrading small-holders. The paper then gives a short history of aquaculture 
cooperatives and clusters in Vietnam before presenting the empirical case studies of 
intensive and improved extensive shrimp farmer clusters in Nhi Nguyet and Tan Long 
hamlets respectively. Finally the paper turns to an analysis of the challenges and 
possibilities of clustering for promoting sustainable shrimp farming. 
4.2   Upgrading and collective production for small-holders.   
4.2.1  Collective action and farmer cooperatives 
Opportunities for small-holders to raise their income from primary production 
and therefore alleviate poverty depends in large part on their ability to successfully 
participate in domestic and international markets (World Bank, 2007; Markelova et al., 
2009; Fischer and Qaim, 2012). However, small-holders typically face a range of 
challenges including high transaction costs and low bargaining power that limit their 
ability their market access. To overcome this situation various types of collective action 
have been promoted which allow them to compete with large producers and 
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agribusiness (Thorp et al., 2005; World Bank, 2007). In general terms collective action 
includes any initiative taken by a group in pursuit of members’ perceived shared 
interests (Marshall, 1998). In economic terms producer cooperatives are forms of 
voluntary collective action taken by a group of individuals, who invest time and money 
to pursue shared objectives (Markelova et al., 2009).  
The economic rationale for collective action by small-holders derives from two 
features of the market (Reardon et al., 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011). First, collective action 
can create economies of scale in production and marketing that reduce transaction costs 
and information asymmetries. Second, collective action can build up countervailing 
market power for small-holders in the context of high degrees of concentration in 
upstream and downstream markets. Small-holders are also increasingly faced with more 
intensive use of purchased inputs and higher degrees of commercialization, and the 
increased modernization of supply chains through high process-related quality and food 
safety standards (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). Together these factors increase transaction 
costs and further aggravate power asymmetries thereby giving greater relevance to 
collective action to improve market access for small-holders.  
Collective action designed to facilitate cooperative production is widely 
promoted as a means of improving the economic performance of small-holders, as well 
as their ability to participate in global value chains (Kassam et al., 2011; Narrod et al., 
2009). Through shared decision-making and improved self-regulation small-holders 
have been shown to improve pre-harvest, production and post-harvest and marketing 
(Narrod et al 2009). However, contrary to the received wisdom of collective action, 
which emphasizes the willingness and ability of individuals to create positive group 
dynamics, the various forms of cooperative production are often conditioned by external 
support from government, NGOs or the private sector (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). 
Understanding the conditions under which cooperative forms of production are 
successfully developed, for whom, and through what benefit sharing mechanisms 
therefore remain key questions, especially for aquaculture where very little empirical 
evidence is available (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). Moreover, questions remain around how 
collective action can facilitate small-holders to upgrade their position in value chains by 
meeting the new demands of quality and sustainability in the global agrifood system. 
4.2.2  Upgrading small-holders in global value chains  
Upgrading is most commonly defined as a process of making better products, by 
either producing them more eﬃciently, or by moving into more skilled activities within 
a wider set of institutional conditions (Huphrey and Schmitz, 2002). The goal of ‘doing 
things better’ is then a matter of improving the ability of firms to generate greater profit 
and thus extract more value from the chain (Gibbon, 2008). The wider understanding of 
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upgrading has been developed in globally oriented industrialised sectors in the global 
North, where doing things better is strongly associated with accumulating knowledge 
and skills to ‘move up’ the value chain in response to globalisation and competition 
(Gereffi, 1999). However, in the context of developing countries a more nuanced 
approach to studying upgrading is needed that takes into account the multiple 
dimensions and strategies of firms (Ponte and Ewert, 2009). This is especially relevant 
to sectors such as shrimp farming in Vietnam, which is dominated by low investment 
small-holder production now trying to maintain access to global markets by complying 
to a range of global certification schemes. 
The GVC literature has traditionally focused on four types of upgrading: product, 
process, functional and inter-sectoral (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Product 
upgrading refers to moving into more sophisticated products with increased unit value 
by developing and applying new knowledge, skills or design principles. Process 
upgrading is defined as achieving more efficient transformation of inputs to outputs 
through the reorganisation of productive activities. Functional upgrading refers to 
acquiring or abandoning the skill content of a productive activity and inter-sectoral 
upgrading involves applying skills and competencies acquired in another sector or 
chain. Each of these forms of upgrading has been linked to different markets structures. 
Process and product upgrading are most likely to occur in chains where producers are 
locked into ‘captive’ relationships, often with the assistance of buyers (Schmitz, 2006). 
Whereas functional and inter-sectoral upgrading is likely to occur in market rather than 
captive transactions and involve small buyers and/or domestic markets.  
Ponte and Ewert (2009) argue that although a helpful starting point, the four-
type classification of upgrading becomes difficult to apply in many situations, largely 
because they assume a discrete separation of strategies, which often does not exist in 
reality. In the agro-food sector (which includes shrimp aquaculture) process upgrading 
often leads to new categories of products such as organic or ‘sustainable’. Similarly, if 
process upgrading is narrowly defined as increasing efficiency, then activities like 
compliance to environmental standards that ‘improve’ production, but not necessarily 
lead to higher efficiency, will not be observed. They also point to cases where 
compliance to social/environmental production standards, and the new functions they 
imply, might lead to a product with intrinsically better qualities but not necessarily of 
higher value to the consumer, making compliance a condition of market entry rather 
than the narrow goal of extracting more value from the chain (cf. Gibbon, 2008). The 
ambiguity of these classifications raise questions over the extent to which these 
upgrading classifications can help to draw out the effectiveness of small-holder 
strategies in dealing with the challenge of globalisation and competition, and in 
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particular, compliance to new forms of regulation such as food safety and environmental 
standards. 
To overcome these limitations, a wider definition of upgrading has emerged that 
goes beyond firm level strategies to emphasise the wider relational aspects of value 
chain coordination. In value chain terms, coordination refers to the how actors set, 
measure and enforce the parameters that define participation and operation in the chain 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). More specifically, coordination can be defined as an 
“effort or measures designed to make players within a market system act in a common 
or complementary way or toward a common goal” (Poulton et al., 2004 p. 521, cited in 
Bolwig et al., 2010). Bolwig et al. (2010) classify these coordination measures as either 
vertical or horizontal – extending the notion from earlier work on commodity chains 
(e.g. Fine et al., 1996; Bush and Oosterveer, 2007) – to create a framework to think 
strategically about the inclusion of small-holders in value chains. In doing so they extend 
the four type classification of process, product, function and inter-sectoral upgrading to 
a wider concept of “desirable change in participation that increases rewards and/or 
reduces exposure to risk” (p.177). Importantly they define rewards and risks beyond 
financial terms to include outcomes related to poverty, gender and environment. 
Horizontal coordination refers to arrangements between actors in the same chain 
node that reduce costs, increase revenue or share risk by cooperating over production 
inputs, marketing, regulation, credit and insurance (Bolwig et al., 2011). The extent of 
such coordination can differ, either being limited to producers of a particular product 
(e.g. shrimp), an industry association (e.g. aquaculture) or, as outlined by Vandergeest 
(2007), community-based natural resource management institutions (e.g. water 
management committees). Vertical coordination includes changes to the ‘structures of 
rewards’ available to suppliers within a chain and the ‘concrete roles’ of upstream actors 
in releasing these rewards to downstream actors (Gibbon, 2008). The expectation of 
much of the cooperative literature is that investment in horizontal coordination will lead 
to coordinated functional upgrading, such as complying with production quality 
standards (Francesconi, 2007), which in turn will lead to vertical coordination in the 
value chain. Improved vertical coordination is subsequently expected to play a critical 
role in coordinating the activities and interests of small-holders (Sykuta and Cook, 
2001), such as improved price bargaining (Coles and Mitchell, 2011), access to technical 
and market information (Bush and Oosterveer, 2007), and ultimately reduce the risk 
they face in participating in global markets (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004). 
In the rest of the paper we apply these relational (horizontal and vertical) and 
functional dimensions of upgrading, and the interaction between them, to determine 
how cooperative forms of production in Vietnamese shrimp aquaculture can facilitate 
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changing production practices to comply with sustainability standards and in doing so 
improve their performance in the global value chain. 
4.3   Methodology 
A comparative case study approach was adopted for this research to investigate 
cooperative production in its empirical context (Yin, 2003; Neuman, 1997). In doing so, 
we compare an intensive shrimp farmer cluster in Nhi Nguyet hamlet, Tran Phan 
commune and improved extensive shrimp farmer clusters in Tan Long hamlet, Tan 
Duyet commune (see Figure 4.1). Both cases are in many ways unique, given the lack of 
functioning aquaculture cooperatives in Mekong Delta, but at the same time are 
representative of the models that are being promoted by NGOs and intergovernmental 
bodies (e.g. Kasam et al., 2011). As the research is problem-oriented the case study 
methodology developed a ‘thick’ description of the upgrading strategies adopted by the 
different groups, and subsequently links these findings back to possible solutions and 
improvements. 
 
Figure 4.1. The map indicates Tran Phan and Tan Duyet communes 
Data was then collected from 2008 to 2010 through seven field trips lasting from 
two to three weeks. A total of 98 formal semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with farmers, local officers from communal to provincial levels, traders, collectors, 
processing companies. To investigate the dynamics of horizontal contractualisation 
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three focus group discussions were held with farmers both involved and not involved in 
cooperative farming to discuss longitudinal quantitative data on farm management 
practices that they had filled in over the two year period. Finally, observations and 
informal talks with farmers during the two to three week visits to the sites over the 
research period were used to validate and complement information. In addition, 
secondary data from commune to provincial level government, as well as national 
organisations such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), the 
General Statistical Office (GSO) and World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF) in the form of 
printed documents, websites and other sources. 
Both qualitative and quantitative data analysis was done to compare the various 
cases in terms of the characteristics of the farming systems, the formation of the 
clusters, the management activities of the clusters, and the factors behind their success 
and failure. An analysis of costs and benefits was conducted based on both price factors 
such as income, membership fees and voluntary contributions and non-price factors 
such as improved access to inputs and outputs and access to information and 
technology. Other factors such as time investment was not calculated. Combined, these 
data provide evidence that can enable argumentative-interpretative analysis (Giddens, 
1993) on the role of clusters in facilitating small-holders to upgrade their position in the 
global value chain.  
 4.4   Shrimp farmer cooperatives and clusters in the Mekong Delta 
Vietnam has one of the fastest growing aquaculture sectors in the world, having 
expanded at 16.4% p.a. from 1990-2008 (FAO, 2010). The shrimp industry, which makes 
up 25% of total aquaculture production, is dominated by small-holders. In the Mekong 
Delta 292,522 households contribute 81% of the total shrimp production of the country, 
72% of which have a pond area range from 0.2 ha to under 2 ha (GSO Vietnam, 2007). 
The predominance of small-holders has meant that cooperative and cluster 
development has remained a central strategy of both the government and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to increase the collective and individual 
competitiveness of the industry (Ha and Bush, 2010). Following the approval of the 
2003 Cooperative Law, the government also put renewed effort into tailoring the form 
and function of cooperative groups to avoid connotations with collectivisation, and also 
facilitate improved managerial capacity for upgrading production to meet BMP and 
other international production standards.  
The Cooperative Law distinguishes two forms of cooperative production. 
Cooperatives are defined as a collective economic organization formed by seven or more 
individuals, households and/or legal entities who have mutual needs and benefit 
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voluntarily contribute assets and labour to carrying out certain works for increasing 
production efficiency and improving living standard of members. Cooperatives operate 
as a business, have legal status, autonomy and self-responsibility for financial 
obligations within the scope of charter capital, accumulated capital and other sources of 
cooperatives accordance with the law (Cooperative Law 2003). Clusters are defined as 
an economic organisation based on a cooperation contract under authentication of 
communal People Committee which is formed “by three individuals or more who jointly 
contribute assets and labour to carrying out certain works for mutual benefit and 
responsibility” (Decree No. 151-2007/ND-CP, 2007). Although the principles of 
cooperative and clusters are similar the main differences are in terms of organisation 
and management levels; cluster can then be seen a simpler form of a cooperative with 
less legal liability for members. 
Shrimp farming in Ca Mau province has been a concern of both government and 
NGOs, who have both been active in promoting cluster formation to promote upgrading. 
The province has an annual production of more than 300,000 tonnes spread over 
122,144 households, of which 67% have less than two ha of pond (GSO Vietnam, 2007). 
Only 0.5% of shrimp farming area is intensive - defined by the use of artificial feeding 
and stocking with a relatively low density ranging from 12 to 30 fingerlings per square 
meter (see Anh et al., 2011). The productivity of intensive shrimp farming ranges 
between 3,500 kg to 4,000 kg per ha per crop, with one crop taking six months. 
Investment in intensive systems - including feed, seed and biosecurity measures to 
prevent disease outbreak – costs 200 million to 250 million VND per ha (US$ 10,000 to 
US$12,500). Dieu (2010) characterised these systems as having low disease prevalence 
but higher virulence, resulting in a greater need for mutual insurance given the high 
investment costs. As illustrated in Figure 2, the higher and more spatially/temporally 
concentrated productivity can be considered more suitable for a more organised 
production cycle and a more direct connection with processing companies. 
In contrast, the improved extensive systems make up almost 95% of all farming 
households, and are characterised by artificial stocking with no additional feeding. 
Investment is therefore much lower than the intensive system at approximately 3.6 
million to 6 million VND ha-1yr1 (US$180 to US$300); mainly used for pond preparation 
once a year. Productivity is also much lower at 356 kg ha-1yr-1 (CDARD, 2007), or 
approximately 8 to 10% of the intensive system. One household with two ha of pond can 
harvest 70 kg of shrimp over two seven day periods per month (for 10 months a year) 
based on high tide events.9 This more open or ‘landscape integrated’ system (Bush et al., 
                                                 
9
 The first seven days range from the 28th to the 4th days and the second seven days range from the 13th to the 19th 
days of the lunar calendar. 
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2010) is also characterised by a higher prevalence but lower virulence of diseases such 
as WSSV (Dieu,  2010). In the context of value chains (Figure 4.2), the temporal and 
spatial fragmentation of this production system makes the role of collectors particularly 
important in linking producers with processing companies. 
 
Figure 4.2. Schematic comparison of the structure and trade relations of intensive and 
improved extensive production systems 
The different production and risk profiles of intensive and improved extensive 
production systems means there are different requirements for collective bargaining for 
cooperative benefits such as mutual insurance, price bargaining and sharing technical 
knowledge. Despite these differences, farmers operating in both systems have been 
encouraged to organise into clusters by the government. However, the attention to these 
collective forms of production and their perceived benefits for improving the 
environmental and economic performance of shrimp aquaculture is overshadowed by 
their decline in number in the province over the last decade (see Table 4.1). Faced with 
this apparent contradiction between policy and practice we now turn to a comparison of 
intensive and improved extensive shrimp farmer clusters, and the challenges and 
possibilities of improving the performance shrimp production through improved 
functional and relational upgrading. 
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Table 4.1. Number of aquaculture cooperatives and clusters from 2001-2008 in Ca Mau  
 
Indicators 
 
2001 2004 2005 2008 
Cooperatives:     
Number of cooperatives 76 58 32 25 
Number of members  1,014 754 1,020 373 
Joint capital (mil. VND) 7,029 5,364 6,000 5,833 
Clusters:     
Number of clusters 79 125 115 86 
Area farmed under clusters (ha) 948 1,500 1,360 1,530 
Source: Ca Mau Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2009 
4.5   The cases of shrimp farmer clusters in Ca Mau 
4.5.1   Nhi Nguyet intensive shrimp farmer cluster 
Nhi Nguyet intensive shrimp farmer cluster is one of the few successful examples 
of a government-led attempt to stimulate cooperative production in Ca Mau and fits into 
the provincial plan for developing 20,000 ha of intensive shrimp production by 2015 
(CDARD, 2007). The cluster was started in 2005 by an ex-national member of 
parliament whose position enabled him to attract government support and contracts 
with input and processing companies. In turn, nine intensive shrimp farmers joined the 
cluster with the goal of sharing experiences and new techniques, as well as to benefit 
from the support offered by the government for installing a three-phase electricity 
system. The following year the group increased to 15 households, and by 2009, sixty-six 
farmers had enrolled. In 2010, the cluster moved beyond a platform for sharing 
technical expertise by establishing two enterprises that have contracts with four 
processing companies, as well as four supply branches with contracts with major 
suppliers of feed, seed and chemicals. This led to further expansion of membership and 
by 2011 the cluster had 100 members with a total area of 120 ha, made up of 96 ha of 
white leg shrimp and 24 ha of black tiger shrimp.  
The sale contracts established with four processing companies show a major shift 
in vertical chain relations directly brought about by the strength and organisation of 
cluster. The contracts bring direct benefits to the farmers who are prone to the 
combined risk of fluctuating market prices and disease. However, it is the flexibility of 
the contract, in combination with more stable pricing arrangements, which generates 
most benefit for the members. The companies do not fix the prices but provide a more 
predictable price indication with 24 hours’ notice. The contracts also do not stipulate 
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fixed trading agreements. The members are free to either sell directly to processing 
companies or through one of the cluster’s shrimp trading enterprises. They are also able 
to sell their products to other processing companies or traders if they get a higher price. 
The benefits of selling to the companies through the clusters are three-fold. First, the 
processing companies pay for the transportation cost of 2,000 VND (US$0.10) per kg. 
Second, once a contract is signed the processing companies commit to buying the shrimp 
at the agreed price even if they have contracted a disease. In the event of a disease 
outbreak the farmers risk is offset by the cluster. Third, the processing companies also 
provide financial support from 20 to 30 million VND (US$1,000 to 1,500) per household 
if requested. 
Farmers who join the cluster also receive a loan at current bank rates and only 
have to repay the loan after three years. The loan is of considerable benefit because the 
interest rate is set at the Social Policy Bank of 0.57% per month, which is considerably 
lower than the commercial credit rate of up to 1.7% per month. Moreover, the farmers 
who are affected by disease can get financial support from the cluster for the next crop 
and only have to pay the loan after harvesting with the same interest as the banks. This 
financial support comes from the cluster’s own resources which are funded primarily 
through a compulsory entrance fee of 200,000 VND (US$10.00) and a one-off voluntarily 
contribution of 500,000 VND (US$25). Additional funds are also generated through a 
500,000 VND (US$25) contribution by those members who get a loan from the bank.   
The cluster has also improved vertical coordination with hatcheries and feed 
mills. The contract with the hatcheries has meant that farmers are able to access 
consistent volumes of higher quality disease-free post larvae. Contracts with feed 
companies have reduced the cost of production. The four feed distribution branches of 
the cluster are able to sign independent contracts with the feed mills. This not only 
improves the efficiency of purchasing and reduces storage, but if payments are made in 
cash it also brings a 1.5 % reduction in costs for individual farmers; equivalent to 3,000 
VND (US$0.15) per kilogram of feed or up to 23 million VND (US$1,150) for the total 
production cycle. The branches then sell feed to the members but only receive payment 
after harvesting. This reduction is divided into a branch fee 2,500 VND (US$0.125), a 
400 VND (US$0.02) subsidy for the farmers and a 100 VND (US$0.005) contribution to 
the cluster management fund. In 2010, 67 cluster members bought 1,000 tons of feed 
from the company through the distribution branches. This led to a three billion VND 
(US$150,000) net profit, which was subsequently divided into 2.5 billion VND 
(US$125,000) for the branch, 400 million VND (US$20,000) for the farmers and 100 
million VND (US$5,000) for the cluster management fund.  
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The government’s investment in the three-phase electricity system for the 
cluster, is seen as the most important infrastructure system to support intensive shrimp 
farming development (CDARD, 2007). The provincial government provided 3.5 billion 
VND (US$175,000) to set up three-phase electricity systems to households in the cluster. 
The data from household recording shows that for the intensive farms in the areas 
without three-phase electricity, the cost for petroleum and diesel generator is nearly 
15% of total production costs. Meanwhile the electricity costs of intensive farms in the 
cluster with three-phase electricity system is calculated at 1.7% of total production 
costs. The cost saving from buying feed through the cluster branches is therefore 
significant because it offsets the cost of electricity (see Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2. Comparison of costs in intensive shrimp farms in and outside clusters 
 
In cluster Outside cluster 
Total costs (US$/ha/crop) 10,024 12,108 
Cost proportion of intensive shrimp farms (%): 
Shrimp seed 2.99 2.02 
Feed 86.73 77.88 
Lime 3.43 4.05 
Biological products 5.19 1.39 
Petroleum  
 
14.66 
Electricity 1.66 
 
100 100 
Source: Household recording from October 2008 to October 2009, this study 
Farmers also recognise a range of ‘non-price’ benefits from joining the cluster 
that also offset their production risk. The very existence of the cluster has led to greater 
attention from government extension services who provide guidance on techniques and 
disease control. However, according to farmers, the relations that have been built with 
feed, seed and veterinary suppliers have proven even more valuable. Technical staff of 
these suppliers, also responsible for sales in many cases, have strong personal ties with 
the cluster members, which allows farmers to phone them directly with technical 
questions. Members also get cheaper and higher quality post larvae since they can share 
the costs for screening common diseases such as White Spot virus. Together, the 
technical input from company staff (especially in relation to disease management), 
provides the farmers with considerable benefits within a wider network of service 
providers that has expanded out the initial goal of building a platform for exchanging 
information. 
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The increase in the number of members over the past five years shows the 
success of the cluster in making production more efficient, while also reducing economic 
and production risk. However, the cluster does not plan to upgrade to a cooperative due 
to concerns over increasing operational costs. Perhaps more importantly, the members 
do not want to increase economic exposure that would come as a registered business 
entity. Within a cluster, members are equal in terms of decision making even though 
voluntary financial contributions are different. However, if they were to upgrade to a 
cooperative, production activities would entail more financial interdependence rather 
than the contribution-without-joint-risk possible under a cluster model. 
4.5.2   Tan Long extensive shrimp farmer clusters  
Tan Long hamlet, located in close proximity to Ca Mau city, has been the focus of 
government and NGO projects promoting shrimp farming cooperatives and clusters 
since 2006. The village has 247 households practicing both intensive and improved 
extensive shrimp production. Seventy-four improved extensive shrimp farmers have 
been involved in three clustering projects. The first was supported by Ca Mau 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (CDARD) through the provincial 
Aquaculture Extension Centre. The second was initially formed by the Research Institute 
for Aquaculture No.2 (RIA2), and the third was established under the supports from 
World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF). Each of these projects provides a comparative case 
to analyse the challenges and possibilities of the shrimp farmer clusters to upgrade 
small-holders.   
The cluster supported by CDARD has enrolled 36 households with 19 hectares of 
improved extensive farming systems. CDARD introduced the idea of clustering to the 
farmers as part of the central governments promotion of the Cooperative Law, as a 
means of  providing a platform for the implementation of Better Management Practice 
(BMP) standards and enable better bargaining power with processing companies. 
CDARD has focused on the provision of credit through the Social Policy Bank. The 
department has also provided technical training for members on production and farm 
management through the state extension service. The cluster set up its own fund for 
providing loans to its members if needed. Each month every member contributes VND 
50,000 (US$2.50) to the fund. Households that need further funds can apply for a loan 
directly from the cluster with an interest of 0.1% per month with a maximum term of 
four months; the minimum length of a production cycle. 
The second group of farmers was established with support of RIA2 as a pilot site 
for a new shrimp farming system they label ‘high-yield improved extensive’. This new 
system is an attempt at upgrading improved extensive systems by introducing higher 
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seed quality, increased feeding and having a sediment settling pond. At the start of the 
program, RIA2 selected 18 households to join the group, all of whom had previously 
suffered financial losses from disease or low productivity. The formation of this cluster 
was funded and subsequently researched by RIA2, but is essentially implemented by 
CDARD; indeed these farmers receive the same access to credit provision as the first 
cluster. RIA2 provides all the related cost such as technical staff who stay in the field, 
equipment for water condition checking, high quality fingerling and half of the pond 
preparation costs. If the farmers make a profit after harvest, they are expected to pay 
back all these cost to RIA2. If they are not successful repayments are waived. The 
technical focus of the project meant that less effort was invested in a coherent horizontal 
cluster management structure or improved vertical market relations.  
The third cluster in Tan Long involves 20 farmers selected under the framework 
of the small-scale shrimp farming project, funded by WWF between 2008 and 2010, to 
improve the effectiveness of production management and bargaining power of small-
holders. The long-term goal of the cluster is to apply production standards, starting with 
BMPs and moving towards the more demanding (and yet to be published) Aquaculture 
Stewardship Council (ASC) shrimp standards. Although BMPs are not recognised in the 
market, and therefore provide little economic incentive (Ha and Bush, 2010), the long-
term assumption is that ASC certification will eventually bring a premium price for 
shrimp in export markets. Like the other two clusters in Tan Long, WWF collaborated 
with CDARD in organizing the cluster and provided training to the farmers through the 
provincial Aquaculture Extension Centre. A distinguishing investment in the WWF 
cluster is the provision of technical equipment for households to test water quality and a 
small budget for the cluster to have meetings every month, enabling farmers to 
exchange experiences on a regular basis.  
The formation of the three clusters in Tan Long is very much externally led, with 
varying goals set out by the funding parties; CDARD, RIA2 and WWF. In contrast to Nhi 
Nguyet, where the motivation for clustering emerged from the farmers themselves, the 
farmers in Tan Long are more passive in their participation, and there is therefore a 
lower likelihood of continuation after the end of the external intervention. Famers 
indicated a number of major reasons for their passive involvement and scepticism for 
the clustering activities in all three projects. 
Farmers indicated that the technical support provided by the project staff do not 
meet the challenges of improved extensive farming systems. Issues of disease and water 
quality are the main concerns of the farmers, but these have been largely overlooked in 
favour of technical support aimed at intensifying production. This was most notable in 
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the RIA2 project where the ‘high-yield improved extensive’ system that was promoted 
by the technical staff requires investment in higher stocking densities and feed; 
measures which increase productivity but do not directly reduce the risk of disease.10 
Farmers in the WWF and CDARD clusters also indicated that while the production 
upgrading activities introduced may improve production they do not necessarily reduce 
the production risk associated with disease that the farmers had experienced in 
previous years. The only activity that farmers acknowledge contributed to lowering 
production risk was the access the cluster was given to testing facilities for white spot 
syndrome in seed. However, how sustainable this service is beyond the implementation 
of the three projects remains unclear. 
 
Figure 4.3. Farmer’s compliance the disease control regulations in 2008-2009 
All three clusters were successful in providing a platform through which the 
provincial government could set and enforce coordinated pond preparation, water 
exchange and stocking. All three activities are regulated at the provincial level in an 
attempt to reduce the probability of disease outbreaks, and also contain contamination 
                                                 
10
 High-yield improved extensive systems are characterised as a more closed system than improved extensive 
systems, with water exchanged only a few times over the grow out period. Densities are also higher between 2-3/m2 
to 8-10/m2). Feeding occurs at a rate of 0.6kg per day for the first month, and then 3kg per day for the second month 
for a 0.5 ha pond. 
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should it occur. The difficulty in improved extensive systems is often the geographically 
scattered distribution of ponds. The farmers and government alike were very positive 
about the greater coordination the clusters enabled for dredging and disposing of 
sediment, recognising the importance of water quality in the growth performance and 
reduced mortality of shrimp. The cluster also enables farmers to more easily inform 
authorities about disease outbreaks and therefore minimize discharge of contaminated 
water directly to the channel before treatment. The information from household 
recording shows that farmers in clusters follow the regulation on disease control much 
better than farmers not in a cluster (see Figure 4.3). 
All three cluster projects, however, placed minimal emphasis on vertical value 
chain relations. As such, farmers do not identify cluster formation with improved 
economic benefit. Interviews with traders and processing companies indicated that 
there are clear disadvantages of improved extensive production over intensive 
production in term of economies of scale, making it unattractive for processing 
companies to invest in contracts. Although improved extensive farms are all harvested 
within 14 days, production remains highly fragmented due to the low level of harvest 
per night at several kilogram per night. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the role of collectors 
remains important in these systems, as they take on the risk of high transaction costs 
associated with geographically dispersed collection. If the government or WWF were to 
try to promote improved vertical contractualisation, they would have to address directly 
how the cluster could either engage and cooperate with the collectors, or adequately 
fulfil this value chain function directly.  
The three cases illustrate some of the dilemmas of using clusters for upgrading 
improved extensive shrimp farming systems. The government, RIA2 and WWF all aimed 
to establish a cluster to overcome the poor economies of scale of these farmers and also 
provide technical input to upgrading. However, the results indicate that while some 
benefits of horizontal contractualisation are apparent, cluster formation alone is 
unlikely to enable improved vertical coordination and significant changes in functions 
beyond production as seen in the case of Nhi Nguyet intensive cluster. 
4.6   A cluster panacea? A discussion 
4.6.1   Upgrading intensive vs. extensive production systems 
Table 4.3 summarises the main characteristics of intensive and improved 
extensive farmer clusters, showing the factors behind the success and failure of 
upgrading small-holders through collective action.  
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Table 4.3. Summarising characteristics of two farmer cluster cases in Ca Mau 
 
Characteristics 
  
Intensive cluster Improved extensive clusters 
Farming system 
characteristics  
 High level of capital 
investment, inputs and 
techniques used. 
 High and geographically 
concentrated productivity. 
 High level of risk in terms of 
disease and finance. 
 Low level of capital 
investment, inputs and 
techniques used. 
 Low and geographically 
fragmented productivity. 
 Low(er) level of risk in 
terms of disease and finance. 
Trigger for the 
formation  
 A group of nine farmers with 
initial objectives of sharing 
experiences and new 
techniques; government 
support for three-phase 
electricity system. 
 External-led formation of 
the clusters by the 
government, NGO and 
research institute with 
different objectives of these 
organisations. 
Role of key actor 
involved 
 Local elite facilitating 
contracts with input 
providers and processing 
companies. 
 External-led organisations 
providing direct financial 
and extension support. 
Key management tasks  Financial fund from multiple 
income streams. 
 Establishment of two 
enterprises and four supply 
branches within the cluster. 
 Signing contract with major 
input providers and sale 
contract with  four processing 
companies. 
 Financial fund from member 
fees 
 Activities of these clusters 
depend on supports from 
external-led organisations. 
 Selling contract with 
processing companies is 
problematic. 
Cost of membership  Entrance fee and one-of 
voluntary contribution of 
VND 700,000 upon joining.  
 Member’s fee of VND50,000 
per month (VND600,000 per 
year). 
Benefits to members  Credit and bulk prices from 
input providers.  
 Reduced cost from three-
phase electricity system. 
 Disease-free post-larvae with 
competitive price. 
 Technical support from 
private extension services. 
 Equipment and technical 
support from state extension 
services and NGOs. 
 Disease-free fingerlings with 
low price. 
 Information exchange. 
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The case of the Nhi Nguyet intensive shrimp farmer cluster demonstrates a 
number of benefits from horizontal coordination. The initial benefit of the cluster was as 
a platform for sharing technical information as a means of avoiding production risk 
associated with market and price. However, farmers quickly realised that so called ‘new 
style’ clusters transcend old cooperative production models. Members remain 
independent, but are able to benefit from belonging to an innovative group, which 
developed and disseminated new technical practices, while at the same time 
maintaining a strong market orientation. Working in this mode, the cluster was able to 
develop a strong organisation, which in turn facilitated a requisite level of trust. As a 
direct result the cluster was able to develop both up and downstream contracts with 
processing companies and input providers. The Nhi Nguyet cluster therefore 
demonstrates the possibility of horizontal contractualisation among farmers leading to 
both upstream and downstream forms of vertical contractualisation and thus changing 
functions of shrimp farmers such as input provision and marketing activities.  
In contrast, the various attempts at developing improved extensive clusters in 
Tan Long were not able to promote vertical contractualisation with other actors along 
the chain and thus did not support changing functions of small-holder producers. The 
clusters have also not reduced the risk associated with fluctuating prices. The chain 
therefore remains under the control of processing companies and, reflecting the findings 
of Bush and Oosterveer (2007), the strategy of shrimp collectors to work with individual 
farmers enables them to maintain a large degree of control over the flow of market and 
technical information. The vertical strategy of contract farming is seen as the solution 
for small-scale shrimp farmers in improving market performance (Barham and Chitemi, 
2009; Markelova et al., 2009) but does not seem appropriate in the case of improved 
extensive shrimp farmer organisations given their geographically fragmented 
production. While intensive farmers get direct economic benefits from clustering, the 
improved extensive shrimp farmers experienced these benefits indirectly through, for 
example, the improved quality of larvae, which in turn reduces their vulnerability to 
disease outbreaks.  
The intensive shrimp farmers appear to be overall more able to benefit from 
cluster formation because they are building on a higher existing level of experience, 
knowledge and financial capacity than the improved extensive farmers. The greater 
homogeneity amongst intensive farmers also appears to reduce the conflicts between 
self and mutual interests (cf. Glover, 1987). This is in contrast to the more diverse 
improved extensive farmers. Traders and processing companies are also more willing to 
establish contracts with these intensive farmers because of their larger and more 
reliable harvests, and also because of the relatively easier access to ponds (see Miyata et 
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al., 2009). Together these advantages for intensive shrimp farmers strengthen the role 
of cooperative forms of production, and therefore the motivation to form farmer 
clusters. The results support wider claims that despite producers seeing the benefits of 
horizontal forms of coordination, co-operative production models can lead to closer 
(contractual) ties to processing companies and access to input and credit. However, as 
outlined elsewhere (e.g. Khiem et al., 2010; Lem et al., 2004), this is more likely to be the 
case for intensive farmers that are already well organised, geographically concentrated 
and able to maintain some level of bargaining power by providing a higher quantity of 
shrimp at harvest. 
4.6.2   Improving quality management 
Both cases demonstrate that focusing solely on increasing production efficiency 
is no longer enough to enable farmers to upgrade their position in the global value chain. 
Producers recognise the need to demonstrate the quality and safety of their products 
and farming practices, but also need to take into account environment and social issues 
related to production (Phillips et al., 2007). Intensive and improved extensive 
production systems differ considerably, but both are fundamentally reliant on good 
water and seed quality to reduce the risk of disease and therefore determine 
productivity of shrimp and the sustainability of the sector. These pressures on small-
holders gives further impetus to determining how cooperative forms might assist them 
to comply with production-oriented quality standards, which may also improve market 
performance.  
The results show that investment in horizontal contractualisation is successful 
for intensive producers because of greater gains in disease management and because 
quality management creates commercial efficiencies that are rewarded by processing 
companies. The case of improved extensive shrimp farmer clusters in Tan Long, 
however, demonstrates there are possibilities for small-holder farmers to change their 
position along the value chain by coordinating the implementation of BMPs (Kassam et 
al., 2011; Umesh, 2007). Although the clusters cannot currently set up meaningful forms 
of vertical coordination, they are able to improve product quality, which may over the 
long term increase their bargaining power and thus allow them to upgrade their 
position in the chain. Promoting the group performance of implementing BMPs 
therefore remains a challenge.  
However, as reflected by Anh et al. (2011), the difficulties in implementing 
quality management through clusters reflects the need for added incentives to stimulate 
both on-farm measures that collectively will have an impact on water quality. Moreover, 
one of the main factors preventing farmers to adopt these standards is the absence of 
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contracts with the processing companies (Loc et al. 2010). The benefits of horizontal 
coordination for improved extensive farmers therefore is less clear, because on-farm 
improvements do not lead to clear commercial efficiencies and are not rewarded in 
market relations with processing companies. The role of external support from the 
government, NGOs and private actors therefore appears necessary for improved 
extensive shrimp farmer clusters to be established. 
4.6.3   External support – the role of government, NGOs and the private sector 
The two cases also show that different types of farmer clusters require different 
forms of support from external organisations, be they government departments, NGOs 
or the private sector. More specifically the results indicate that the success of externally-
led cluster development is dependent on the characteristics of the production system, 
the motivation of producers, and prevailing market relations. The influence external 
actors can have over promoting shrimp cluster formation therefore depends on the 
extent to which these three factors are taken into consideration.  
The intensive shrimp farmer cluster in Nhi Nguyet clearly demonstrates the 
influence the government both indirectly, through the species diversification policy, and 
directly, through investments in infrastructure. The combined effect of white leg shrimp 
production and three-phase electricity were fundamental in allowing cluster members 
to maintain a high economic return compared to farmers outside the cluster. However, 
external government support would not have been effective if the farmers in Nhi Nguyet 
had not already established a shared learning platform on which the cluster could be 
built. As outlined above, the need for higher quality production, to reduce the risk of 
disease, provided the impetus for cooperative production. Based on the initial 
endogenous motivation for clustering the government was able to better support the 
group of farmers. Furthermore, although private sector support did not extend to the 
creation of contracts, they were more willing to engage with these farmers on the basis 
of an existing organisational structure. 
All three of the improved extensive clusters in Tan Long have been established by 
external parties. In contrast to Nhi Nguyet, the direct financial and technical support by 
both the provincial government, RIA2 and WWF have not led to viable cluster formation 
beyond the life of the three projects. Because these clusters have been so closely related 
to the promotion and implementation of BMPs, these findings support wider 
observations that farmers are unlikely to comply with external production standards if 
they do not see the benefit of compliance; either in terms of lower production risk or in 
terms of incentives for self-regulation in the market. As seen elsewhere in Asian shrimp 
aquaculture, the role of external intervention remains important in providing technical 
support for farmer cluster in order to build their capacity for improving production and 
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complying with international production standards (Mohan and De Silva, 2010). 
However, without clear financial benefits for doing so, the Vietnamese government’s 
aspirations for creating market oriented new style cooperatives, and WWF’s hopes of 
enabling small-holder involvement in ASC may remain problematic.  
The role of external support to new style cooperative or cluster formation in 
Vietnam therefore needs rethinking. The two case studies also demonstrate that when 
they see a clear economic benefit small-holder shrimp farmers proactively engage in 
cooperative forms of production. However, it is more likely in intensive systems where 
production risks are higher and market linkages more direct. Reflecting the findings of 
Belton et al. (2011), access to cooperative groups also appears to be strongly influenced 
by existing social relations of a group of farmers with political and commercial interests. 
For groups with lower production risks and poor social relations, external support 
might be more effective if BMPs are recognised by market actors. This would ensure that 
government support for public certification would give higher incentive for changing 
production practices (Jia et al., 2010). As observed elsewhere (Chirwa et al., 2005; Hellin 
et al., 2009; Key and Runsten, 1999), government and NGOs might be more effective in 
supporting new style cooperatives if producer clusters are given greater legal 
recognition, so that contract terms can be enforced. This would facilitate the flow of 
market information and, as illustrated by the case of Nhi Nguyet, allow for investment in 
key infrastructure. 
4.7   Conclusions  
Faced with the rising pressure of complying quality standards cluster formation 
appears to be an important activity to support small-holders to upgrade their 
production and position in global value chains. The new style cooperatives and clusters 
in Vietnam are expected to combine both relational and functional dimensions of 
upgrading small-holder shrimp farmers. By stimulating a form of horizontal 
contractualisation they aim to improve the capacity of small-holders for complying with 
international and national production standards, which in turn improves vertical access 
to processing companies that control access to international  markets. Clusters therefore 
bring opportunities for small-holders farmers to upgrade production, but not 
necessarily move them ‘up’ the chain or to a higher level of efficiency. In line with Bolwig 
et al (2010) and Ponte and Ewert (2009), our results show that upgrading through 
cluster formation instead gives meaning to collective action that in turn provides 
opportunities to increase rewards and reduce exposure to production risks. In this 
context compliance with quality standards, that increase the need for shared learning 
and ‘better’ practices that lead to often indirect benefits, may provide a new pretext for 
farmers to collaborate. 
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The relabeling of ‘new-style cooperatives’, in the context of an export oriented 
economy, raises questions about the form and function of clusters and the circumstances 
under which small-holders can participate. The results show that while clustering is 
seen as a lower entry form of collective action than more formal cooperatives, they are 
more suited to intensive rather than improved extensive farmers. The key reasons for 
this are that intensive farmers are more geographical concentrated, have a higher 
existing level of knowledge and technical capacity, and have shorter and higher volume 
harvesting periods. As a result intensive farmers are better able to establish favourable 
terms in vertical contractualisation with up and downstream chain actors. Improved 
extensive shrimp farmers on the other hand are less well organised socially, 
commercially and geographically, making it difficult for them to negotiate improved 
terms of access to markets and technical support. Underlying the inability of improved 
extensive farmers is also their weak capacity for capitalising on wider social and 
political networks. Ironically these factors mean that although improved extensive 
farmers have the most to gain from new style cooperatives they are least able to develop 
the capacity for successful cooperation. The results therefore demonstrate a gap 
between intensive and improved extensive producers in their ability to upgrade based 
on both relational  and functional dimensions of horizontal coordination. 
Together these results indicate that cooperative production in aquaculture does 
not per se create benefits for small-holders. Producer cooperatives and clusters are 
therefore not a ‘panacea’ for solving the challenges faced by small-increasingly 
promoted by government and international organisations alike. Furthermore, there 
appears to be a paradox of external support in establishing cooperation; the more 
external support that is needed the less successful the clusters appear to be. Although in 
line with the literature on collective action, this also raises a series of challenges for the 
Vietnamese government, which is promoting ever greater integration of small-holder 
aquaculture farmers in international markets, while not providing adequate support for 
them to deal with the ever greater demands of market access. The government can 
therefore play a more direct role in facilitating farmer cooperatives and clusters by 
providing infrastructure and creating a legal framework for contractualisation between 
farmers and the private sector. Achieving these goals may then enable the formation of 
cooperative forms of aquaculture production that better meet the needs of a wider 
group of small-holders trying to maintain and improve their position in global markets.  
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Abstract 
Large parts of the world’s remaining mangrove forest are lost due to the expansion of 
shrimp farming in coastal areas. Current forest allocation and subcontracting policies of 
the Vietnamese government with respect to the devolution of forest management and 
participation of local people in sustainable forest management reflect both 
environmental and economic concerns. The paper aims at investigating how the 
devolution of rights over forestland and benefit sharing mechanisms are related to 
actual rights and the distribution of benefits of forest management practices. The 
findings show that farmer’s decision-making over mangroves is very much influenced by 
shrimp farming since the income from mangroves is very low compared to that from 
shrimp. Farmer’s decision making over forest is very much influenced by the way in 
which the benefit sharing policy is implemented by the state-owned forestry companies 
and management boards. However, their attitudes towards mangrove plantation and 
protection are far from negative. The study supports the claim that shrimp farmers may 
well be able to plant, protect and manage mangroves if they have more rights and 
responsibilities over forests and are able to benefit more from the production of 
mangroves. In this way more sustainable management of mangrove forests may be 
promoted. 
Key words: forest allocation, mangroves, shrimp farming, benefit sharing, Mekong Delta 
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Chapter 5    
FOREST MANAGEMENT IN INTEGRATED SHRIMP- MANGROVE AREAS 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 Mangrove forest is one of the primary features of the coastlines throughout the 
tropics of the world and its substantial areas are found in Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (Islam and Wahab, 2005). However, more 
than 50% of the world’s mangroves have been lost and shrimp culture is responsible for 
52% of the losses of mangrove forests (Valiela et al., 2001). Shrimp farming started in 
the Southeast Asia since 1970 and the region has continued to dominate world shrimp 
aquaculture production (Sá de Abreu et al., 2011) with the hope that shrimp aquaculture 
will relieve pressure on fishing resources and may cover demand for fish products for a 
growing human population (Rönnbäck et al., 2002). The consequence of this 
development in the region is that the establishment of brackish water ponds for shrimp 
farming has been a major cause of about 50% to 80% losses of mangrove forests 
(Wolanski et al., 2000). Most of the shrimp farms in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, 
Thailand and the Philippines are positioned in mangroves forests and wetlands (Béland 
et al., 2006; Binh et al., 1997; Flaherty and Karnjanakesorn, 1995; Primavera, 1995). 
Paradoxically, while shrimp farming is the main reason for mangrove clearance, the 
productivity and sustainability of shrimp aquaculture is directly dependent on the 
support of mangrove goods and environmental services (Beveridge et al., 1997; 
Rönnbäck, 1999). Moreover, one of the major constraints to develop policy and 
management of mangroves in the region is the lack of relevant information on the value 
that stakeholders ascribe to such ecosystems and the absence of a balanced assessment 
of ecological functioning, local people livelihoods and multiple uses (Alongi, 2002). A 
better understanding of the relation between mangrove conservation and shrimp 
farming as one of the main livelihood sources for millions of shrimp farmer households 
in coastal areas is vital for the successful development of aquaculture in Southeast Asia.  
 In Vietnam, the decline of mangroves over the past decades has been associated 
with the development of aquaculture especially shrimp farming which has led to 
deforestation and ecological degradation (Sam et al., 2005). This can be explained by the 
demand on the global market for shrimp in a situation where government policy and 
legislation was not able to respond adequately to protect the mangrove forest and 
regulate the growth of the sector (Armitage and Johnson, 2006). From a managerial 
point of view, the decline and degradation of mangroves is defined as a result of 
unsuitable technical, financial and management policies for the planting and the 
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protection of mangroves (MARD, 2008). As a consequence, farmers and the private 
sector lacked adequate incentive structures to participate in mangrove protection. 
Mangroves like other types of forests in Vietnam are under state legislation designed to 
prevent or reduce harm created by aquaculture. However, as seen elsewhere the 
regulatory approach is fraught because of the lack of will and ability to enforce 
legislation. Economic incentives may be more effective than regulatory approaches in 
inducing behavioral changes (Primavera, 2006). The main issue is how to design policies 
that promote maintaining mangroves in terms of quality and quantity and improve 
livelihoods of shrimp farmers at the same time.  
Using the case of integrated shrimp mangrove farming system in Ca Mau 
province, the Mekong Delta the paper aims at investigating how changes in legal rights 
associated with the devolution of forest management, are related to actual rights and the 
distribution of benefits out of forest management practices and influence shrimp 
farmers’ decisions with respect to the management of mangroves. It will provide an 
understanding of the issues around mangrove management and policy implementation 
in a situation where mangrove production and conservation is integrated with shrimp 
farming. In doing so, we will challenge the assumption that mangrove forests cannot 
compete with more competitive land uses like shrimp farming. These understandings 
are valuable for policy makers and managers in reconsidering the effects of shrimp 
farming and the role of shrimp farmers in planting and protecting mangroves in coastal 
areas. 
The paper is organised into six sections. The following section briefly reviews 
literature related to the issues of devolution of forest management, benefit sharing and 
participation of local people in forest management. Section three provides information 
on the study sites and methods used in collecting data. Section four presents background 
information on forest allocation and benefit sharing policies in Vietnam. Section five 
highlights the results and findings of the research in Ca Mau province and two 
communes as the study sites. Section six discusses the ability of increasing income from 
mangroves for shrimp farmers and gives some conclusions and policy 
recommendations.  
5.2   Devolution of forest management and benefit sharing - implications for 
mangroves 
Previously, conventional forestry saw centralised forest management by the state 
as the recommended strategy for forest conservation and protection while local people 
were regarded as the main threats to resources like forests (Weeks and Packard, 1997). 
Since the 1990s, the devolution of forest management to resource users has become a 
major policy trend in developing countries (Rosyadi et al., 2005). Responsibility and 
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authority over forest resources are transferred from the state to local people as a 
response to the failure of centralised bureaucracies to incorporate the needs of forest 
dependent people (Coulibaly-Lingani et al., 2011). The policy of forest devolution aims 
to address institutional problems, which have been identified as the major reason 
behind deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (Ligon and Narain, 
1999). These institutional problems include state ownership and centralized 
management of forest resources, corruption of staff in the forestry sector, a lack in 
effective monitoring and enforcement of legislation and policies, and a lack of incentives 
for local people to conserve and sustainably manage forest resources (Wibowo and 
Byron, 1999). A number of studies on local forest management emphasises the potential 
of local people’s involvement in improving forest management (Sikor, 2001), and have 
stressed that the participation of resource users is very much influenced by the property 
rights they have over forest and land (Coulibaly-Lingani et al., 2011). 
Devolution of forest management aims to increase the actual power of local 
people and their ability to benefit from forests by way of legal acts (Edmunds et al., 
2003) and institutional changes (Thanh and Sikor, 2006). Following Thanh and Sikor 
(2006), we define institutional change as a process of negotiation between differently 
positioned actors in which they hold unequal bargaining powers because of differences 
in resources, skills and previous experiences with the state, including its various entities, 
as the most powerful actor. Based on this, three complementary issues, relevant for 
investigating the (possible) effects of these institutional changes, emerge: (1) the 
bargaining power of the farmers involved in forest devolution; (2) the extent to which 
they consider tree and forest management as part of their agriculture practices; and (3) 
the ways in which they may potentially benefit from changes in policies and the 
institutional frameworks in place.  
Bargaining power is closely related to the benefits different actors are able to get 
from forest management. Within the context of devolution of forest management, it is 
useful to make a distinction between endowments and entitlements. According to Leach 
et al. (1999) endowments are regarded as rights on resources like land or forest for 
example that social actors have while entitlement refers to specific sets of benefits they 
can actually get from the resources. Forest endowments do not automatically lead to 
entitlements and local people need not only endowments but also access (the ability) to 
derive benefits (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) from forest devolution. As Tan (2006) argues 
“to make people benefit from forest devolution, the state policy should not only focus on 
how people get rights to devolved forest but also on how people derive true economic 
benefits from it” (p. 418). Moreover, when devolution of forest management is likely to 
generate benefits for local people then it is more important to see how the benefits are 
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distributed, especially in the context of multiple actors involved. One of the mechanisms 
that devolution of forest management can provide in addressing problems in the 
forestry sector is the creation of incentives through the fair and democratic distribution 
of benefits (Rosyadi et al., 2005). It then follows that participation of local people in any 
of forest activities is determined by the benefits they obtain from forest (Coulibaly-
Lingani et al., 2011; Sikor, 2001).  
Silvo-fisheries, a form of land use that integrates low-input brackish water 
aquaculture with mangrove tree culture, is practiced across Southeast Asia; with 
mangroves either within or outside the pond system at specific pond-mangrove area 
ratios (Bush et al., 2010). These ‘ecologically integrated’ mangrove-friendly aquaculture 
technologies are amenable to small-scale, family-based operations and can be adopted in 
mangrove conservation (Primavera, 2006). From the livelihood point of view, the 
systems in Vietnam are also accessible to poorer members of coastal communities who 
have only limited access to finance and are largely dependent on open-access resources 
(Luttrell, 2006). These systems may therefore have the potential to support coastal 
ecosystem conservation while maintaining high-income potential shrimp aquaculture 
for coastal communities (Binh et al., 1997). Moreover, in mangrove areas shrimp 
farming is a very competitive system compared to mangrove production, in which 
income from shrimp is much higher than from forests. Recognising integrated shrimp 
mangrove farming as a complex socio-ecological system (Bush et al., 2010), state 
regulation and market incentives need to be complementary to succeed in their common 
goal of maintaining adequate forest cover.  
Forest allocation to households for long-term use has been implemented in 
Vietnam over the past 17 years within the framework of policies to devolve rights over 
forests and forest land to farmers, known as the devolution of forest management 
process. The policies are regarded as an important strategy to encourage local people to 
participate in forest planting and protection. They have been implemented in all the 
regions of Vietnam from upland to lowland forest areas. In accordance with forest 
allocation policies, a national benefit sharing policy in forest protection and 
development became operational. This policy is based on three principles aiming at 
ensuring harmony between: the state and the forest users‘ interests; economic benefits 
and the ecological functions of forests; and between short-term and long-term benefits 
to make sure that forest users can live on forestry (Tan et al., 2008). Forest and 
forestland allocation to households has been assessed as successful in terms of 
promoting afforestation and creating economic returns to local people in the Northern 
upland of Vietnam (Thanh et al., 2010). Implementation of forest allocation, however, 
has been much slower in the Mekong Delta than other regions of Vietnam. The main 
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reason is because of the concerns that the government has about farmers cutting down 
all mangroves to increase shrimp production. State policy on the devolution of 
mangrove forest in Vietnam therefore faces the challenge of maintaining tree cover as an 
important ecological function, as well as supporting local livelihoods through the 
implementation of a fair benefit sharing policy.  
5.3   Study sites and methods 
This study was conducted in Ca Mau province located on the southern tip of the 
Mekong Delta, Vietnam. The province currently has the largest area and output of 
shrimp cultivation with 265,153 ha equivalent to 43% of the total shrimp farming areas 
of Vietnam, producing 99,600 tonnes or 25% of the country’s total production (Vietnam 
Aquaculture Department, 2009; GSO Vietnam, 2010). The province is also the host of the 
largest remaining mangrove forests in Vietnam, mainly located in the two eastern 
coastal districts of Nam Can and Ngoc Hien. However, mangrove cover has declined over 
the last three decades largely as a direct result of the extension of shrimp farming (Buu 
and Phuong, 2000). In Minh Hai province (later on split to Ca Mau and Bac Lieu 
provinces) 66,253 ha of mangroves was converted into shrimp ponds between 1980 and 
1995. This led to a 2,434 % increase of the shrimp farming area from 3,000 ha to 76,036 
ha over the same time (Buu and Phuong, 2000). Shrimp farming is therefore widely 
recognised as the main factor leading to the reduction of both the quantity and quality of 
mangrove forest in the region.  
Being the province with the largest areas of mangroves, the integrated shrimp-
mangrove farming system is typical for Ca Mau. The system is characterised by 
artificially stocked black tiger shrimp (Penaeus monodon) with no additional feeding 
located within mangrove forests. Shrimp ponds and mangroves are integrated with a 
mangrove ratio ranging from 30-70% depending on the size of total cultivated land. This 
kind of integrated shrimp mangrove farming model can only be found in Nam Can and 
Ngoc Hien districts where mangroves still exist and grow well, while in other districts of 
Ca Mau province, a similar shrimp farming system called improved extensive is 
practiced by farmers but in non-mangrove areas.   
The fieldwork was conducted from November 2007 to February 2011 in Ngoc 
Hien and Nam Can districts, Ca Mau province. Secondary data was first collected on the 
area of mangrove forest allocated and contracted to stakeholders from the government 
agencies at provincial and district levels. Based on this data further empirical 
information was collected in two communes on benefit sharing and farmer’s decision 
making over shrimp and mangrove production. The first commune is Tam Giang located 
in Nam Can district, where mangroves are classified as production forest systems and 
are managed by the Ngoc Hien Forestry Company. The second commune is Tan An in 
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Ngoc Hien district where mangroves are classified as protection forest and under the 
management of the Kien Vang Protection Forest Management Board. A number of 48 
semi-structured interviews was conducted with key informants such as shrimp farmers 
and other stakeholders from communal to provincial levels. 
In these two communes, 32 households were randomly selected in February 
2011 to fill in the questionnaires in order to collect quantitative data on income from 
forest and farmer’s perception and decision making with respect to mangroves. We first 
listed households who cut forest from 2006 to 2010 in the study sites and then 
randomly selected for filling to the questionnaires. Of the 32 households interviewed 
with questionnaires, 18 have production forest subcontracts with Ngoc Hien Forestry 
Company, while the others have protection forest subcontracts with the Kien Vang 
Protection Forest Management Board. Table 5.1 provides a description of the sampled 
households according to percentage forest cover on their land. Although the total 
cultivated area ranged from less than three ha to more than five ha, the shrimp pond 
areas are not significantly different between households, with an average of two ha of 
shrimp pond per household.  
Table 5.1. Description of sampled households according to percentage forest cover 
Household (HH) descriptors Total 
Forest cover ratio 
30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  
Number of HHs interviewed  32 3 3 19 6 1 
Percentage of HHs (%) 100 9 9 60 19 3 
Average of cultivated land (ha) 127.9 2.83 3.63 3.76 5.16 6 
Average of forested areas (ha) 65.15 0.85 1.45 1.89 3.07 4 
Average of shrimp farming areas 
(ha) 
62.75 1.98 2.18 1.87 2.09 2 
Source: Household questionnaires in 2011, this study 
The research also used monthly household recording taken by 20 shrimp farmer 
households in three communes consist of Tam Giang and Tan An from October 2008 to 
October 2009. These monthly household recordings mainly provided information on 
shrimp farming practices in both integrated shrimp-mangrove and monoculture shrimp 
farming systems. Income from shrimp was calculated from the monthly household 
recording for one year. This was considered as a suitable basis to compare income from 
shrimp with income from mangroves collected from the questionnaires mentioned 
above. 
Two methods were used to analyse the data for qualitative and quantitative 
information. First, the Statistical Packages for Social Science (SPSS) was used for 
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analysing the data from monthly household recording and questionnaires to get 
descriptive statistics and to test whether there were significant differences between the 
productivity of shrimp farming in the monoculture improved extensive and the 
integrated shrimp-mangrove systems. The results of these analyses provide quantitative 
data to support our arguments. Second, content analytical methods were used to analyse 
qualitative information from secondary data sources and semi-structured interviews. 
This information was categorized into themes tailored to the research objectives.  
5.4   National forest allocation and benefit sharing policy in Vietnam 
The causes of deforestation and forest degradation in Vietnam in the second half 
of the last century resulted from poor management capacity of the sector and a deficient 
institutional and legal framework (De Jong et al., 2006). From the early 1960s until the 
1990s, forest and forestland in Vietnam were national property and put under the 
management of a system of state-owned forest enterprises (which later on became 
state-owned forestry companies). Nevertheless, millions of people remained dependent 
on forest products for their livelihoods (Thanh et al., 2010). State ownership of forest 
resources led to de jure state property but de facto open-access (Bien, 2001). As argued 
by Thanh et al (2010), local people’s interest and insights were not taken into account in 
forest management and the policy framework led to conflicts between local resource 
users and state forest organizations such as state-owned forestry companies and forest 
rangers.  
Devolution of forest management started in the early 1990s when the 1993 Land 
Law and Decree 02/CP in 1994, mandated that management be handed over from state-
owned forest enterprises (SFEs) at the central and provincial levels to households, 
villages and communes for sustainable and long-term use (De Jong et al., 2006; Sikor, 
2001). Today forests in Vietnam are classified into special use forests, protection forests 
and production forests; each with a different forest management policy. Special use and 
protection forests are under the control of state management boards responsible for 
forest protection and conservation. Production forests are managed by SFEs (now called 
forestry company) who exploit them on a commercial basis, and are legislatively 
responsible for the socio-economic development activities in and around the forests. 
These state organisations are actually allocated the forests from the government. 
Production and less-restricted protection forest can also be allocated to households and 
individuals for long-term use. When forest is allocated to households, they receive a ‘red 
book’ forestland use title for up to 50 years, with a bundle of rights consisting of rights of 
use, transfer, lease, inheritance and mortgage. Leasing forest is also possible under 
Decree 163/1999/ND-CP but this has been very slowly implemented because of low 
economic returns from forestry. These allocation conditions apply both to households 
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and to forestry companies, which were allocated forest or given forestry contracts since 
in Vietnam there is no private ownership for land and forestland. 
Continuing a policy of decentralised forest management, Decree 01/CP allowed 
state-owned enterprises and management boards to establish contracts with 
households to plant and to protect forest for up to 20 years, or one production cycle. 
These contracts provide households with a so-called ‘green book’ forestland use title, 
grants the household the same rights as red book title, with a different set of conditions 
with respect to time of the harvest and benefit sharing mechanism applied by state 
forestry companies and management boards. The rights and conditions that these ‘green 
book’ holders get, directly affect the benefits they receive from forest conservation and 
use.  
Despite being successfully implemented across the country, concerns emerged 
over the management effectiveness and equitability of the red and green book contracts. 
In response, the government released a national benefit sharing policy in forest 
protection and development under Decision 178/2001/QD-TTg. Under this policy, the 
responsibilities of households for management as well as their right to economic 
benefits in allocated, leased and contracted forests and forestland arrangements were 
set out. For production forest allocated to households by the state, benefits include state 
funding for investment; permission for intercropping; the rights to collect non-timber 
forest products and timber for housing; and entitlement to a share of the value of timber 
products after tax. The specific share in the benefits from timber products varies from 
75% to 100% depending on the source of investment in the case of plantation or, in the 
case of natural forest, the state of the forest at the time of allocation.  
More specific rights and responsibilities are also set out for households who sign 
contracts with forestry companies and management boards in mangrove areas. These 
include the provision of investment funds from the government for planting and 
protection, the limitation of not using more than 30% of land for aquaculture, an 
allowance to cut no more than 20% of the forested area and, most relevant to benefit 
sharing, entitlement to 80-90% of income after tax for households that receive financial 
support from the government and 100% for those who invested without support 
(Article Nr. 17, Decision 178/2001/QD-TTg). The national policy on benefit sharing 
provides guidelines for decentralized legislation and implementation by provincial 
governments.  
In 2007, nearly 80% of the 12.9 million ha of forest in the country was allocated 
to forestry companies, protection forest management boards and households. Protection 
forest management boards currently hold 40% of forests, while forestry companies and 
households hold 23% and 28% of the total allocated forestland respectively (Vietnam 
 119 
Forest Protection Department, 2008). The Northern upland area is the leading region in 
terms of allocation of forest and forestland to households. Out of a total of 4.8 million ha 
of forest in 16 northern upland provinces, more than 3.5 million ha have been allocated, 
of which 54% are allocated to households, while 29% was allocated to forest companies 
and management boards. In the Mekong Delta, only 27% of the forest is allocated to 
households, while about 49% and 20% are allocated to the management boards and 
forestry companies respectively.  
On average one forestry company manages an average of 13,502 ha of forest and 
forestland (Vietnam Forest Protection Department, 2008). Since Vietnam shifted to a 
market-oriented economy, the state stopped allocating funds to forestry companies, 
including financial support for afforestation efforts. Instead, the state now extends credit 
to forestry companies to enable self-financing of their activities. De Jong et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that many forestry companies have failed to adapt to this new economic 
mechanism and are only able to survive by participating in the nationwide forest 
rehabilitation programmes such as the Five Million Hectares Forest Programme. The 
majority of forestry companies have failed to manage the natural forest under their 
control in a sustainable manner because of, among other reasons, excessive logging. 
They are, therefore, an important contributor to the serious decline of Vietnam’s tropical 
forests. Moreover, almost half of the forestry companies suffered from land 
encroachment by surrounding communities and spontaneous immigrants. As argued by 
out by Thanh et al. (2010), there is a need to consider the efficiency of forestland use 
between forestry companies and local people under the form of household economy.  
5.5   Results  
5.5.1   Forest management and allocation status in Ca Mau province 
Presently, the total forest area of Ca Mau province is 108,025 ha, including 96,378 
ha of forested areas and 11,647 ha of wasteland planned for reforestation. The province 
has 66,656 ha of mangroves accounting for 61% of the total and the remainder is 
Melaleuca forest located in western part of the province near the shores of the Gulf of 
Thailand. Ca Mau therefore has the largest stand of mangroves accounting for nearly 
52% of the Mekong Delta and 32% of the country as a whole. These mangrove forests 
are recognised as playing an important role in coastline protection, mitigation of wave 
and storm impacts, local climate stabilization and as a source for wood, fuel and feeding 
and nursing areas for many aquatic species, which have economic value in the Mekong 
Delta and the Ca Mau peninsula (Viet Nam Environment Protection Agency, 2005).  
Ca Mau was one of the first provinces in the country where the forestland 
allocation programme was implemented, starting with the Song Trem Forest-Fishery 
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Enterprise in 1988. A further 84,848 ha were allocated to 125 state-owned economic 
units over a period of 10 years from 1988 to 1998. Direct allocation to households has 
been considerably smaller, with 1,820 ha of mangroves and 9,070 ha of melaleuca 
plantation allocated to 190 and 2,648 households respectively. From 2000 to 2004, only 
445.5 ha were allocated to 297 households. Figure 5.1 presents the percentages of forest 
and forestland areas allocated and subcontracted to different stakeholders in Ca Mau 
province recently. Most households who are forest users in the province have been 
subcontracted by forestry companies and protection forest management boards. They 
currently manage 52% of the total forest area. One can therefore say that most of forests 
and forestland in the province are under control of state-owned companies and 
protection forest management boards, while daily management is subcontracted to 
farmers. 
 
Figure 5.1. Percentages of forest allocated to stakeholders in Ca Mau province 
In Ngoc Hien district, the host of the largest stand of mangroves in the province, 
80% of the 38,132 ha of forest and forestland is allocated to the state-owned forestry 
companies and protection forest management boards, while the number of households 
with a red book is relatively small. Although approximately 50% of the forest managed 
by forestry companies and management boards are subcontracted to households with a 
green book, a large part of forestland remains under the control of these state 
organizations. At the same time, the demand for forestland and forest products of the 
rural households is increasing. This led to a situation where forestry companies and 
management boards are under pressure to curb illegal cutting by local people. The 
conflict between state forest management board and/or forestry companies and farmers 
therefore emerged as one of the main problems in forest management in the province. 
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The benefit sharing policy of the government was only implemented after forest 
allocation and subcontracting based on the central government policy of 2001 became 
operational, and was adapted through the Ca Mau Provincial People’s Committee 
Decision 24/2002/QD-UB. This Decision governs contracts between farmers with state-
owned forestry companies and protection forest management boards by setting out the 
specific ratios of mangrove area to shrimp farming. The required forest-to-pond ratio 
increases proportionally as the size of the plot increases, from 40:60 in plots under 3 ha, 
50:50 in plots range from 3 to 5 ha and 60:40 in plots exceeding 5 ha. Through this 
household or plot level regulation, the government hopes to maintain 50% of the area 
covered with mangrove in coastal areas. The policy also stipulates that farmers (as 
contractors) should receive 6% of the benefit from the wood harvests after tax per year 
to a maximum of 95% in total in case households provide all production costs. 
The provincial government’s benefit-sharing policy departs from the national 
policy both in terms of forest-to-pond ratio and benefit-sharing percentages. The 
provincial Decision allowed for 10 to 20% larger ratios of aquaculture ponds to forests 
than the national regulation. However, the benefit-sharing percentages that farmers get 
in practice are lower than the national policy and depend on the number of years forests 
are conserved. If farmers protect forests for 11 years (minimum time for harvesting) 
they get 66% of wood harvest. If the time is 15 years and more they get 95% of wood 
harvest while the remaining is for forestry companies and management boards. In Ca 
Mau, most of the farmers who sign protection and production forest contracts cover 
100% of the investment costs for planting because seedlings can be collected naturally. 
The question is however, whether, the provincial benefit sharing policy is effective by 
being more oriented to local conditions in maintaining the overall goal of 50% forest 
coverage while also supporting the livelihood of contracted farmers? We now turn to 
this question in the two selected communes. 
5.5.2   Benefit sharing mechanism and income from mangroves  
 A comparative analysis of income from shrimp and mangroves after harvesting 
shows that the income from shrimp is much higher than that from mangrove cutting (see 
Table 5.2). The majority of mangroves in the province were contracted to households 
according to Decree 01/CP of the central government. Therefore, most of mangroves in 
the areas were planted and replanted in 1995. Among the 32 households interviewed, 
only four started planting during the period from 1992 to 1994 while the others planted 
mangroves in 1995. The income from mangroves, calculated from the sale of the wood 
after cutting at the end of the 1995 to 2010 production cycle, would be higher if thinning 
and domestic use would have been included. The results from the interviews show that 
the average productivity is 78 m3 per ha per production cycle. Productivity was 
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estimated on the basis of information from the questionnaires in which farmers 
reported the production as calculated by the forestry companies or management boards 
for benefit sharing. One ha of mangroves yielded US$ 596 per production cycle of 15 
years(≈US$40 ha-1), which is less than 3% of the income from shrimp estimated at the 
average US$ 1,539 per ha per year from shrimp. This gap would have been even bigger if 
a discount factor would have been applied. 
Table 5.2. Income comparisons between shrimp and mangrove harvests in sample 
households 
 
Indicators 
Income from mangrove’s 
harvest per production cycle 
(1995 - 2010) 
Income from shrimp’s 
harvest per year  
(2008- 2009)  
Areas (ha) 
Productivity 
65.15 ha 
78 m3  ha-1yr-15  
62.75 ha 
218 kg ha-1yr-1   
Total income 38,865 US$ m3 ha-1yr-15  96,600 US$ ha-1yr-1   
Income (US$/ha/year) 40 US$ ha-1yr-1  1,539 US$ ha-1yr-1   
Sources: Household recording from October 2008 to October 2009; and household 
questionnaires 2011, this study 
According to the contracts with forestry companies and management boards, 
mangroves can be harvested for commercial purposes from year 11. If the households 
want to harvest, they must inform and register with the companies or management 
boards, who come to the farm for harvest planning, which is mainly for calculating the 
volume of wood and the calculation of their share after cutting. After cutting the forest, 
the farmers are obliged to sell the products to selected traders, who are concessionaires 
for wood and are chosen by the forestry companies and management boards. The 
income from cutting mangroves that farmers get from traders therefore depends on the 
volume of planned cutting and the price of wood. Information from the fields and 
questionnaires show that the price of wood that farmers were paid from traders is much 
lower than the normal market price. For example, by the year 2010, in the free market 
one cubic meter of commercial wood was priced from US$50 to US$60, while farmers 
got only around US$15 payment from the forestry companies and management boards. 
Moreover, household income from mangroves is reduced by various ‘management costs’ 
levied by protection forest management boards and forestry companies. 
The income from mangroves for households however differs from year to year 
(see Table 5.3). The results show that the income from mangrove’s harvest from 2006 to 
2008 was very low with less than US$3 per m3 and significantly increased in 2009 and 
especially in 2010. The reason, as explained by farmers, is that before 2008 most of 
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farmers did not attach much about the value of the wood to sell because they considered 
the revenues very small or even almost nothing compare to the income from shrimp. 
Later on however, some farmers recognised that the income they received from timber 
was far lower compared to the market value. A number of farmers then decided not to 
harvest after 10 years but wait until the benefit sharing mechanism changed. In 2009 for 
example, only few households in the study sites harvested mangroves and this is the 
reason why we have only one household selected to fill the questionnaire. Some others 
tried to get a higher price for the wood harvested through bargaining with the forest 
management boards and forestry companies In 2010, the income from wood 
significantly increased for households (even though the price was still lower than that in 
free market), because the farmers took a stronger stance vis-à-vis the forestry company 
and management boards. In 2010 therefore, many households decided to harvest 
mangroves and the number of households who filled out the questionnaire was 13. The 
income from wood for households therefore also depends on the bargaining power of 
households. The more care farmers took in the maintenance and harvest of mangroves, 
the more income they received. 
Table 5.3. Productivity, income and price of mangroves according to the year of cutting  
 
Indicators 
 
Total 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of household 
interviewed 
Forest area harvested (ha) 
 
32 
65.15 
 
2 
5 
 
4 
8.75 
 
12 
22.54 
 
1 
1 
 
13 
27.87 
Wood production (m3) 
Productivity (m3/ha) 
5,077 
78 
265 
53 
615 
70 
2,102 
93 
90 
90 
2,500 
88 
Total income (US$) 38,865 720 1,545 6,100 600 29,900 
Price per m3 (US$/m3) 7.65 2.71 2.51 2.90 6.67 14.91 
Source: Household questionnaires in 2011, this study 
Although the income from mangroves was not as high as from shrimp, the 
harvest yields a certain amount of money at one time, which can be used for larger 
investments or buying new land. This was an important difference to income from 
shrimp, which was higher overall, but earned on a monthly basis. The information from 
the field also shows that although productivity of shrimp in forest areas is not higher 
than in non-forested areas, farmers in mangrove areas have more diverse sources of 
income than farmers in non-forested areas, both from mangroves and aquatic products. 
Shrimp production in an integrated shrimp–mangrove system therefore appears far 
more stable than in an improved extensive monoculture system. Moreover, the results 
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show that farmers in an integrated system generate extra income from fish and crab 
(nearly 28% of total income), but in non-forested areas, farmers generate only an 
additional 9% from these sources (Ha et al., 2012). Diversification of income is highly 
valued by farmers (ibid.). 
5.5.3   Farmer’s decision-making and perspectives on mangroves in two study sites 
Table 5.4 provides the farmer’s perception and decision making in mangroves 
based on the survey results. The first part of the table shows two the most important 
values of mangroves for farmers are timber and the habitat creation for shrimp. 
However, as shown in the second section of the table, if farmers gained complete 
ownership rights half of them would maintain the government’s benefit sharing 
regulations, while about 43% of them want to reduce forest areas to increase the area of 
their shrimp pond. Only two out of 32 respondents indicated they would clear all 
mangroves on their land for shrimp farming – as revealed later in interviews, this was in 
response to what they perceived as an unfair benefit sharing mechanism between 
farmers and forestry companies. About one third of the respondents mentioned that 
mangroves are vital for shrimp and nearly 30% of them think that high density of 
mangroves is not good for shrimp and that they reduce income from shrimp farming.  
The last part of the table indicates three of the most important factors that 
influenced their timing in harvesting the mangroves. The results show that the most 
important factor for cutting forest is the schedule set by the forest companies. This is 
followed by the age of forests. Farmers believe that mangroves older than 15 years 
negatively affect the growth of shrimp, demonstrating their concern over shrimp 
farming in relation to mangroves. The recent high value of wood in the market is the 
third factor affects farmer’s decision on cutting forests. Despite the apparent negative 
perception of mangrove production, all of the farmers interviewed said they are willing 
to plant mangroves if further land was made available to them. Moreover, all farmers 
interviewed expressed their aspiration to obtain full rights and responsibilities over 
forest resources through the forestland allocation programme, and that this would not 
lead to further deforestation. These more positive statements about mangrove 
management reflect the long-term benefits the farmers receive from planting 
mangroves, as well as reflecting the concerns from farmers and local government 
officers alike, that forestry companies are inefficient in their use and management of the 
forests. The farmers’ primary argument is that they get a very low share of the revenue 
from mangroves after cutting as explained by the data shown in the previous section, 
and that this undermines the acknowledged value of having mangroves integrated on 
their land. Some farmers therefore do not care about the quality of mangroves such as 
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density of trees. They cut mangroves continuously for domestic use and sometimes for 
selling or giving to others.  
Table 5.4. Farmer’s perception and decisions making in mangroves  
Farmer’s perceptions and decision making 
Percentage of 
respondents (%) 
1. Mangrove’s value (select more than one option)  
 Value of wood to sell in the market 100 
 Good environment for shrimp  72 
 Domestic use of wood 19 
2. Decision to cut mangroves (if farmers have right to do so)  
 Cutting all mangroves for shrimp farming 6 
 Maintaining the status quo 50 
 Reducing forest areas to increase shrimp pond area 44 
3. The reasons behind cutting mangrove’s decision (if they have 
right) 
 
 No mangrove no shrimp 34 
 Increasing shrimp pond to gain more money 22 
 High density of mangroves is not good for shrimp 28 
 Woods have high value 9 
 No mangrove higher shrimp production 6 
4. Factors influencing the decision in time of cutting mangroves 
recently (farmers are asked to list the most three important 
factors) 
 
 The time that forest companies allow to harvest 78 
 Mangroves of more than 15 years are not good for shrimp 44 
 High price of wood in the market 22 
 Family’s economic situation 16 
 Benefit sharing from harvesting with forestry companies 9 
Source: Household questionnaires in 2011, this study 
5.6   Discussion and conclusion 
The integrated shrimp mangroves farming system in Ca Mau provides an 
interesting case of how forests are managed by farmers in relation to a highly 
competitive land use type like shrimp farming. Farmers recognise the value of wood in 
the market, because this may bring them a substantial income that they can use for 
longer-term asset accumulation, while income from shrimp is mainly for daily 
subsistence. However, given the fact that overall income from mangroves is very low 
compared to shrimp, decisions are primarily based on maximising aquaculture 
production. At the same time, the value of mangroves is also judged indirectly through 
the provision of habitat for shrimp production as well as improving the stability of 
shrimp production and the lower incidence of disease (Binh et al., 1997; Ha et al., 2012). 
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The results show that farmers do recognise the positive role mangroves play in terms of 
ecological function is much more important than directly financial income from wood 
The government’s prescribed forest cover of 50% is an indicator for the quantity 
of forest but it is not necessarily the best indicator for the quality of forest such as the 
density of trees. Farmers and provincial government officials alike blame the continued 
decline of mangrove quality in the province on the mechanism of benefit sharing 
between farmers and forest companies and management boards. The low return 
farmers receive at the end of production cycle is a key reason for many farmers to cut 
mangroves continuously. It reduces the capacity of forest to maintain ecological 
functions. The ecological function of mangroves thus is indirectly affected by the benefit 
sharing policy applied by the forestry companies and management boards to contracted 
households. Although the regulations of the state on forest-to-pond ratio are followed by 
the farmers, they do not pay attention to the quality of mangroves due to their low share 
in the benefits after harvesting. It also shows that farmers’ decisions and perceptions are 
very much determined by the government regulations and the way in which they are 
implemented by the forest companies and management boards. Moreover, they are 
willing to have control over forest in terms of time of cutting and turnover after cutting 
even under the current state regulations.  
The productivity calculated as 78 m3 ha-1yr15 by the forestry company and 
management board also raises questions. A simple calculation of the potential income 
from mangroves after cutting from known data and information shows a very different 
picture. With a density of 7,000 trees per ha at the time of cutting and the high quality of 
mangroves in this area, an average productivity can be reached of 250 m3 per ha at the 
age of 15 years, based on the Vietnam Forestry Sector Standard 04 - TCN-66-2003. 
Similarly, Alongi (2011) calculates a potential production of 260-340 m3 per ha  for the 
Mekong Delta in a 20-year production cycle. The commercial wood production can 
therefore be calculated at least at about 200 cubic meters for a 15-year production cycle. 
With a price of US$ 50 - 60 per cubic meter in the free market in 2010, farmers could 
have an income of US$ 10,000 -12,000 per ha per production cycle, which is much higher 
than the average of US$ 596 that the farmers had previously received.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that if forests are managed by farmers with full 
responsibility and rights over products they can be well protected and maintained. This 
contradicts the government’s concern about maintaining forests for shrimp farming if 
mangroves are allocated to local people. This point also provides the reason why forest 
allocation process has been poorly implemented in the Mekong Delta and especially in 
Ca Mau province. Given the ongoing conflict of interest between forest companies and 
management boards and households, further devolution of rights through household 
 127 
contracts do not appear to hold much potential in bringing further benefit to farmers. As 
shown by our results, despite the fact that revenues in 2010 were higher, the income 
farmers obtained from mangrove cutting is only a small part of the potential revenue 
they can get from mangrove cultivation. In contrast to wider opinion, it therefore 
appears that full rights over mangrove forest would result in much higher income from 
mangroves, and that this income would further strengthen sustainable use of the 
mangrove forest. 
Forest policy and management in integrated shrimp-mangrove farming in Ca Mau 
province provides an interesting case of changing patterns of legal rights, actual rights 
and benefit of forest management practices associated with forest devolution. First, 
despite the fact that shrimp farmers consider mangrove management as part of their 
aquaculture practices, decision-making over mangroves is very much influenced by 
shrimp-farming activities in which income from shrimp is much higher than that from 
forests. Second, the bargaining power of shrimp farmers to get more benefit from the 
mangroves with protection management boards and forestry companies is very much 
influenced by their resources, skills and previous experiences with the state, which is 
represented by forestry companies and forest management boards. Third, the ways in 
which shrimp farmers benefit from policies in place is problematic because of the unfair 
benefit-sharing mechanism applied by the forestry companies and management boards 
as these stakeholders control forests and relations with markets.  
Our results indicate that shrimp farmers are willing to plant and to protect 
mangroves if they are given both economic incentives to do so, as well as greater control 
over the management of their forestland. Farmers are therefore not fundamentally 
opposed to mangrove plantation and protection, but their decision-making is very much 
influenced by the way in which the benefit sharing policy is implemented by the state 
management boards and forestry companies. Reflecting the landscape integrated shrimp 
aquaculture model outlined by Bush et al. (2010), shrimp farmers may well hold the 
potential to plant, protect and manage mangroves if they have full rights and 
responsibilities over forests. Accepting this would mean reevaluating the perception 
that shrimp farming fundamentally leads to the deforestation and degradation of 
mangrove habitats. The integrated shrimp-mangrove model in Vietnam therefore 
appears to provide an alternative model more sustainable and brings more income 
sources for farmers in forested areas. Seen as such, shrimp farming is a mangrove-
friendly source of revenue, which also promotes the planting and protection of 
mangroves. 
These findings therefore lead to important policy implications. Integrated shrimp 
mangrove system is a sustainable system that should be considered as the best practice 
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for coastal areas to conserve mangroves and increase income for local shrimp farmers. 
The government policy and management over mangroves therefore should pay 
attention to shrimp farmer’s livelihood from both, direct income from mangroves and 
indirect benefit from ecological function of mangroves, which affect shrimp production. 
This would change perception and attitude of farmers about the value of mangroves and 
thus provide reasonable incentives for shrimp farmers to plan and protect mangroves. 
Inter-sectorial approach for mangroves and shrimp production therefore should be 
considered in the government’s policy and management scheme and implementation.  
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Chapter 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1   Introduction 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that the Vietnamese shrimp industry 
is embedded in a global system of markets and governance. The industry’s greater 
exposure to international markets has brought economic benefits to producers but has 
also increased producers’ vulnerability as trade and emerging trade-related policies 
have generated economic risks and uncertainties. Moreover, the increasing emphasis on 
new qualities of shrimp production through trade, including both production and 
environmental aspects of shrimp aquaculture, also influence Vietnamese producers’ 
capacity to achieve sustainable production. All of these risks and uncertainties are 
related to the overall social-ecological resilience of coastal areas such as the Mekong 
Delta, where shrimp aquaculture is one of the most important economic activities. While 
some researchers have correctly observed that the most dramatic period of shrimp 
production was during the boom decade of the 1990s (Hall, 2004; Lubchenco, 2003; 
Kwei-Lin, 2001), this thesis has demonstrated that even in a consolidation phase, such 
as occurred in Vietnam, the sector continues to face a combination of chronic and acute 
trade and production risks. This thesis was written from 2007 to 2012 against the 
backdrop of an increasingly vulnerable economic and environmental landscape, 
including the global financial crisis and the increase in disease outbreaks in the Mekong 
Delta.  
As an illustration, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) 
reported that in the first 9 months of 2011, 594,421 ha of shrimp ponds were in use in 
the Mekong Delta, 99% of which were dedicated to black tiger shrimp, accounting for 
92% of the total shrimp production of the country (Notification Nr.5330/TB-BNN-VP). 
However, the report also outlines unprecedented losses suffered by farmers in the Delta 
due to an unspecified disease that infected approximately 80,000 ha of ponds, leading to 
losses of 13 billion fry (MARD, 2011b). As of June 2011, 52,000 ha of shrimp farms in the 
Mekong Delta had been destroyed by a strain of liver necrosis that first emerged in 
March 2011. These diseases caused a drop in output and a shortage of supply, which left 
regional processing plants operating at only 50% to 60% of their capacity. This outbreak 
illustrated the vulnerabilities faced by shrimp farmers in the Delta and the importance 
of governance arrangements to better address issues of risk and vulnerability. 
In October 2011, MARD organised a workshop addressing the prevention of 
shrimp disease in the Mekong Delta. The conclusions were similar to those of previous 
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meetings. Disease is caused by a range of interrelated environmental factors (a theme 
explored in greater detail by Hoa, 2012), including harsh changes in the weather and 
climate, which lead to unfavourable changes in temperature and tidal (saline) influence. 
In addition, a range of production practices and wider governance failures contribute to 
the problem, including the following:  
 the build-up of chemical residues in the water and soil environment by shrimp 
farming activities; 
 shrimp farmers’ non-compliance with regulations with respect to dredging and 
disposing of sediment for disease control, which leads to water pollution; 
 the low quality of fingerlings; the government’s management failings with respect 
to the feed, chemicals and medicine used for aquaculture, leading to these 
products’ poor quality; 
 ineffective state aquaculture extension services; and 
 an overlap in the roles and functions of different state organisations that are 
responsible for shrimp aquaculture, such as the aquaculture, veterinary, quality 
management, and environmental management departments at the provincial and 
district levels (MARD, 2011b). 
There is therefore an urgent need for solutions in which the governance of shrimp 
farming takes centre stage. 
In the preceding chapters, we addressed some of the challenges of shrimp 
production in the Mekong Delta by linking environmental factors and production 
practices to governance arrangements in an attempt to contribute to a discussion about 
the wider social-ecological resilience of coastal communities that depend on coastal 
resources. In doing so, we moved beyond the local level by integrating broader economic 
processes compared to the more locally oriented concerns of other studies focused on 
the resilience of coastal areas (e.g., Adger, 2000). In doing so, we attempted to traverse 
different spatial scales, moving beyond the local to incorporate global markets by 
exploring how decision making through these global (networked) markets interact with 
other spatially discrete governance arrangements, such as the state (Oosterveer, 2005). 
We have seen how the promise of high returns on investment in shrimp farming has 
been gradually tempered by higher risks and increasing levels of social and ecological 
uncertainty and vulnerability (Bush et al., 2010). As shrimp farmers are increasingly 
embedded in a global system of markets and governance arrangements, the control and 
management over their resources has therefore also expanded to include networks of 
state and non-state actors on multiple spatial and political scales, from local to global 
(Bush and Oosterveer, 2007). 
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Through the four empirical studies presenting different governance 
arrangements in Ca Mau province, we critically investigated the interaction between 
existing state and non-state actors and institutions to develop a more informed 
understanding of how state, market and community-based governance arrangements at 
different levels influence decision making over shrimp farming in the coastal areas of the 
Mekong Delta of Vietnam. In doing so, the research has focused on the interplay between 
local, regional, national and international market channels; policy-making at the local 
and national levels; social practices at the local level in governing shrimp farming; and 
the collective influence of these channels, levels and practices on coastal shrimp 
production. Thus, the research contributes to understanding the influence and 
interdependencies of local and global governance processes in attempting to foster 
equitable and sustainable shrimp farming in the context of global networks and markets. 
This final chapter relates the main findings from the four empirical chapters to 
the broader context of sustainable shrimp farming and how the interplay between the 
governance arrangements presented may contribute to the social-ecological resilience of 
the coastal areas. In doing so, the chapter pays attention to three main issues: (1) the 
shift from government to governance and the changing role of the Vietnamese state; (2) 
value-chain governance and upgrading small producers; and (3) shrimp farming 
governance and the social-ecological resilience of coastal areas. The final section 
presents the broader theoretical implications of the thesis results with respect to 
governance and resilience. 
6.2.   The shift from government to governance and the changing roles of the state 
Governance has emerged as a buzzword in political science, public 
administration, political geography and human ecology during the past decade. It refers 
to a paradigm shift in the way that postmodern societies steer decision making (Buizer 
et al., 2011). Viewed in a more dynamic way, the turn to governance is a shift in the role 
of government and the emergence of alternative actors, sites and modes of decision 
making (Kooiman and Bavinck, 2005). Government is often depicted as an “old” 
institution tied to hierarchical arrangements of decision making with power 
concentrated at the national level. In contrast, governance breaks these hierarchies and 
views decision making as a function of networked forms of collaboration through public-
private partnerships or less hierarchical arrangements within and/or beyond the nation 
state (van Tatenhove et al., 2000). From an environmental perspective, this shift to 
governance is seen as positive because the structure of the state, which is traditionally 
oriented to the (re)distribution of welfare, is not well suited to address new social-
ecological challenges, let alone more expansive notions of resilience (Adger et al., 2003). 
This study engaged this shift in the role of the state by exploring the ways in which the 
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Vietnamese government and private actors respond to a series of arrangements set 
within global value chains and aimed at promoting sustainable shrimp production. 
As a broad organising concept, global value chains (as outlined in the first 
chapter of the thesis) have provided a sharp lens to focus on the transformation from 
state-based to alternative market-based and community-based shrimp production 
management arrangements in the wider context of mangrove forests. One of the main 
drivers behind the broader transformation of governance in the global agro-food system 
is the increased emphasis placed on sustainability and the environment as new qualities 
of (shrimp) production. As part of a wider set of qualities, from the regulation of safety 
and nutritional content to a range of ‘credence’ issues with respect to the production 
process—including sustainability, organic production and fair-trade (Watts and 
Goodman, 1997; Busch and Bain, 2004)—environmental governance through value 
chains is leading to a fundamental change in the role of the nation-state. It forces 
governments to adopt a more decentralised and consensual approach at multiple levels 
to the governance of shrimp production (Gunningham, 2009). As argued in chapter 2, 
the Vietnamese government, like many others, has begun to re-negotiate its role from a 
regulator to a facilitator, ensuring conditions for global regulatory processes and flows 
(Mol and Spaargaren, 2006). More concretely, this renegotiation includes the shift from 
public to private regulation with respect to safety and quality standards, branding, and 
contract, environmental and social certification organised for competition based on 
quality (Busch and Bain, 2004, Lee and Marsden, 2009).  
As illustrated in this thesis, Naturland certification, WWF and processor-led 
production clusters, and market incentives for mangrove protection are clear examples 
of these shifts in shrimp aquaculture, especially given that shrimp is a high-value export 
commodity that depends on natural resources and ecosystem services. The main 
challenges of the three governance arrangements and the current and potential role of 
the Vietnamese government to contribute to improved governance are summarised in 
Table 6.1 and described below.  
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Table 6.1. Challenges of governance arrangements and (potential) roles of the state 
Main challenges of governance 
arrangements 
(Potential) roles of the state 
 
1. Organic shrimp certification 
1.1. Involvement of shrimp farmers 
as partners rather than targets of 
regulations.  
1.2. Unfair premium-sharing 
mechanism for certified farmers. 
1.3. The legitimacy and credibility of 
private auditing systems.  
1.1. Establishing national standards in 
accordance with international (organic) 
standards. 
1.2. Facilitating negotiations between farmers 
and processing companies/other actors.  
1.3. Monitoring and steering private auditing 
systems. 
2. Shrimp-farmer clusters 
2.1. Externally induced formation of 
shrimp-farmer clusters without 
regard for farmers’ needs and 
abilities. 
2.2. Ability to establish vertical 
contractualisation between clusters 
and actors along the value chain. 
2.3. Ability to generate economic 
benefits from cluster formation. 
2.4. Ability to ensure the long-term 
operation of farmer clusters. 
2.1. Providing clusters with support and 
infrastructure for development. 
2.2. Creating a legal framework to help 
private actors to play their roles in extension 
and credit services. 
2.3. Better enforcement of legislation with 
respect to contract arrangements along the 
value chain. 
2.4. Supporting the incorporation of 
BMP/GAqP in contract farming.  
2.5. Providing management knowledge and 
skills to clusters  
3. State mangrove forest policy and management 
3.1. Perception that forest allocation 
to households will lead to mangrove 
clearance for shrimp farming. 
3.2. Unfair implementation of the 
forest benefit sharing policy by state 
forestry companies and forest 
management boards 
3.1. Considering integrated shrimp-mangrove 
systems as the best practice for the 
management of mangroves in coastal areas. 
3.2. Hastening the devolution of forest 
management in coastal areas. 
3.3. Applying an inter-sectoral approach to 
the management of shrimp farms at the local 
level. 
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The implication of these governance shifts for the Vietnamese government is that 
decision making at the farm or local level is no longer subject to state policy alone but is 
also contingent upon a range of external influences. As a single-party state, this fact 
presents a particular challenge for Vietnam: if sustainable and equitable shrimp 
production is to be fostered, what challenges need to be overcome to balance internal 
and external governance objectives? This question evokes a central governance dilemma 
faced by most economies in transition that are engaged in high-value production such as 
shrimp aquaculture. On the one hand, the domestic shrimp industry is embedded in a 
global system of production, thereby creating local employment and income (Nhuong et 
al., 2006; Thong et al., 2004). On the other hand, this arrangement exposes producers to 
high risks in international markets, thereby driving the degradation of coastal 
ecosystems (see, for example, Manson et al., 2005; Vaiphasa et al., 2007; Primavera, 
1997). However, if governments such as Vietnam’s are able to effectively shift their role 
from that of governor to that of facilitator, market pressures can be put to effective use. 
Based on international concerns over product quality and strategies to secure future 
market access, market-based or value-chain approaches can lead to a shift from 
‘internal’ state economic policy to the constructive use of ‘external’ forces to incorporate 
social and environmental qualitative aspects of production (see Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002). In Vietnam, the concerted effort to combine both quantitative and qualitative 
production goals under the new export-led economy offers a positive means of 
complementing the regulatory role of the state with the power of the market. This shift 
has led to new questions beyond the state-community dialectic that focuses on how new 
governance arrangements can balance quantitative and qualitative production goals 
defined and enacted through actors located in private and market-based institutions. 
The transformations of Vietnamese shrimp aquaculture policy evident through 
the case of Ca Mau province also present a complex balancing act between externally 
imposed global market demands and consumer concerns with respect to the 
environmental and social performance of tropical shrimp production and the 
Vietnamese government’s interest in maintaining sovereign control over the shrimp 
industry and fostering export-led economic growth (chapter 2). As external interests 
through markets and networks become more prevalent in Vietnam, the government 
finds itself as a key but also more equal partner with private companies and NGOs. As 
indicated in Figure 6.1, the government has repositioned itself in two parallel processes 
of government-to-governance shifts. The first transformation, beginning in the 1990s, 
has been a process internal to Vietnam by means of responding to external interests by 
reorienting land-use and biodiversity policies as well establishing state-led BMPs. The 
second transformation, beginning in 2000, has been the emergence of voluntary 
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standards and, even more recently, externally led attempts to revive cooperative 
production as a means to enable producers to better comply with these standards. The 
nature of both transformations, as evident from the various cases presented in this 
thesis, further supports the claim that the Vietnamese government should continue to 
position itself as a facilitator of global private governance arrangements, especially as 
farmers and global market actors are engaged in transnational regulatory networks 
operating at local scales. Moreover, the state needs to increase the market incentives to 
foster farmers’ participation in and compliance with these transnational regulatory 
networks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Transformations of the Vietnamese shrimp aquaculture policy—the case of 
shrimp farming in Ca Mau province, the Mekong Delta 
The case of the Naturland organic shrimp certification demonstrates that the 
participation of small-scale primary producers in the global shrimp supply chain 
remains, despite considerable support and good intentions, limited (Kambewa et al., 
2007). Moreover, this case demonstrates that domestic market and policy failures 
contribute to the limitations of externally led certification (Nissanke and Thorbecke, 
2006). The reasons for the perceived failure of organic certification are the unfair 
distribution of value in local value chains (from the farmer to the processor), 
information asymmetries and imperfect competition between the actors. Policy failures 
in this case refer to the inadequate response by the state in addressing these structural 
inequalities between value-chain actors. The results of chapter 3 show that state 
involvement in market-based governance arrangements would provide a stabilising 
effect on the value chain. However, this involvement should also be facilitative rather 
than regulatory by steering private regulation to be more effective and as a third-party 
Transformations of state policy: from quantitative to 
qualitative aspects of production  
Private governance arrangements: 
voluntary approach to improve the 
quality of production 
Land and 
forest policy 
Species-
diversification 
policy 
GAP/BMP 
mandatory 
policy 
Naturland 
organic shrimp 
certification 
Farmer 
cooperative 
and cluster 
development  
From 2000 to present From 1990 to present 
 140 
arbiter, in which local governments at the communal and village levels bridge a widely 
perceived lack of trust among actors by providing an independent assessment (auditing) 
of the shrimp chain. Moreover, the state needs to give far more attention to market 
incentives for fostering the participation and compliance of farmers in these 
transnational regulatory networks.  
The Vietnamese government has already demonstrated its engagement with 
actors further down the value chain by promoting cooperative forms of production in an 
attempt to facilitate better inclusion of these actors in global markets (chapter 4). 
Although the policy promoting cooperatives and clusters for aquaculture has been 
developed and implemented in partnership with international NGOs such as NACA and 
WWF, the results indicate there is a need for further internal reform. Cooperatives can 
only remain in business when their performance improves in terms of production 
volumes and marketing activities as well as product quality and safety (Francesconi, 
2007). For aquaculture cooperatives to be a sustainable venture for producers, they 
must move beyond facilitating horizontal relations between producers to address 
vertical (contract) relations with processors and compliance with private ‘voluntary’ 
environmental and quality standards. A key lesson learnt from this research is that 
vertical relations are imperative for enabling farmers to organise into clusters or 
cooperatives and that both horizontal and vertical relations are needed to ensure that 
changes in production—towards sustainability—are in the common interest of 
producers and processors alike.  
Given wider observations that improved quality, with or without certification 
schemes, leads to increased control and more integrated governance arrangements, 
such as long-term contracts (Ruben et al., 2007), the Vietnamese government policy 
should better incorporate state-led BMPs/GAqPs or other international standards. In 
doing so, the most effective role of the state would be to build the capacity of 
cooperatives and clusters to manage the implementation of standards, including training 
programmes for farmers to employ sustainable practices. However, this admonishment 
includes a proviso around the BMP/GAqP standards. For these state-led standards to be 
effective, they must provide a market incentive, which they do not currently given their 
lack of recognition in export markets. Clustering as a means of upgrading will therefore 
only be effective if these national standards gain recognition in the global value chain 
and/or are built into the contract terms of processing companies. Moreover, more 
effective cooperation between state and non-state extension services may be an 
important means of spreading technologies, thereby assisting farmers to comply with 
BMP and GAqP. 
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 The devolution of forest management, as explained in the case of integrated 
shrimp farming (chapter 5), is also a key transformation of government policy. The 
study’s results demonstrate that when the government allocates and subcontracts 
mangroves to households using long-term contracts, farmers respond with greater 
stewardship over the mangroves even when shrimp is their primary source of income. 
The case also shows that governance over shrimp production should be placed in the 
wider context of governance of coastal areas, especially with regard to mangrove policy 
and management. The results of this thesis demonstrate that the role of shrimp farmers 
in the planting and protection of mangroves should be reassessed. In practice, an 
integrated management scheme from the government should place more emphasis on 
the potential of the integrated shrimp-mangrove farming system given that the 
production model appears to provide a more sustainable shrimp farming system in 
terms of both its ecological function and income generation for farmers in forest areas. 
The devolution of forest management must therefore be hastened in the coastal areas in 
the Mekong Delta with a better implementation of a benefit-sharing policy to provide 
reasonable incentives for shrimp farmers to plant and protect mangroves.  
6.3   Value-chain governance and upgrading small producers 
The shrimp supply chain in the Mekong Delta, as with other vulnerable tropical 
food products, is heterogeneous in terms of its production practices and access to 
international markets. As outlined by Lambert and Cooper (2000), tropical agrifood 
supply chains have some common features, including (1) large irregularities in supply 
due to the nature of the farming systems; (2) scattered production by a large number of 
smallholder producers; (3) high transaction costs due to the long distance between 
producers and consumers; (4) thin local markets with a limited number of traders; and 
(5) deficient public regulation and limited capacity for collective action. All of these 
factors are evident in the shrimp-farming sector in the Mekong Delta. The results also 
support the broader observation that shrimp farmers, despite being an important actor 
in a ‘supply-driven’ global value chain (see Gereffi,  1994), remain vulnerable to the 
relations and practices in the domestic segments of the chain. For market-based 
governance arrangements, such as certification, to be effective in promoting more 
resilient forms of shrimp production, they must encourage producers to develop the 
capacity to respond in a timely and appropriate way to external drivers of change, 
whether in the environment or global markets. The evidence demonstrates the current 
inadequacy of the system.  
The rapid changes in the agricultural sector over the last two decades, such as 
technological innovation, environmental concerns, the changing roles of governments 
and multi-national corporations, strongly influence global agricultural development 
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(Pattison, 2000). In transitional countries such as Vietnam that are moving from a 
centrally planned economy to an open market system, these changes have been 
particularly rapid, and farmers who face more competition in the global market and less 
government support are increasingly left to their own devices to improve their position 
(Chirwa et al., 2005; Pattison, 2000). Recently, a number of international development 
organisations have placed greater emphasis on the role of value-chain approaches to 
reducing poverty through strategies designed to assist producers to improve their 
position in the value chain (see, for example, Mitchell and Coles, 2011). However, the 
success of these strategies depends on the extent to which these interventions are able 
to stimulate changes in products and/or production processes that enhance producers’ 
rewards and/or reduce their exposure to risk.  
The case of Naturland organic shrimp certification represents this type of 
innovative governance arrangement (see chapter 3). However, the results presented in 
this thesis show that three regulatory challenges must be overcome before organic 
certification will be effective in improving producers’ position. First, shrimp farmers 
need to be better integrated as partners rather than targets of regulation under 
certification. Currently, certified shrimp farmers are objects of regulation both by 
Naturland standards and the state regulations. Their experiences and values are not 
recognised because they only have the right to sell or not to sell their certified products 
to the processing companies. They are not actively involved in value-chain activities or 
decisions around management. Second, the ways in which economic benefits are shared 
between actors in the value chain is unfair; certified farmers do not receive a reasonable 
(and contracted) premium for their certified products. Shrimp farmers only receive half 
of the added value that the processing company receives. Third, the level of legitimacy 
given to private-sector-led auditing systems is questioned by a range of actors. The main 
issue here is that traceability in the organic shrimp chains is undermined when the ICS 
cannot effectively monitor the collectors as reported by farmers. These regulatory 
challenges indicate two central points: (1) shrimp farmers, the primary producers, are 
the most powerless actor along the chain; and (2) collectors, as “middlemen” who link 
small producers with processors, are the “weakest” actor in the chain because they are 
the most difficult to monitor.  
In the case of shrimp farmer cooperatives and clusters, the results show that the 
model is a potentially effective strategy to improve farmers’ position in the value chain, 
but that its success depends on the type and strength of the vertical coordination of 
farmers with other actors along the value chain (see chapter 4). Vertical 
contractualisation between farmer clusters and downstream value-chain actors can 
economically benefit the producers, but this situation is more likely to occur for farmers 
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engaged in intensive rather than (improved) extensive production. Contract farming 
does not seem to be appropriate in the case of improved extensive shrimp farmers 
largely because of the poorer economies of scale derived from geographically 
fragmented production. However, there are possibilities for improved extensive farmers 
to establish the vertical coordination if they are able to coordinate cooperative forms of 
production, as evident to different degrees in the cases of Naturland in Ngoc Hien and 
WWF-led clusters in Dam Doi. However, this conclusion comes with an important 
proviso. To be successful, shrimp farmer clusters should not solely focus on increasing 
production efficiency but also on actively integrating farmers in the value chain by 
producing high-quality and safe products and by engaging in sustainable on-farm 
management practices.  
Upgrading shrimp farmers in the value chain, especially the structure of 
incentives and rewards for doing so, is also determined by forest policy and 
management in Vietnam. The case of integrated shrimp-mangrove farming in Ca Mau 
(chapter 5) provides an interesting case of how changing patterns of the legal rights, 
actual rights and benefits of forest management practices associated with forest 
devolution influence the stewardship of forested coastal habitat. This shift is 
demonstrated in three ways. First, although shrimp farmers consider mangrove 
management to be a part of their aquaculture practices, decision making over 
mangroves is influenced by shrimp-farming activities in which income from shrimp is 
higher than that from mangrove production. Second, benefits to shrimp farmers from 
forest policies and management already in place is problematic because of the unfair 
benefit-sharing mechanism applied by the forestry companies and management boards. 
Third, the bargaining power of shrimp farmers to obtain more benefit from the 
mangroves with management boards and forestry companies is influenced by their 
resources, skills and previous experiences with the state. Therefore, the results support 
the claim that farmers are also weak actors in the mangrove value chain, despite 
attempts to raise their profile and bargaining power in the shrimp chain. Redressing this 
imbalance between mangrove and shrimp farming therefore requires ensuring that the 
incentives for farmers to plant and protect mangroves are given equal importance to the 
concerns regarding improved shrimp production practices.  
In the shrimp industry, as in other agrifood sectors, quality is a competitive 
advantage to join global food chains, and ecological sustainability is emerging as a key 
factor in determining long-term supply (Kambewa et al., 2007). Production is mainly in 
the hands of small-scale primary producers, and thus they play an important role in 
ensuring the sector’s sustainability. The results of this thesis therefore show that 
governance arrangements must better address the need for appropriate incentive 
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structures that enable shrimp farmers to invest resources and concerted efforts to 
promote quality improvement (Hueth et al., 1999). The results of this thesis show that 
all cases in some way strive to empower farmers and move them to self-regulation. 
However, as argued above, better enforcement of regulation from the side of the state is 
equally important to adequately meet the demands for the production of safe and 
quality products. What is perhaps particular to shrimp is that any mix of incentives and 
regulation cannot by-pass or subjugate producers. In both strategies (implemented 
jointly or separately with the state), the participation of the producers in decision 
making and (self)regulation is imperative. With this assertion in mind, we now turn to 
three specific considerations for improving our understanding of the role of shrimp 
farmers in sustainable shrimp production: (1) the roles of shrimp farmers in ensuring 
production sustainability and product quality; (2) the importance of bargaining power 
in affecting the distribution of added value in favour of shrimp farmers; and (3) 
identifying the factors that affect farmers’ choice and compliance to both state and 
market-based governance arrangements. 
Although shrimp farmers, as other small-scale primary producers, are often 
excluded from global networks and are unable to exploit the opportunities from 
integration in world markets (Kambewa et al., 2007), they are important in ensuring the 
quality and environmental sustainability of the sector for which their on-farm activities 
remain vital. The results of this thesis clearly show that shrimp farmers in the sites of 
Naturland organic shrimp certification largely complied with organic shrimp standards, 
which is assessed as a means of linking farm-level management to the sustainability of 
landscapes (in chapter 3). Shrimp farmers in other places in Ca Mau also follow state 
regulations on sediment disposal during pond preparation and pond-forest ratio, which 
is important for the water quality and environment. Moreover, shrimp farmers strictly 
follow state disease control regulations as shown in the case of farmer clusters (in 
chapter 4). This finding is important because shrimp farming, unlike land-based 
agriculture, has a higher degree of interaction with the environment and other 
producers, e.g., through the use of a common water resource and common discharge 
channel (e.g., Anh et al. 2010). Environmental sustainability and product quality can 
therefore only be achieved when farmers strictly comply with regulations and 
environmentally friendly farming practices.   
The ability of small producers to benefit from the added value created in the 
production chain is strongly related to their power and bargaining capacity. Small-scale 
shrimp farmers depend in most cases on downstream actors in the chain, such as 
intermediaries, retailer or exporters for their input suppliers, credits and market access 
while value is mainly added at the end of the supply chain (Ruben et al., 2007). Thus, the 
 145 
distribution of the added value received by farmers does not reflect the investment 
required for the improvements that are made. For example, it is clear that certified 
shrimp farmers in Naturland organic certification sites receive almost the same price for 
their products as non-certified farmers. Moreover, farmers are not seen as a partner 
along the value chain but as an object of monitoring and management schemes applied 
by downstream chain actors. Similarly, shrimp farmers who plant and protect 
mangroves for fifteen years obtain low revenues through the benefit-sharing mechanism 
applied by forestry companies and management boards. As demonstrated in the cases of 
the Tam Giang and Tan An communes, one hectare of mangroves harvested yields less 
than 3% of its income from shrimp. However, those who have skills and previous 
experiences with the state, which affect their bargaining power, are able to increase 
their benefit from the mangroves harvested (chapter 5). Improved horizontal 
coordination also indicates an improved bargaining power but only for intensive shrimp 
farmers who have an adequate level of capital, production and therefore adequate 
economies of scale (chapter 4). Improving the bargaining power of farmers is therefore 
a strategy to ensure that benefit-sharing by farmers becomes more equitable.  
Third, the shrimp farmers’ decisions about compliance with governance 
arrangements depend on the incentives that they perceive. In the case of Naturland 
organic shrimp certification, shrimp farmers participated in the scheme primarily 
because of the promised price premium but were discouraged from continuing with the 
scheme when this premium did not materialise or was paid with a considerable delay. If 
such (predominantly) upstream issues around the distribution of value in value chains 
are not adequately addressed by certification schemes, the motivation of farmers to 
enter or continue their involvement will likely diminish (chapter 3). State regulations of 
forest management also demonstrate this point. If farmers receive a reasonable income 
from the mangroves after harvesting, both the quantity and quality of forests are more 
likely to be ensured (in chapter 5). Examining incentives is therefore a valuable way to 
determine which standards are able to effectively sustain an on-going presence rather 
than focusing on the moment when the standards were introduced, as is done in most 
policy-related studies.  
Governance arrangements oriented towards the realisation of sustainable shrimp 
farming must therefore recognise farmers’ great importance and their position and 
relationships with other actors along the value chain. Benefits from any activity adopted 
by producers or downstream actors are therefore imperative to understanding the 
impetus behind the willingness to voluntarily co-operate in market-based governance 
(Plummer and Fennell, 2007). The farmers participate in the organic certification 
programmes, cluster because of economic benefit they derive from these programmes, 
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and leave when their economic incentive is not satisfactory. Economic incentives 
therefore provide the starting point for co-operation and the drive for long-term 
collaboration towards sustainability.  
6.4   Shrimp farming governance and social-ecological resilience of coastal areas 
This thesis has been set against the backdrop of resilience as an organising 
concept for a broader research programme Rebuilding Resilience in Coastal Populations 
and Aquatic Resources (RESCOPAR). Resilience is used an organising concept because it 
draws together a range of disciplinary approaches that address the interrelationship of 
mangrove-shrimp production as a linked social-ecological system (Holling, 1973; Folke 
et al., 2002). In this thesis, resilience has not been applied directly but has provided a 
conceptual means to link decision making and societal steering (i.e., governance) to 
practices in both value chains at the farm level with a broadly defined notion of 
‘sustainable’ ecological function (cf. Kassam, 2010). Reflecting on the ‘governance 
results’ from the thesis in reference to the wider concerns of (coastal) resilience 
provides a means of engaging with the aims of the RESCOPAR programme and opens 
four further lines of argumentation exploring the material outcomes of shrimp 
aquaculture governance: (1) farming systems and their effect on the resilience of coastal 
areas; (2) linking scaling to shrimp farming governance and the resilience of coastal 
areas; (3) global-local links, economic risks and their effects on the resilience of coastal 
areas; and (4) governance in the context of social relations and its implications for 
resilience. 
6.4.1   Farming systems and their effects on the resilience of coastal areas. 
As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the question of which shrimp 
farming systems are best able to facilitate both the social and ecological resilience in 
coastal areas is an on-going concern for policy makers. Bush et al. (2010) point out that 
the rise of the sustainable seafood debate and the global proliferation of quality 
standards have led to two opposing scenarios situated along a spectrum of potential 
production systems. The first scenario is landscape-integrated systems: low-input 
aquaculture integrated with mangrove systems akin to the integrated shrimp-mangrove 
systems in Ca Mau province. Although the production system has low production per 
unit, its main advantage is the ability of balancing conservation issues while optimising 
economic profitability. At the other end of the spectrum are closed intensive systems, 
which are characterised by closed recirculation ponds located outside of the intertidal 
zone. The systems have a high level of production per unit compared to the extensive 
systems (Otoshi et al., 2009). However, because of the high investment costs, small-scale 
producers are less likely to utilise the intensive farming systems (Bush et al., 2010). Both 
systems are resilient in their own way: integrated systems are more vulnerable to 
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external influences but are better able to recover from any perturbation such as disease, 
while closed systems are less exposed to external influences but are more vulnerable to 
catastrophic changes should they be compromised.  
This research identified several social-ecological indicators of shrimp farming 
systems that are indicative of the resilience of coastal areas that can also be taken into 
consideration by decision-makers (see Table 6.2). Four social-economic indicators can 
be considered relevant for an assessment of the resilience of shrimp farming in the 
Mekong Delta. The first indicator is the investment cost, which is indicative of the ability 
of shrimp farmers to adopt a specific farming system and to reinvest when dealing with 
a shock or changes. The indicator is linear: the lower the investment cost, the greater the 
ability of shrimp farmers to (re)invest. The second indicator is the Benefit Cost Ratio 
(BCR), which expresses the economic benefits of a project or business relative to its 
costs: the higher the BCR, the better the investment. This indicator is useful for 
comparing different farming systems in terms of their financial yield. For small-scale 
farmers, identifying the type of farming system that results in the greatest benefit 
relative to its cost is important and directly affects the farmers’ social-economic 
resilience. The third indicator is the diversification of farmers’ income sources. This 
indicator is important for shrimp farmers to reduce the risk and uncertainty associated 
with monoculture aquaculture, such as price fluctuations in international markets or the 
loss of production due to natural hazards or disease. The fourth indicator is the stability 
of (revenues from) shrimp production. This indicator is important because it is directly 
linked to the ability of shrimp farmers to maintain their income over time. 
From an ecological perspective, we focus on two main indicators. The first is the 
level of a disease’s virulence: the increased incidence of the White Spot Syndrome Virus 
(WSSV) is an environmental issue, but it creates great economic risks for shrimp 
farmers. This indicator emerged from Dieu’s (2010) study on the epidemiology and 
evolution of WSSV in the Mekong Delta. The second indicator is bio-diversity 
maintenance, for which the area of the existing mangroves relative to the shrimp ponds 
is most important. As noted by Beveridge et al. (1997) and Rönnbäck (1999), the 
productivity and sustainability of shrimp aquaculture depends directly on the support of 
environmental goods and services from mangroves. Mangroves in their natural state are 
robust to disturbances and capable of rapid regeneration in which a minimum amount 
of mangroves will be necessary to maintain coastal fish productivity and diversity 
(Manson et al., 2005). Changes in mangrove area and structure may affect the ability of 
the coastal ecosystem to recover from shocks and long-term changes and may thus 
affect ecological resilience (Bush et al. 2010). Moreover, the value of these social and 
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ecological indicators is not absolute because these factors interdependently affect 
resilience and may occur in different combinations.  
Table 6.2. Level of social-ecological resilience indicators observed among systems 
Shrimp farming 
systems 
Investment 
cost  
Benefit 
Cost 
Ratio 
Diversity 
of sources 
of income  
Stability of 
shrimp 
production 
Level of 
virulence 
of disease 
Bio-diversity 
maintenance 
Intensive 
farming  
xxx x x / xxx x 
Monoculture-
improved 
extensive  
x xxx xx x x xx 
Integrated 
shrimp-
mangrove  
xx xx xxx xxx x xxx 
(Note: xxx: high level; xx: medium level; x: low level; /: not observed) 
The results of the economic analysis of different shrimp farming systems in Ca 
Mau show that the integrated shrimp-mangrove system scores higher than the intensive 
system in terms of investment costs, economic efficiency, diversity of sources of income 
for farmers and bio-diversity maintenance. The integrated shrimp-mangrove system is 
also found to be better than the monoculture-improved extensive system in terms of the 
diversity of sources of income for the farmers, the stability in productivity and bio-
diversity maintenance (see chapter 3). This finding is supported by Martínez-Porchas et 
al. (2010), who argue that shrimp poly-culture is an important alternative to resolving 
and/or minimising numerous problems that shrimp aquaculture has faced over the past 
two decades, such as environmental pollution, diseases and fluctuating prices. Moreover, 
as mentioned by Gunderson (2010), the role of diversity in contributing to resilience is 
recognised for both social and ecological systems. Hence, integrated shrimp-mangrove 
systems can be seen as a lower risk form of farming for the majority of shrimp farmers 
in Ca Mau. The intensive system, although it has a (potentially) high productivity also 
appears to be a higher-risk form of farming and may thus negatively affect the social-
ecological resilience of the coastal areas. Moreover, intensive production is only 
appropriate for a small number of shrimp farmers in the region because of the high 
investment costs. The provincial government’s plan of increasing the area under the 
intensive cultivation system to 10,000 ha in 2010 did not materialise, and the intensive 
farming area remained at 1,300 ha from 2008 to 2011.  
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In addition, it is useful to examine farming systems for the long-term resilience of 
coastal areas in the context of climate change. In the Mekong Delta, the effects of climate 
change are visible most obviously through the occurrence of drought that leads to 
sanitisation. According to the scientists form the Southern Institute of Water Resources 
Research, in 2011, the water levels of most inland rivers in the region were their lowest 
in 30 years, thereby leading to salinization in most of the provinces in the Mekong Delta. 
This change is especially evident in the Ca Mau peninsula, with its three sides bordering 
the sea. Therefore, mangroves as a coastal forest belt are an important means to mitigate 
the effects of climate change (MARD, 2011a). In this situation, integrated shrimp-
mangrove farming is the most appropriate cultivation system applied in brackish water 
areas. This model can thus be viewed as a sustainable farming system that contributes to 
both the ecological and the social resilience of the coastal areas of the Mekong Delta.  
6.4.2   Linking scaling to shrimp farming governance and resilience of coastal areas. 
In ecological science, scale and scaling have been viewed as determining factors 
underlying numerous environmental problems (Verburg and Veldkamp, 2005). Scale 
has often been defined as the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions 
used to measure and study any phenomenon (Gibson et al., 2000), while scaling can be 
regarded as the translation of information across scales (Wu and Li, 2006). 
Environmental problems manifest themselves at various scale levels. To address them, 
action should be reconciled between these scale levels to avoid discordance between the 
problem at hand and the governance arrangements addressing them (Buizer et al., 
2011). Linking scaling to governance is therefore an important issue for the 
improvement of environmental management and policies to achieve effective 
governance. However, the governance arrangements can only be regarded as effective if 
they positively influence the resilience of social-ecological systems beyond the scale they 
target.  
As shown in Table 6.3, all three governance arrangements investigated in this 
thesis have the potential to promote the social-ecological resilience of the coastal area, 
although they predominantly focus on the farm level. For instance, the shrimp-farmer 
cluster model can be viewed as a means to link the farm-level management of water and 
disease control to higher ecosystem levels, while state forest policy provides a means of 
linking the farm-level management of mangroves to the coastal landscape level. Organic 
certification can provide a means of linking farm-level management to the sustainability 
of landscapes through both shrimp farming and mangrove management at the farm 
level. Indeed, the notion of “organic coasts” presented in chapter 3 is an attempt to 
address the question of how best to manage shrimp farming to ensure both social and 
ecological resilience in coastal areas in the Mekong Delta.  
 150 
Table 6.3. (Potential) impacts of governance arrangements on coastal resilience  
I. Organic shrimp certification 
1.1. Improving shrimp farmers’ livelihoods through the diversification of sources of 
income. 
1.2. Improving legitimacy of the auditing process for certifying organic shrimp to meet 
international market requirements. 
1.3. Linking farm-level management of shrimp and mangroves with the level of the 
coastal landscape. 
II. Shrimp farmer clusters 
2.1. Improving farmers’ livelihoods through income created by vertical 
contractualisation. 
2.2. Upgrading small producers’ position along the value chain. 
2.3. Creating economies of scale for small producers. 
2.4. Linking the farm-level management of water and disease control to the sustainable 
management of the coastal landscape. 
III. State mangrove forest policy and management 
3.1. Improving shrimp farmers’ livelihoods through the diversification of sources of 
income. 
3.2. Linking farm-level management of mangroves to the sustainability of the coastal 
landscape. 
The governance arrangements not only affect ecological functions at different 
scales. The results of the study also show that two private governance arrangements 
may have an impact on the social resilience of coastal areas at different scales by 
operating though the value chain. In the case of organic shrimp certification, one of the 
(potential) impacts is that the implementation of value-chain governance arrangements 
may affect the legitimacy of the existing systems. Although shrimp farming in mangrove 
areas in Ca Mau province already shows “organic” characteristics (see chapter 3), the 
system requires a third-party auditor to legitimise its environmental soundness and to 
demonstrate to customers in foreign markets that the products are environmentally and 
sustainably produced. The premium for organic products can therefore only be 
generated when the farming systems are certified. In the case of farmer clusters, the 
main effect on the value chain is the creation of economies of scale in production, which 
is important for a fragmented chain as in Ca Mau. This governance arrangement also 
improves the relationships among actors along the value chain through vertical 
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contractualisation. The results of the research therefore show that such governance 
arrangements, although primarily focused on farm-level management, also affect the 
coastal landscape level through wider networks of control.  
6.4.3   Global-local links, economic risks and their effects on the resilience of coastal areas 
 Water pollution and disease outbreaks are commonly cited as two of the main 
environmental problems associated with shrimp production in the Mekong Delta, but 
they also have severe consequences for the economic vulnerability of farmers. Economic 
vulnerability and uncertainty also result from global and local economic processes that 
have received much less attention in the literature addressing shrimp aquaculture and 
coastal resilience. The global economic downturn in 2008 led to a reduction of shrimp 
exports. At the same time, both the EU and US markets have become increasingly 
stringent because of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS). Moreover, shrimp-
farming governance in the Mekong Delta is influenced by external factors, such as the 
consumer requirements with respect to safety and environmentally sound products 
through certification systems and international conventions (cf. Ponte and Gibbon, 
2005). These global economic risks directly affect the practices of shrimp farmers in the 
Mekong Delta, thereby indicating the importance of a global value-chain approach to 
understanding the relationship between local social-ecological resilience and 
globalisation.  
 Certified shrimp farmers in Tam Giang and Tan An clearly faced the risk of 
receiving a lower income than the non-certified farmers for the same amount of product 
for two reasons: first, the strategy of lowering the farm gate price to avoid mixing non-
certified with certified products applied by processing companies and second, the long 
period of time required for premium payments after export combined with the low 
percentages that they receive from the premium price. If a discounting factor were 
applied, this risk would be even more obvious. Another issue for certified farmers is the 
risk of rising costs if they have to pay for auditing costs, which are now paid by SIPPO. 
One of the main institutional barriers that may exclude small producers from 
participating in certification schemes is the cost of auditing, which is often costly. If 
SIPPO ceases to subsidise the auditing costs, the shrimp farmers will no longer 
participate in the scheme. Moreover, certified shrimp farmers may have to face the 
global economic crisis, which may lead to difficulties in locating markets for organic 
products. All of these effects may potentially harm the income and livelihoods of shrimp 
farmers and thus jeopardise the social-ecological resilience of the coastal areas.  
 These economic risks resulting from the global-local links raise numerous issues. 
First, there is the question about the roles of the external auditors and international 
traders/importers in establishing lasting governance arrangements aimed at resilience 
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in the delta. What are the reasons and motivations for the auditors and 
traders/importers to invest in the new governance arrangements, such as certification 
for the purpose of coastal area sustainability? A related question is what challenges 
changing consumer preferences pose to the governance arrangements in relation to the 
concern over the delta’s resilience? A second issue is the role of the government in 
maintaining its control over the sector within the context of globalisation. What 
challenge does the Vietnamese government faces in maintaining its sovereignty? 
Answering these questions requires additional research to understand the global-local 
link and its effects on the social-ecological resilience of coastal areas such as the Mekong 
Delta. 
6.4.4   Governance in the context of social relations and its implications for resilience 
The literature on governance and resilience focuses on the adaptive capacity of 
people and institutions in social-ecological systems to develop resilience through 
collective actions (Walker et al., 2004). An adaptive governance framework proposes 
collaboration between a diverse set of stakeholders operating at different scales in 
multi-level institutions and organisations (Olsson et al., 2004). Social relations among 
these stakeholders play an important role in supporting flexible institutions and social 
networks in multi-level governance systems, as one of four essential aspects of adaptive 
governance (Folke et al., 2005). A final governance challenge, or paradox, emerges. 
Social relations that have developed over time around an activity such as shrimp 
farming might not foster resilience but can be sustainable in their own right. Numerous 
examples of this arrangement emerge from this thesis, from trade relations between 
farmers and middlemen to political ties behind the success of cluster formation. External 
intervention by the government or market actors, as prescribed in this thesis, then faces 
the challenge of intervening in these social relations and raises questions about what 
these interventions might mean for the social dynamics of resilience.  
In the case of the Nhi Nguyet intensive shrimp-farmer cluster, it is clear that its 
success is strongly influenced by the existing social relations of a group of farmers with 
political and commercial interests. One of the founding cluster members was a member 
of the national parliament. Given his past political affiliations, he continues to have a 
good relationship with processing companies, input providers and government staff. His 
involvement affects the ability of the cluster in obtaining favourable input and output 
contracts with other actors along the value chain by increasing the cluster’s bargaining 
power. His position also influences the decisions by the government staff to invest in 
infrastructure for the intensive shrimp-farmer cluster. The case is similar to that of 
pangasius production in the Mekong Delta, where Belton et al. (2011) concluded that 
“private economic activity is deeply embedded in informal relations with the state 
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bureaucracy in Vietnam” (p.567). The case also shows that power is an intrinsic aspect 
of the social relations within social networks. 
The case of Naturland organic certification, in contrast, shows the strength of the 
patron-client relationship within the social networks of shrimp production. The results 
from the interviews with shrimp farmers in the sites of organic shrimp certification 
show that there are numerous certified shrimp farmers who are not satisfied with the 
premium payment for their certified products, but they still sell to organic collectors. 
However, the non-certified shrimp farmers also sell their products to organic collectors. 
In the study sites, it is common for shrimp farmers to borrow money from collectors 
without interest but with an unwritten contract that they must sell shrimp harvested to 
these collectors. Moreover, there is no difference between the price from collectors and 
the market price. Their relationship developed over a long period of time and is 
maintained through the social capital and trust between them. This arrangement 
demonstrates that the social relations established between shrimp farmers and 
collectors are flexible and present a win-win situation that benefits both parties. The 
functioning of these long-standing relationships may also affect the traceability of 
organic shrimp products when collectors source shrimp from both certified and non-
certified farmers and mix them together. Similarly, in intensive shrimp farming, the 
shrimp farmers have closer relations with the input providers in term of information 
and technical transfer than with the state aquaculture services.  
As Tran (2012) outlines, these social relations help to shield the livelihood of 
shrimp farmers and thus contribute to the social resilience of coastal communities. 
However, it is difficult to characterise these effects for the social-ecological resilience of 
the coastal Mekong Delta. The results of the research show that neither state nor market 
regulations can intervene in the (informal) social relations that exist in the networks. 
The governance arrangements and their effect on the social-resilience of coastal areas 
must therefore be analysed within the context of existing the social relations wherein 
state and non-state actors play their roles. Understanding these social relations within 
shrimp production and trade will contribute to a better implementation of the 
governance arrangements. 
6.5   Final comment 
This thesis has demonstrated that both the material conditions and social 
relations of shrimp farming affect the effectiveness and responsiveness of governance 
arrangements aimed at maintaining rural livelihoods and environmental sustainability. 
The results also show that governing shrimp aquaculture in the Mekong Delta is 
increasingly a balancing act between externally led global market demands and 
consumer concerns for the improved environmental and social performance of tropical 
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shrimp production and the government’s interests in maintaining sovereign control 
over the shrimp industry. This study has shown that all of the cases of shrimp-farming 
governance appear to have overcome the public-private divide by fostering complex 
regulatory networks. In this context, the Vietnamese government is embarking on a new 
era of Đổi mới, or renovation, where the state is positioned as a facilitator rather than a 
regulator of a global private governance arrangement. For this process to benefit 
Vietnam, the effect of these governance arrangements and the social-resilience of coastal 
areas must be understood in the context of the existing social relations between shrimp 
production and trade. Only then will the risks and vulnerabilities for shrimp farmers and 
coastal habitats be adequately addressed. 
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Intensive shrimp farming system in Tan Duyet commune, Dam Doi district, Ca Mau 
province 
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Annex 1 
Monthly recording of shrimp farming household 
Month…………year……….(Lunar month) 
 
1. GENERAL INFORMATION 
HH’ leader name:………………………………........................................................................................................................................... 
Hamlet:…………………...........Commune:……………………................District:……………………........... 
Type of farming systems: 
   Intensive 
   Improved extensive 
   Integrated shrimp-mangrove 
Total area: …………................ha   
      Forest:……………................... ha                          Pond:……………….................ha 
Member of shrimp farmer cluster:              Yes                            No 
2. POND PREPARATION 
- Cost :……………………..VND 
- Time for pond preparation: From date……………................. to date……………………............ 
3. STOCKING 
- Where to buy shrimp seed (Name & address)?............................................................................ 
- Did you test the shrimp seed?               Yes                                   No                            
  If yes, - where?............................................................................................................................................. 
    - who pay the cost of testing?................................................................................................ 
- Number of shrimp seed:………………….........          - Price:…………………...............VND/unit 
4. FEEDING 
- Did you feed shrimp?       Yes                                               No 
- If yes: 
+ Amount of feeding?..........................................kg/day 
             + Cost for feeding: ……………………………….....VND/kg 
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+ Type of feed:…………………………………………………………………….................... 
+ Where did you buy (get) feed?................................................................................ 
5. OTHER COSTS 
- Lime: ………………………………………VND/month 
- Saponin (for killing trash fish in shrimp pond)……………………………VND/month 
- Bio-product or enzyme (for sustaining water quality)…………………….........VND/month 
- Gasoline and oil ……………………………………VND/month 
- Others (if applicable)…………………………….....VND/month 
6. HARVESTING 
 
Time of 
harvesting 
 
Size of shrimp 
Production  
Price (VND/kg) Number of 
shrimp pieces 
Weigh (Kg) 
 
First harvest 
20 pieces/kg    
30 pieces/kg    
Trash shrimp    
Others    
 
Second harvest 
20 pieces/kg    
30 pieces/kg    
Trash shrimp    
Others    
 
Other time of 
harvest 
(Using Lu) 
20 pieces/kg    
30 pieces/kg    
Trash shrimp    
Others    
7. SELLING SHRIMP 
- To whom did you sell the shrimp? 
   - Small collector 
   - Big collector 
   - Trading company 
   - Processing company 
   - Other (mention if applicable)………………………………………................ 
- Why did you sell to him (her)? 
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   - Having loan from them 
   - Getting higher price compare to others 
   - Getting payment immediately 
   - Keeping good relationship 
   - Relative/friend 
   - Other (mention if applicable)………………………………………. 
- Payment time:        Immediately                               Later on 
If later, when? …………………………………………………………………………….. 
7. OTHER INFORMATION: 
- Did you borrow money for shrimp culture?        Yes                               No  
If yes, from who?..................................................................Interest rate:……………… 
Purposes of the loan:…………………………………………………………………… 
Amount of money to pay for interest every month or every quarter?................................. 
- Have your shrimp got disease in this month?       Yes                                No  
If yes, how did you deal with the problem?  ……………………………………………..................... 
Estimating loss (%):………………………………………………………………………................................ 
- Did you join any training in this month?              Yes                                No 
If yes, who is organizer?............................................................................................................................ 
Content of the training? 
              - Introducing new techniques of shrimp farming 
                           - Improved techniques of current shrimp farming 
                           - Water exchange and management 
                           - Drug/chemical use 
               - Feeding  
               - Water testing techniques 
                           - Market/price information 
              - Other training (mention clearly if applicable)………………… 
- Do you think that this training is useful?     Yes                         No 
Explain your reason:..................................................................................................................................... 
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- Did you share shrimp farming experience with other farmers this month?                                           
 Yes                                      No 
If yes, what are the information did you exchange? 
                             - Introducing new techniques of shrimp farming 
                             - Improved techniques of current shrimp farming 
                             - Water exchange and management  
                             - Drug/chemical use 
    - Feeding  
                - Water testing techniques 
                             - Market/price information 
                             - Other training (mention clearly if applicable)…………………………........... 
- Do you think that this experience sharing is useful?    Yes                            No    
Explain your reason:...................................................................................................................................... 
8. OTHER REMARKS 
Please mention other remarks/comments that you think affect/important to shrimp 
production in this month 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 163 
Annex 2 
Household questionnaire for mangrove management  
 
1. GENERAL INFORMATION 
HH’ leader name:………………………………........................................................................................................................................... 
Hamlet:…………………...........Commune:……………………................District:……………………........... 
Total area: …………................ha:     Forest:……………........ha                   Pond:………………......ha 
- Legal status of forest: 
  Allocated forest (red book) 
  Sub-contracted forest (green book) 
  Leased forest (specified if applicable)..................................................................... 
  Other (specified if applicable)...................................................................................... 
- Forest under management and control of: 
  Local government 
Forest Management Board (FMB) 
  Forestry Companies (FC) 
  Other (specified if applicable)..................................................................................... 
2. FOREST PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
- The year of plantation of the nearest harvesting........................................................................... 
- Plantation methods: 
  Planted by yourself 
  Planted by the FMB/FC 
  Planted by others (specified if applicable).......................................................... 
  Integration of these two methods 
  Other (specified if applicable):................................................................................... 
- Density at plantation (trees/ha):.......................................................................................................... 
- Do you get any supports from the government for plantation? 
  Capital 
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  Seedlings 
  Techniques 
  Others (specified if applicable).................................................................................. 
- Estimated the cost over forest production, from plantation to harvesting:...............VND 
- The nearest year of harvesting mangroves:..................................................................................... 
- Density at harvesting (trees/ha):......................................................................................................... 
- Harvesting methods: 
  Clear cutting 
Selective cutting 
Group cutting 
Other (specified if applicable)...................................................................................... 
- Harvesting production (m3):................................................................................................................... 
- Who calculated this production?:......................................................................................................... 
- Income from selling mangroves from harvesting?.............................................................VND 
- Benefit sharing policy:.............................................................................................................................. 
- Estimated income from shrimp farming (VND/year):............................................................... 
3. FOREST MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AND DECISION MAKING 
- Your perception on mangrove value (you can select more than one option): 
  Value of wood to sell in the market 
  Good environment for shrimp  
  Domestic use of wood 
  Others (specified if applicable):................................................................................. 
- Did you decide to harvest forest and to make management cycle depending on (in 
priority from 1-3): 
  Forest age 
  Timber price in the market 
  Family’s economic status 
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  Related to shrimp farming 
  Benefit sharing policy with FMB/FC 
  Banking interest rate 
  Government’s policy 
  Decisions of adjacent households 
  Others (specified if applicable).................................................................................. 
- If you have full right on cutting mangroves, you will: 
  Cutting all mangroves for shrimp farming 
  Maintaining the status quo 
  Reducing forest areas for increasing shrimp pond areas 
  Others (specified if applicable).................................................................................. 
- The reasons behind this cutting decision (if you have right): 
  No mangrove no shrimp 
  Increasing shrimp pond to gain more money 
  High density of mangrove is not good for shrimp 
  Woods have high value 
  No mangrove higher shrimp production 
  Others (specified if applicable):................................................................................ 
- Are you satisfied with benefit sharing policy applied by FMB/FC? 
  Yes, please give your reason:..................................................................................... 
                           No, please give your reason:....................................................................................... 
- Please give suggestions for better mangrove management in your location?:.............. 
............................................................................................................................................................................. 
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Summary 
 
The Mekong Delta is one of seven ecological regions in Vietnam as well as an essential 
habitat for many plant and animal species within the Mekong River Basin. The Delta 
region consists of 13 provinces and accounts for about 80 percent of shrimp production 
of the Vietnam. Aquaculture and shrimp products are internationally traded and the 
shrimp farmers are firmly embedded in a global system of production and trade. The 
growth of shrimp aquaculture, in addition to population growth and higher levels of 
investment, has left coastal resources in the Mekong Delta increasingly vulnerable to 
rapid changes in land and resource use. With government support focused on export-led 
trade, the vulnerability of producers to global market perturbation and policies has also 
increased. Shrimp farming is also deemed as a high-risk activity because of the spread of 
disease, the vulnerability of shrimp farmers to price fluctuations and, consequently, the 
vulnerability of shrimp-based livelihoods. The shrimp industry, made up of multiple 
stakeholders and fragmented market chains, is also now subject to a range of attempts 
to move towards more sustainable and/or responsible shrimp aquaculture. While 
striving for improved environmental performance to reduce bio-physical variability in 
production these governance systems have also brought stringent requirements for 
producers that determine their ability to access international markets.   
The general objective of this research was to investigate the interactions between 
existing state and non-state actors and institutions governing the shrimp industry to 
develop a more informed understanding of how state, market and community-based 
governance arrangements at different levels influence decision-making in shrimp 
aquaculture in coastal areas of the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. The general research 
question focuses on how different material conditions and social relations affect the 
effectiveness and responsiveness of governance arrangements aimed at achieving the 
multiple goals of maintaining rural livelihoods, environmental sustainability and 
improved food quality. 
The research was conducted in Ca Mau province in Vietnam, where a large part of 
the shrimp industry is concentrated. Data were collected from shrimp farmers, traders, 
government officials, and representatives of non-governmental organisations and 
farmer cooperatives. 
The second chapter highlights two key transformations of Vietnamese shrimp 
aquaculture policy in Ca Mau province. The first transformation is an internal policy 
shift from quantitative to qualitative state-defined production goals. The second 
transformation is in response to market demands, but is directed to the emergent 
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‘quality’ concerns with respect to the environmental and social impacts of tropical 
shrimp aquaculture. Our results indicate that this second governance shift has created a 
new set of challenges for the government as it is positioned within the context of global 
market and (environmental) advocacy networks. Together these two transformations 
present a complex balancing act between externally-led global market demands and 
consumer concerns with respect to the improved environmental and social performance 
of tropical shrimp production, and the government’s interests in maintaining sovereign 
control over the shrimp industry. The results also show that the Vietnamese government 
should not only position itself as a controlling force but also as a facilitator of global 
private governance arrangements, especially as farmers and global market actors are 
engaged in transnational regulatory networks, which become operational at local scales. 
Moreover, the state needs to give far more attention to market incentives for fostering 
the participation and compliance of farmers in these transnational regulatory networks.  
The third chapter analyses the case of Naturland organic certification and its 
implementation in meeting the government’s plan to create an organic coast scaling up 
the organic farming along southern part of Ca Mau by 2015. The results shows that 
Naturland certification appears to overcome the state-private divide by ensuring that 
both landscape-scale forest management and farm level aquaculture practices are 
reciprocal; with state legislation and mandatory production standards aligned with the 
incentives offered by an organic export market. Our results support the claim that 
organic certification can provide a means of linking farm-level management to the 
sustainability of landscapes dominated by the shrimp-forest integrated farming system 
in Ca Mau. However, this is only achievable if certain challenges are overcome. The first 
challenge is the tension between farmer practices and externally defined and regulated 
quality standards. The second challenge is to ensure that economic benefit are shared 
between actors in the organic certified value chain; the low price premium for organic 
shrimp in Ca Mau has emerged as a key source of tension stemming from the imbalance 
of power between the retailers and small producers, and the imbalance between 
environmental concerns and the consumer’s economic welfare. Finally, the level of 
legitimacy given to private sector led auditing systems needs to be addressed. The 
results demonstrate that participation, auditing and supply chain management are all 
important functions of the Internal Control System (ICS), which in their current make-up 
appear to be hindering the sustainability of the certification scheme.  
The thesis then explores (Chapter 4) the development of shrimp farmer 
cooperatives and clusters by the government based on a policy to explicitly increase the 
competitiveness of the sector in the international market and to improve economic 
conditions for small producers. The results shows that vertical contractualisation under 
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the form of contract farming between farmer cluster with up and downstream chain 
actors results in economic benefits for small-holder producers engaged in intensive 
production. The improved extensive system, however, gives further impetus to 
determining how cooperative forms of production might assist smallholders to 
complying with production-oriented quality standards, which in turn may also 
improving market performance. Although possibilities exist for small-holder improved 
extensive farmers to establish vertical contractualisation with other actors along the 
value chain they are less able to do so than intensive farmers. The cases therefore 
support the claim that the development of shrimp farmer clusters should not solely 
focus on increasing production efficiency but also on successful integration into the 
value chain; producing high-quality and safe products, and engaging in sustainable on-
farm management practices.  
The final case study (Chapter 5) looks at shrimp farming in the broader context of 
promoting ecological function in integrated shrimp-mangrove farming systems. 
Attention is given to how incentives are generated for shrimp farmers to plant and 
protect mangroves by analysing farmer’s decision-making and their perspective on 
mangroves in relation with state-based governance arrangements, the forest allocation 
and benefit sharing policies. The results show that farmer’s perception on the role and 
value of mangroves are positive and they are willing to plant and protect mangroves 
both for economic and environmental reasons. Moreover, they want to have control over 
mangroves although forests are still under the state regulation. However, farmer’s 
decision-making is very much influenced by the way in which the forest benefit sharing 
policy is implemented by the state-led forest management boards and forest companies. 
The results show that the perception of shrimp farming as the main cause of 
deforestation and degradation should be reevaluated in the context of the integrated 
shrimp mangrove production system because farmers income is improved if mangroves 
are an integral part of the production system. Instead, the evidence shows that shrimp 
farmers are potentially the best stakeholders to plant, protect and manage mangroves if 
they have full rights and responsibilities over forests. Seen as such, shrimp farming is 
potentially a mangrove-friendly source of revenue, which also promotes the planting 
and protection of mangroves.  
Governance is a political process that deals with how power is distributed 
between stakeholders, allowing different groups to participate, control and use 
resources in a way transparent to all others involved. The four case studies clearly 
demonstrate that market-based and state-based governance processes over natural 
resources in Vietnam are increasingly interdependent, linked by locally and globally 
scaled forces that create and regulate flows of information, commodities, and finance. 
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State and non-state governance arrangements, with their associated political, social, 
cultural and environmental histories, resulting from these global-local dynamics 
influence decision-making over aquatic resource use, regulation and management. The 
research therefore provides a scientific basis for recommendations concerning 
improved governance arrangements both across coastal environments and socio-
political national and international scales. 
As governance is a response to the complexity and multi-layered nature of 
environmental problems, action should take account of the interactions between these 
scales. Consequently, linking scaling to governance therefore is an important issue for 
the improvement of environmental management and policy. In this context, resilience 
defined as the capacity of social and ecological systems to absorb disturbance and still 
retain their basic function and structure is an important concept as it is closely linked to 
the sustainability of society and their respective environments. The results show that all 
three governance arrangements have a (potential) impact on the ecological resilience of 
coastal areas in which they present a means of linking farm level management to the 
sustainability of the coastal landscape. The shrimp farmer cluster model can be seen as a 
means to link farm-level management of water and disease control, and the state forest 
policy of linking farm-level management of mangroves to the coastal landscape level. 
Finally, organic certification can provide a mean of linking farm-level management to 
the sustainability of landscapes by both shrimp farming and mangrove management at 
farm-level.  
The results of the research also show that two private governance arrangements 
hold (potential) consequences for the social resilience of coastal areas both in terms of 
linking to environmental processes in coastal areas and in global value chains. 
Certification holds the potential to affect the legitimacy of existing systems. In the case of 
farmer clusters, the main effect to the value chain is the creation of economies of scale 
for smallholders. This has particular importance for improved extensive shrimp farmers 
who operate in a more fragmented chain than intensive farmers do. Clusters also 
improve the (horizontal) relationship among farmers as well as provide a basis for 
better (vertical) value chain coordination. The results show that although all governance 
arrangements consider farm-level management as the object of regulation they hold the 
potential to impact the management of the coastal landscape. In doing so they hold the 
capacity to positively affect the social-economic resilience of the industry and coastal 
areas, but in many cases they have not yet reached their full potential. 
To reach their potential in steering Vietnamese aquaculture to maintaining rural 
livelihoods, environmental sustainability and improved food quality, and therefore a 
form of social-ecological resilience, a number of challenges need to be overcome. These 
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can be classified into three groups. First, (negative) perceptions about the needs and 
abilities of shrimp farmers have to be changed. Second, the imbalance in power relations 
between farmers and other actors that leads to unfair benefit share for farmers needs to 
be transformed. Third, the challenge of monitoring and steering the value chains needs 
to be addressed by the changing roles of the government. The governance arrangements 
and its effect to social-resilience of coastal areas have to be analysed within the context 
of existing social relations where state and non-state actors each have to play their own 
roles.  
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Samenvatting 
 
De Mekong Delta is een van de zeven ecologische regio’s in Vietnam en een 
belangrijke habitat voor vele planten en dieren in het Mekong stroomgebied. De regio 
bestaat uit dertien provincies en is verantwoordelijk voor ongeveer 80 procent van de 
garnalenproductie van Vietnam. Aquacultuur- en garnalenproducten worden 
internationaal verhandeld en garnalenktelers zijn een integraal onderdeel geworden van 
een mondiaal systeem van productie en handel. De groei van aquacultuur van garnalen, 
naast bevolkingsgroei en hogere investeringen, heeft tot gevolg dat de hulpbronnen in 
de kustzones van de Mekong Delta in toenemende mate onder druk staan door de snelle 
veranderingen in het gebruik van land. Met overheidssteun zijn de producenten zich 
gaan richten op exporthandel en daardoor is ook de kwetsbaarheid van producenten 
voor verstoringen op de globale markt en internationaal beleid ten aanzien van 
aquacultuur en garnalen toegenomen. Garnalenkweek wordt ook gezien als risicovol, 
vanwege de spreiding van ziekten, de kwetsbaarheid van producenten voor 
prijsschommelingen, en, als consequentie, de bestaansonzekerheden voor de 
kleinschalige garnalentelers. De garnalenindustrie, bestaande uit een veelheid aan 
belanghebbenden en gefragmenteerde marktketens, is nu onderwerp van een reeks aan 
(beleids)initiatieven om te komen tot een meer duurzame en/of verantwoordelijke 
garnalenkweek. Hoewel er gestreefd om te komen tot verbeterde milieuprestaties om de 
bio-fysische variabiliteit te verminderen, brengen deze nieuwe sturingssystemen, ofwel 
governance arrangementen, ook stringentere eisen voor kleine garnalenproducenten 
met zich mee, wat invloed heeft op hun toegang tot internationale markten.  
De doelstelling van dit proefschrift is de interacties tussen bestaande overheids- 
en non-gouvernmentele actoren en instituties te onderzoeken, om te komen tot een 
beter begrip van de manieren waarop de besluitvorming in de garnalenkweek in de 
kustzones van de Mekong Delta in Vietnam wordt beïnvloed door verschillende 
governance arrangementen die voortkomen uit de interacties tussen staat, markt en 
leefgemeenschappen op verschillende niveaus. De centrale vraagstelling is: hoe hebben 
verschillende materiële condities en sociale relaties een invloed op de effectiviteit en 
responsiviteit van governance arrangementen die meerdere doelen hebben, zoals het 
komen tot duurzaamheid op het gebied van rurale leefomstandigheden en milieu, en een 
verbeterde voedselkwaliteit. 
De studie richtte zich met name op de provinci Ca Mau, waar een groot deel van 
de Vietnameses garnalenproductie is geconcentreerd. Hier werden data verzamelt bij 
een groot aantal garnalekwekers, tussenhandelaren, overheidsambtenaren, 
vertegenwoordigers van niet-gouvernmentele organizaties en boerencoöperaties. 
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In het tweede hoofdstuk worden twee belangrijke transformaties in het beleid 
van de Vietnamese garnalenkweek in Ca Mau provincie belicht. De eerste transformatie 
is een interne beleidsverandering van kwantitatieve naar kwalitatieve productiedoelen 
die door de staat worden gesteld. De tweede transformatie is in reactie op de 
marktvraag, maar gericht op de toenemende zorgen over ‘kwaliteit’ ten aanzien van de 
milieu- en sociale effecten van tropische garnalenkweek. Onze bevindingen laten zien 
dat door deze tweede verandering in het governance systeem de overheid voor een 
reeks nieuwe uitdagingen wordt gesteld, omdat zij hier een tussenpositie krijgt met aan 
de ene kant mondiale markten en netwerken van (milieu-) belangenbehartiging met aan 
de andere kant de nationale garnalenindustrie. Tesamen leiden deze twee 
transformaties tot een complex samenspel tussen, enerzijds, de externe vraag-op 
mondiale markten en de behoefte van consumenten aan betere milieu- en sociale 
prestaties van de tropische garnalenindustrie, en, anderzijds, het overheidsbelang 
gelegen in het handhaven van de soevereine controle over de garnalenindustrie. De 
resultaten geven aan dat de Vietnamese overheid zich niet alleen zou moeten 
positioneren als controleur maar ook als facilitator van mondiale, private governance 
arrangementen, met name als garnalenproducenten en mondiale marktactoren 
betrokken zijn in transnationale netwerken van wet- en regelgeving welke 
geoperationaliseerd worden op lokaal niveau. Daarnaast zal de staat meer aandacht 
moeten hebben voor marktprikkels om participatie boeren in deze transnationale 
netwerken te bewerkstelligen en naleving van wetegeving te bevorderen.  
Het derde hoofdstuk geeft een analyse van de casus van de organische 
certificering van Naturland en de uitvoering hiervan. Organische certificeringwordt 
bevorderd om tegemoet te komen aan de internationale vraag naar organisch 
geproduceerde garnalen en het overheidsplan om de organische teelt van garnalen in 
het zuidelijke deel van Ca Mau tussen nu en 2015 op te schalen. De resultaten laten zien 
dat de certificering van Naturland de kloof tussen staat en het private domein lijkt te 
overbruggen door ervoor te zorgen dat er wederkerigheid is tussen het beheer van 
mangrove op landschapsniveau en aquacultuurpraktijken op bedrijfsniveau, en door 
regelgeving en verplichte productiestandaarden gelijk te trekken met de prikkels die 
worden geboden door de organische exportmarkt. Onze bevindingen bevestigen de 
stelling dat organische certificering een middel kan zijn om management op 
kwekerijniveau te verbinden met het duurzaam beheer van het landschap in Ca Mau dat 
gekarakteriseerdword door de integratie van mangrovebos en garnalenteelt in één 
agrarisch systeem. 
Dit kan echter alleen worden bereikt als er bepaalde problemen worden 
overwonnen. De eerste uitdaging is het spanningsveld te overbruggen tussen lokale 
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teeltpraktijken en extern gedefiniëerde en gesanctioneerde kwaliteitsstandaarden. De 
tweede uitdaging betreft de redelijke verdeling van het economische voordeel over de 
verschillende actoren in de marktketen van organische certificering; de geringe 
meerwaarde die telers van organische garnalen in Ca Mau krijgen, heeft zich ontwikkeld 
tot een belangrijke bron van spanningen. Deze ongelijke verdeling komt voort uit de 
machtsongelijkheid tussen tussenhandelaren en kleine producenten en de scheve balans 
van de belangen van kleine garnalenproducenten met milieubelangen en de 
economische welvaart van de consument. Ten slotte moet er meer aandacht worden 
gegeven aan de legitimiteit die wordt verleend aan door de private sector geleide 
auditingsystemen. De uitkomsten tonen verder aan dat participatie, auditing en 
ketenmanagement belangrijke elementen zijn van het Internal Control System (ICS) dat, 
in de huidige vorm, de verduurzaming van de certificering in de weg lijkt te staan.   
In het proefschrift (hoofdstuk 4)wordt vervolgens de ontwikkeling van 
coöperaties van garnalen-producenten verkend, alsomede door de overheid 
georganiseerde clusters van producenten die zijn gebaseerd op een beleid dat expliciet 
de toename van de competitiviteit van de sector op de internationale markt en de 
verbetering van de economische condities voor kleine producenten nastreeft. De 
resultaten geven aan dat verticale contractualisering in de vorm van contractteelt tussen 
clusters van garnalentelers met actoren uit beide kanten van de marktketen leidt tot 
economisch voordeel voor kleine producenten met een intensief productiesysteem. Het 
verbeterde extensieve systeem geeft verder een stimulans aan de ontwikkeling van 
coöperatieve productievormen die kleine producenten kunnen ondersteunen om zich te 
kunnen houden aan productie-georiënteerde kwaliteitsstandaarden, welke op hun beurt 
de toegang tot de internationale markt van deze productenten kan vergroten. Hoewel er 
mogelijkheden zijn voor kleine extensieve producenten om verticale contractualisering 
met andere actoren in de marktketen te realiseren, zijn zij minder in staat om dit te 
bewerkstelligen dan intensieve telers. Deze casus bevestigt zodoende de stelling dat de 
ontwikkeling van clusters van garnalenkwekers niet alleen gericht moet zijn op het 
verbeteren van de efficiëntie van de productie, maar ook op een succesvolle integratie in 
de marktketen, het produceren van veilige producten van hoge kwaliteit en 
betrokkenheid bij het bevorderen van duurzame beheerspraktijken op de werkvloer van 
de bedrijven.  
De laatste casus bekijkt garnalenteelt in de bredere context van de bevordering 
van de ecologische functie in het agrarisch systeem dat het beheer van mangrovebos 
met garnalenteelt combineert. De nadruk in dit hoofdstuk ligt op het zoeken naar de 
manieren waarop marktprikkels voor garnalenproducenten kunnen worden gegeven 
waardoor zij mangroves planten en beschermen. Dit wordt gedaan via een analyse van 
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de besluitvorming van garnalenproducenten en hun percepties van mangroves in relatie 
tot overheidgestuurde governance arrangementen, met betrekking tot de verkaveling op 
bedrijven en de verdeling van de winst uit de opbrensgten van de exploitatie van 
mangroves. De uitkomsten tonen aan dat de perceptie van de producenten op de rol en 
waarde van de mangroves positief is, en dat zij bereid zijn om mangroves te planten en 
te beschermen om zowel economische als milieuredenen. Daarnaast is het hun wens om 
de mangroves beheren, hoewel de bossen nog steeds vallen onder de wet- en 
regelgeving van de staat. De besluitvorming van garnalentelers is echter sterk 
afhankelijk van de manier waarop het beleid met betrekking tot de winstdeling uit de 
inkomsten van de exploitatie van de mangrovebossen, wordt geïmplementeerd door 
staatgestuurde bosbeheerbesturen en bosbouwbedrijven. De studie laat zien dat, in de 
context van het integrale model van garnaalteelt en mangrovebeheer, het idee dat 
garnalenproductie de belangrijkste oorzaak is voor ontbossing en verval moet worden 
herzien, omdat het inkomen van de kwekers toeneemt als mangroves onderdeel zijn van 
het productiesysteem. Hiermee wordt bewezen dat garnalenkwekers in potentie de 
meest belanghebbenden zijn om de mangroves te planten, beschermen en beheren als 
zij de volle rechten en verantwoordelijkheden over de bossen zouden hebben. Vanuit dit 
perspectief is extensieve garnalenproductie potentiëel een mangrove-vriendelijke bron 
van inkomsten die ook kan bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling en bescherming van de 
mangroves.  
Governance is een politiek proces dat gaat over hoe macht is verdeeld tussen 
belanghebbenden, waarbij verschillende groepen kunnen participeren en controleren, 
en gebruik kunnen maken van hulpbronnen, op een manier die transparant is voor alle 
betrokkenen. De vier casussen geven duidelijk weer dat in Vietnam marktgeleide en 
staatgestuurde governance processen over natuurlijke hulpbronnen in toenemende 
mate van elkaar afhankelijk zijn, verbonden door krachten werkzaam op lokaal en 
mondiaal niveaul die informatie-, goederen-, en financiële stromen creëren en reguleren. 
Institutionele arrangementen vanuit de overheid en niet-gouvernementele organisaties 
geïnitieerd, met de daarbij horende politieke, sociale, culturele en milieuachtergronden, 
voortkomend uit deze dynamiek tussen lokale en mondiale processen, beïnvloeden de 
besluitvorming over het gebruik, regelgeving en management van aquatische 
hulpbronnen. Het onderzoek geeft daarom een wetenschappelijke basis voor 
aanbevelingen betreffende de verbetering van governance arrangementen voor 
kustgebieden en sociaal-politiek terrein op nationaal en internationaal schaalniveau. 
Aangezien deze governance arrangement een reactie zijn op de complexiteit en 
veelzijdige aard van milieuproblemen, zal in bij de implemmatie van deze aanbevelingen 
rekening met deze niveaus moeten worden houden. Het maken van verbinden tussen 
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schaalniveaus door middel van governance arrangementen is een belangrijk punt voor 
de verbetering van milieubeheer en –beleid. In deze context wordt het begrip 
ecologische veerkracht (resilience) gedefiniëerd als de capaciteit van sociale en 
ecologische systemen om verstoringen op te vangen en de basisfunctie en structuur te 
behouden, vaak gebruiktdat in relatie tot een debat over de duurzaamheid van de 
samenleving en de respectievelijke leefomgeving. De resultaten laten zien dat de drie 
bestudeere governance arrangementen een (potentiele) impact hebben op ecologische 
veerkracht van kustgebieden waarin zij middelen bieden om management en beheer op 
bedrijfsniveau te koppelen aan de duurzaamheid van het kustlandschap. Het 
‘garnalentelerscluster’ model kan worden gezien als een middel om op bedrijfsniveau 
waterbeheer en ziektecontrole te verbinden, en door de overheid gestuurd bosbeleid 
geeft middelen om het management van mangroves op bedrijfsniveau te koppelen aan 
het niveau van het kustkustlandschap. Tot slot, organische certificering voorziet in het 
verbinden van management op bedrijfsniveau met de duurzaamheid van het landschap, 
door middel van zowel garnalenteelt als het beheer mangrovebos op het niveau van het 
bedrijf.  
De resultaten van dit onderzoek laten ook zien dat twee private governance 
arrangementen (potentiële) gevolgen hebben voor de sociale veerkracht van 
kustgebieden, door de koppeling van milieuprocessen in kustgebieden met processen in 
mondiale marktketens. Certificering heeft de potentie om de legitimiteit van bestaande 
systemen te beïnvloeden. Uit de casus van de garnalenproducentenclusters blijkt dat het 
creëren van ‘economies of scale’ voor telers het belangrijkste effect op de marktketen 
heeft. Dit is met name relevant in de verbeterde extensieve garnalenteelt, waarbij de 
producenten in een meer gefragmenteerde keten opereren dan in intensieve 
garnalenproductie. Clusters dragen ook bij aan de verbetering van (horizontale) relaties 
tussen producenten en leggen een basis voor een betere (verticale) coördinatie in de 
marktketen. De bevindingen wijzen uit dat, hoewel alle governance arrangementen het 
management op bedrijfsniveau als object voor regulering beschouwen, zij in potentie 
het duurzaam beheer van het kustlandschap kunnen beïnvloeden. Op die manier hebben 
zij de mogelijkheid om positieve invloed uit te oefenen op de sociaal-economische 
veerkracht van de garnalenindustrie en kustgebieden, maar in veel gevallen is dit 
potentieel nog niet ten volle benut.  
Om de mogelijkheden in het sturen van de Vietnamese aquacultuur voor het 
behoud van ruraal levensonderhoud, duurzaamheid in milieutermen, en een verbeterde 
voedselkwaliteit, en daarmee een vorm van sociaal-ecologische veerkracht, te kunnen 
waarmaken, moet er een aantal problemen worden overwonnen. Deze kunnen worden 
geclassificeerd in drie groepen. Ten eerste, (negatieve) percepties ten aanzien van de 
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behoeften en vermogens van de garnalenkwekers moeten worden veranderd. Ten 
tweede, de ongelijke machtsverhoudingen tussen producenten en andere actoren, die 
leiden to een oneerlijke winstverdeling voor de producenten, moeten worden verbeterd. 
Ten derde, de toekomst van de monitoring en sturing van marktketens moet worden 
geduid in het licht van de veranderende rollen van de overheid. De governance 
arrangementen en de effecten op de sociale veerkracht van kustgebieden moeten 
worden geanalyseerd in de context van bestaande sociale relaties waar overheid en non-
gouvernementele actoren ieder hun verschillende rol hebben. 
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